Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1964

The Speaking of John Sharp Williams in the League of Nations
Debates, 1918-1920.
Jerry Allen Hendrix
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Hendrix, Jerry Allen, "The Speaking of John Sharp Williams in the League of Nations Debates, 1918-1920."
(1964). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 980.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/980

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

T h is d is s e r ta tio n has b e e n
m ic r o film e d e x a c tly a s r e c e iv e d

65-3379

H ENDRIX, J e r r y A llen , 1 9 3 4 TH E SPEAKING O F JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS
IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS DEBATES,
1 9 1 8 -1 9 2 0 .
L o u isia n a State U n iv e r sity , P h .D ., 1964
S p e e c h -T h e a te r

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE SPEAKING OF JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS IN THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS DEBATES, 1918-1920

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Speech

by
Jerry Allen Hendrix
B.A., East Texas State College, 1956
M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1957
August, 1964

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The writer is indebted for generous guidance and assistance to
Professor Owen M. Peterson, director of the study, and to the members
of the examining committee, Professors Waldo W. Braden, Claude L.
Shaver, Burl Noggle, and John P, Moore.

The writer also expresses

grateful appreciation to Mrs. Jennie Beth Clark of the LSU Library
School for the insights gained from her personal acquaintance with John
Sharp Williams.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENT..................................................
LIST OF TABLES

ii

....................... . ...................

v

A B S T R A C T .........................................................

vi

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION

...........................................

1

Purpose of the Study
Plan of the Study
Sources and Contributory Studies
Authenticity of Speech Texts
II.

THE S P E A K E R .................

18

Williams the Debater
Appearance and Personality
Speech Preparation and Delivery
III.

THE PRE-COVENANT DEBATE, DECEMBER 2, 1918-FEBRUARY 14,
1 9 1 9 ................................................

43

The Occasion
The Audience
The Representative Speech
IV.

THE UNOFFICIAL COVENANT DEBATE, FEBRUARY 15, 1919JULY 10, 1919.......................................... 131
The Occasion
The Audience
The Representative Speech

V.

THE FIRST COVENANT DEBATE, JULY 10-NOVEMBER 19, 1919. .
The Occasion
The Audience
The Representative Speech
iii

223

iv
Chapter
VI.

Page
THE SECOND COVENANT DEBATE, NOVEMBER 20, 1919MARCH 19, 1920 ........................................

305

The Occasion
The Audience
The Representative Speech
VII.

C O N C L U S I O N S ...............................................358

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................... 362
APPENDIX I ......................................................... 373

LIST OF TABLES

Table
I

j
Newspaper Polls ..........................................

v

Page
161

ABSTRACT
Significant among the advocates of United States entry into the
League of Nations during the debate in the United States Senate concern
ing ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was Senator John Sharp
Williams of Mississippi.

From December 3, 1918, through March 18, 1920,

Williams delivered twenty-one addresses from the Senate floor urging
ratification of the treaty and the attached covenant of the League of
Nations.
Each of the four periods of the debate was studied in terms of
the occasions on which Williams spoke, his listeners, and one representa
tive speech from each phase, examined as a stimulus designed to elicit
from his listeners a particular response.
This evaluation of Williams' speaking, accordingly, was con
cerned, first, with the establishment of causality between his appear
ances before the Senate and that body's subsequent rejection of the
treaty and, second, with Williams' degree of technical perfection as a
speaker.
Evidence does not exist to support an inference isolating a
speech or a group of Williams' speeches as the stimulus directly respon
sible for the behavioral responses of his listeners in this situation.
Nor does existing evidence permit the establishment of any degree of
causality between Williams' speaking and the defeat of the treaty.
In pleading his cause before his fellow senators, moreover,
vi

vii
Williams failed to utilize the available means of oral persuasion.

His

singular strength lay consistently in his dependence upon ethical proof.
That is, he depicted himself as a man of high integrity and good will,
whose aim was peace among the nations of the world, a goal to which most
senators at least paid lip service.
Generally haphazard in organizing his speeches, all of which were
impromptu, Williams refused to concern himself with his listeners1
ability to comprehend and retain his arguments.

Since his position in

the debate was well known by all his listeners, Williams should have
organized his speeches more obviously by clearly stating his theses, by
previewing his arguments, by introducing each argument with appropriate
transitional material, and by summarizing his arguments in his concluding
statements to refresh his listeners1 memories.
Williams further failed logically to substantiate arguments vital
to his cause;

that the discussion in the Senate of the League had been

unfair, that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error, and
that the United States should enter the League without the Lodge reserva
tions .
The speaker's use of emotional proof, his attempt to stimulate
within his listeners emotional responses to his arguments, was limited
essentially to appeals to the listeners' motives of self-preservation,
patriotism, and social responsibility.

This means of persuasion was

probably restricted by Williams' recognition of his colleagues' lack of
susceptibility to emotive speech.
Consistently verbose and rambling in his style, Williams' average
sentence length was forty words.

The impromptu nature of his addresses,

viii
together with his propensity toward wordiness, probably contributed most
to his failure to achieve clearness and impressiveness.
A final appraisal of the planter-spokesman for the League of
Nations must recognize the impossibility of the establishment of
causality as well as the technical failure of Williams as a speaker.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Organizations aimed ostensibly at the establishment of inter
national peace such as the Quadruple Alliance, 1815; the American Peace
Society, 1828; the International Peace Conference, 1848; the Interna
tional League for Peace and Freedom, 1867; the International Women's
Peace Society in Europe, 1896, and the Nobel Peace Foundation, 1910,
illustrate Fleming's observation that "dreams of a parliament of man and
federation of the world began centuries ago and plans for a league to
keep the peace were proposed long before the twentieth century."'*'
The first important American peace proponent was Theodore
Roosevelt, who, prepared by previous experience as mediator in the RussoJapanese war, told the Nobel Prize Committee in 1910 that ". . . i t would
be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would
form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but
to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others."
Still a powerful advocate of a league of nations to preserve
peace as late as 1915,

3

the Rough Rider was joined in his belief by his

^Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations,
1918-1920 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 3.
2The Independent, LKVIII (May 12, 1910), 1027.
O
Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York:
Putnam's Sons, 1925), pp. 80-81.
1

G. P.

2
former protege, William Howard Taft, a league spokesman as early as 1914
and leader of the League to Enforce Peace.

This organization, formed in

Philadelphia's Independence Hall on June 17, 1915, had as its objective
the establishment of an agreement among nations:
1.

2.
3.

4.

To submit all justifiable questions to an international
court of justice both upon the merits and upon any issue
as to its jurisdiction;
To submit all other questions to a council of concilia
tion for hearing, consideration, and recommendation;
To jointly use forthwith both their economic and military
forces against any member committing acts of hostility
against another before submitting to arbitration or con
ciliation;
To hold periodic conferences to formulate and codify inter
national law.-*
A third distinguished American, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of

Massachusetts, joined the league forces when, in Washington on May 27,
1916, he addressed a meeting of the League to Enforce Peace.
Probably it will be impossible to stop all wars, but it certainly
will be possible to stop some wars, and thus diminish their
number. The way in which this problem must be worked out must
be left to this league and to those who are giving this great
subject the study which it deserves. I know the obstacles.
I
know how quickly we shall be met with the statement that this
is a dangerous question which you are putting into your argument,
that no nation can submit to the judgment of other nations, and
we must be careful at the beginning not to attempt too much. I
know the difficulties which arise when we speak of anything
which seems to involve an alliance, but I do not believe that
when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant
for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized
nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war
and encourage peace.®

^Address before the Century Club in New York, October, 1914.
Cited in F. H. Lynch, "Taft's Labors for International Peace," Current
History.XXXII (May, 1930), 297.
^Fleming, 0 £. c i t ., pp. 8-9. The definitive work on this
subject is Ruhl F. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

£
York:

Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp.

the League of Nations (New
131-2.

4
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Speaking from the same platform was the man who would become the
most important advocate of a league of nations and whom both Roosevelt
and Lodge would soon bitterly oppose on this issue.

Recorded as privately

favoring an organized peace movement as early as 1914,^ Woodrow Wilson
publicly pledged his support of the League to Enforce Peace for the first
time as he spoke, following Lodge, on the evening of May 27, 1916.
Wilson contended that the United States at the close of the war should
enter into a universal association of nations to preserve the freedom of
the seas and to prevent any war begun without warning or without full
Q

submission of the causes of the conflict to the peoples of the world.
Anxious personally to assist in the actual institution of a
league of nations and, of all league proponents, in the most favorable
position to do so, Wilson further developed his proposals in his "War
Message," April 2, 1917; his appeal to the Russian people, May 26, 1917;
and, ultimately, in his "Fourteen Points," January 8, 1918.^
To implement his fourteenth point, "a general association of
nations" to secure "mutual guarantees of political independence and
territorial integrity to great and small states alike," however, Wilson
first had to contend with that Constitutionally created bludgeon of the

Wilson had told his brother-in-law, Dr. Stockton Axson, a
visitor in the White House, of his views favoring a league of nations.
Fleming, op. cit., p. 7.
®Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, The Public Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, III (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1925-27), 184-188.
^Ibid., "War Address" text, V, 17-21; "Appeal to Russian
People," V, 49-51; "Fourteen Points," V, 155-162.
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foreign policies of other less feared and hated Presidents, the Senate
of the United States.^

Acutely aware of the Constitutional provision

that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators
present concur," the Senate had sometimes rejected treaties for reasons
that had nothing to do with the wisdom of the foreign policy involved.
Holt has noted that these reasons "can usually be traced either to the
struggle between the President and Senate for the control of foreign
policy or to the warfare of the President's political opponents who hope
to secure some partisan advantage."•*■•*•
Resistance in the Senate to the view that the United States
should enter a league of nations had been expressed as early as January
5, 1917 by Senator William E. Borah.

Link has suggested, however, that

three of Wilson's decisions made between October and December, 1918, were
the most influential factors in crystalizing Senate opposition to ratifi
cation of the treaty:
The first was his decision to issue an appeal to the country
on October 25 for the election of a Democratic Congress, and by
so doing to make the forthcoming election a specific test of
national confidence in his conduct of foreign affairs. The
second was his decision to ignore the Senate and the Republican
party in discussions of the possible terms of the settlement
and in the appointment of the American delegation to the Paris
conference, and to name only such men as he thought would be
loyal to him and his ideals and subordinate to his direction.

■*-^For the history of conflict between Presidents and the Senate
over the making of foreign policy, see W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated
by the Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933).
■^Holt,

jd£.

cit., p. v.

The third was Wilson's decision to go to Paris in person, as the
head of the American Commission.
Link further observes that, although the first two decisions were "egre
gious mistakes," the wisdom or foolishness of these decisions is far
less important than the fact that they clearly transformed into a parti
san issue the ratification of whatever treaty Wilson might help to write.
In addition to making certain that Republicans would oppose and Democrats
would support his treaty, Wilson, by ignoring the Senate in his appoint
ment of commissioners and by deciding to go himself to Paris, "made it
inevitable that the treaty fight would renew in virulent from the old
conflict between the President and the upper house for control of foreign
policy. "^3
Still another factor which aroused conflict in the Senate was
Wilson's determination to incorporate in the peace treaty the Covenant
of his proposed League of Nations.

Confident that the Senate would not

dare to reject the entire treaty and "break the heart of the world," he
defiantly boasted that
When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find
the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty
tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from
the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure. The
structure of peace will not be vital without the League of
,
Nations, and no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him.
Braden has divided the ensuing senate debate on the Versailles
Treaty into four phases:

(1) the phase beginning with the opening of

the lame duck session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, which convened

•^Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore:
Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 128.
13Ibid., p. 129.
*^New York Times, March 5, 1919, p. 1.

Johns
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December 2, 1918, through the middle of February, 1919, during which the
Republicans attacked Wilson and the League without any specific knowl
edge of what would be contained in the treaty;

(2) the second phase,

which began when the first unofficial draft of the Covenant became
available in the middle of February, 1919, through July 10, 1919, when
Wilson submitted the official treaty to the Senate for ratification;
(3) the third phase, from July 10 until November 19, 1919, when the
Senate rejected the Treaty for the first time; and (4) the final phase,
which concluded with the second defeat of the treaty in March, 1920. ^
These four phases of the debate will be known in this study as
the following:

(1) the pre-covenant debate; (2) the unofficial covenant

debate; (3) the first covenant debate; and (4) the second covenant
debate.
Significant among League advocates in the Senate and, in
Braden's view, the only senator "able to hold his own with Borah and
other League opponents,” ° was John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, who
from December 3, 1918, through March 18, 1920, delivered twenty-one
major addresses from the Senate floor urging ratification of the treaty
and the attached Covenant of the League of Nations.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to assess the influence upon public
behavior of Williams' speeches in the Senate. According to Thonssen and

■*'%aldo W. Braden, "The Senate Debate on the League of Nations,
1918-1920: An Overview," Southern Speech Journal, XXV (Summer, 1960),
274.
16Ibid., 281.
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Baird, ' the extent of the influence of speeches upon the behavior of
specific audiences and, ultimately, upon the behavior of society may be
determined in terms of six measures:
to the speeches;

(1)

the immediate surface response

(2) the readability of the speeches;

perfection, or quality, of the speeches;
judging trends of the future;

(3) the technical

(4) the speaker's wisdom in

(5) the delayed response to the speeches;

and (6) the long-range effects of the speeches on the social group.

Plan of the Study
To achieve these goals of analysis and evaluation, the study
will include seven chapters.

Chapter One, an introduction, provides a

brief background of the debate and outlines the purpose and methodology
of the study.
Chapter Two, "The Speaker," presents a brief treatment of
Williams' background, education, speech training, the few available
findings on his speech preparation and delivery, and an outline of his
part in the development of the controversy prior to the beginning of
the debates.Chapters Three through Six constitute analyses and evaluations
of Williams' speaking in the four phases of the debate, each chapter
including a description of the speaking occasions, the listeners, the
Mississippian's speeches during the period, and a detailed analysis
and evaluation of one representative speech.
17

York:

^'Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New
Ronald Press Co., 1948), pp. 455-58.

l®Ibid.

The seventh chapter will constitute general conclusions of the
study.

Sources and Contributory Studies
Most valuable of primary sources are the Congressional Record,
which contains all the speech texts selected for study, and the John
Sharp Williams Papers in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of
Congress, which provide considerable insight into the Mississippian1s
motivation and behavior.
The Senate debate has been treated extensively by Fleming,
Bailey,

20

Holt,

21

Micken,

22

Chappell,

23

and Braden.

24

19

More intensive

studies of the roles of various individuals involved include those of
25
Osborn, J who has written the definitive biography of Williams;
2
Braden, ° who pioneered the rhetorical study of individual senators

^Fleming, o£. cit.
2n

York:

Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New
Macmillan, 1945).
^ H o l t , ££. cit.

^ R a l p h A. Micken, A Rhetorical Study of the Senate Debates on
the League of Nations (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1948).
22
^ JBen A. Chappell, An Analysis of the Arguments Used in the
United States Senate Against America's Entry into the League of Nations
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1963).
^ Braden, op. cit.

2S
George C. Osborn, John Sharp Williams, Planter-Statesman of
the Deep South (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1943).
^■°Waldo W. Braden, A Rhetorical Criticism of the Invention of
William E. Borah1s Senate Speeches on the League of Nations, 1918-1920
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1945).
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involved in the debate; Henderlider;
Ol

OO

McKenna;J-L Leopold;J

27

Garraty;

28

Blum;

29

Johnson;

30

QO

and Jessup.

The entire speaking careers of

Senators Cummins,^ J o h n s o n , K n o x , 36 and Reed^^ have been studied
rhetorically and are of some value in the present study.
Williams' speaking in the League of Nations controversy has been
studied in terms basically of the speaker's argumentation, with little
attention to emotional or ethical proof and no treatment of style or
delivery.3®
^ C l a i r Henderlider, An Evaluation of the Persuasive Techniques
of Woodrow Wilson in His League of Nations Speeches, September 4-25,
1919 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1945).
28john A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, A Biography (New York:
Knopf, 1953).
^ J o h n M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1951).
on
C. 0. Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York: Longmans, Green
and Company, 1936).
^^Marian C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor:
Press*1961).

(Boston:

University of Michigan

•^Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition
Little, Brown and Company, 1954).
33p. c. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York:

Dodd, Mead and Company,

1938).
3^E. W. Harrington, The Public Speaking Career of Albert B.
Cummins (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1938).
■^Egbert R. Nichols, Jr., An Investigation of the Contributions
of the Public Speaking of Hiram W. Johnson to His Political Career
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California,
1948).
36Thomas A. Hopkins, A Comprehensive Study of the Oratory of
Philander C. Knox (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University, 1954).
Jack C. Bain, A Rhetorical Criticism of the Speeches of James
A. Reed (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1953).
3®Stanford P. Gwin, An Analysis of the Speaking of John Sharp
Williams During the League of Nations Controversy in the Senate, 19181920 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Southern Mississippi, 1963).
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Although his biography of Williams includes a chapter on the
Mississippian's role in the Senate treaty fight, Osborn limits his
analysis and evaluation of Williams' speaking to observations of a
general nature and makes no attempt at the establishment of causation.^
Micken also treats Williams' speaking in the debate in general terms,
although he acknowledges Williams' importance as one of the leading
figures in the fight

Authenticity of Speech Texts
Two reasons have been advanced to indicate that the remarks of
Congressmen as they appear in the Congressional Record are not neces
sarily the remarks as actually spoken.

First, it is argued that each

member of Congress has the right to revise, delete, or amplify his
remarks before they arfe'printed, or to ", .. , omit the speech in its
entirety or even substitute a new text." ^

A second objection to textual

authenticity is that the editors of the Record freely correct errors or
discrepancies of diction, grammar, quotation, reference, and style as a
matter of form, even before submitting the copy to the speakers involved.

42

Micken, however, argues that the Record text is practically

authentic, since (1) busy in the press of legislation, the senators can
give only perfunctory attention to revision of proofs; (2) on many
occasions senators must be limited in their editing by the rush to print
OQ

70sborn, og. cit.
^^Micken, o p . cit., pp. 30-31.
^ Z o n Robinson, "Are Speeches in Congress Reported Accurately?,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXVIII (February, 1942), 10.
^Elizabeth G. McPherson, "Reporting the Debates of Congress,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXVIII (April, 1942), 148.
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which characterizes the publication of the Record; (3) the honor and
good sense of the senators, as well as their jealousy of forensic repu
tations, make extensive tampering with remarks unwise; (4) the Record
text is the official version of the League debate upon which the senators
were willing to stand, with no denial by any senator that he was properly
quoted on earlier comments when the Record was referred to during the
argument; and (5) the Record text is essentially oral rather than
literary in style.
The debate contained in the Record for 1919 does not smell of
the lamp, it is not overly literary, it has not wholly lost the
flavor of immediate, often unpremeditated oral expression. The
writer can vouch for the verisimilitude of these debates as re
ported, as can anyone who reads them. They still strike fire
in the advocate's heart, still elicit the peculiar thrill of a
point well made, the anticipatory satisfaction of a dilemma ap
proached and skirted, and the special delights of forensic
thrust and parr y . ^
In addition to the evidence establishing textual authenticity
advanced by Micken, other evidence exists to verify the texts as they
appear in the Congressional Record.
First, the reports of Williams' speeches in the New York Times,
the most complete texts to be found aside from those in the Congressional
Record itself, may be considered the unedited versions of the speeches
recorded by staff reporters rather than copied from the Record, which
could have been tampered with prior to public exposure.^

That the

reports in the Times constitute a separate source of texts from those in
the Record is indicated by Chester M. Lewis, Chief Librarian of the New
York Times.

^Micken, ££. cit., p. 12.
^ T h e limitation of space in the newspaper naturally required
the selection of only the most significant excerpts from the individual
senators participating in the debates.

12
The Congressional Record material probably appears about the
same time as the morning edition of the Times. Presumably, then
we would not wait for publication of the Record to obtain texts.^
This opinion was verified by Lauren D. Lyman, a member of the Times
staff in 1918.
The New York Times relied on its staff reporters for the cover
age of the debates in Congress at the period of John Sharp
Williams' time. It may well be that in the Times' Current
History and in the Sunday features the writers used the Con
gressional Record for reference, but for the daily stories the
coverage was from the floor and the gallery directly by the
staff
Moreover, a verbatim comparison of the excerpts of the speeches
published in the Times with the texts in the Record reveals significant
similarity.

The differences seem to be those that would normally be

expected of a reporter attempting to copy the remarks of a speaker,
rather than those that would be expected if the reporter were taking
his excerpts directly from the Record itself.
A first minor difference appears in the paragraph structure,
punctuation and grammatical tenses.

A second difference is the substi

tution of words in the Times excerpts that are similar in meaning but
phonetically different.

This discrepancy in transcription could have

been caused by the position of the reporter in the press gallery behind
the speaker who customarily addressed the Chair, thereby keeping his
back to the press gallery reporters.

These seemingly phonetic substi

tutions include "exploit" for "exhibition," "heresy" for "idiocy,"
"constitutional-oiled arrangements" for "constitutional toilet arrange
ments," and "cosmetics upon the base" for "cosmetics upon the face."

^ L e t t e r of Chester M. Lewis to the writer, July 25, 1963.
^ L e t t e r of Lauren D. Lyman to the writer, August 14, 1963.
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Finally, there are omissions of words in the Times excerpts, as compared
with the same excerpts from the Record, which indicate that the report
ers were either unable or unwilling to quote Williams entirely verbatim.
These omissions do not seem significant enough, however, to justify
exclusion from this study of an analysis and evaluation of the speaker's

style.^
In addition to the validity of the New York Times text excerpts
as separate reports from those of the texts in the Congressional
Record and the significant similarity between these two separate
textual sources, a second reason exists for trusting the authenticity
of the Record texts.

Had Williams wished to make himself appear in a

better light than afforded by the Record, he surely would have edited
out all the extraneous remarks, such as interruptions by other senators
and the heckling and disapproval expressed toward him by the occupants
of the galleries.

The fact that he did not exclude these often un

favorable extraneous remarks lends credibility to the accuracy of the
Record.
A third reason for accepting the Congressional Record's authen
ticity as a textual source is the loose conversational style of
Williams' sentences.

The style is not comparable with other examples

^ S e e Appendix 1. I have.included comparable excerpts from
both the Times and the Record side by side so that the reader of this
study may make his own comparison of texts.
I have enclosed the
differences within brackets.

14
of Williams' published works.

48

Had Williams edited his remarks before

their publication in the Record, he very likely would have corrected his
rambling style and possibly would have revised his rambling organization.
A final reason for accepting the textual authenticity of the
Congressional Record is that on the one known occasion during the
League debates when Williams did edit his remarks before publication,
he freely acknowledged making the revisions in his personal corres
pondence, and the newspaper accounts in this instance differ signifi
cantly from the Record text.
Following his fiery speech of October 16, 1919 against IrishAmericans who placed the welfare of Ireland above that of America, he
deleted from his remarks, before their publication, some things which
he felt he should not have said.

In a letter to W. D. Vandiver,

Williams explained
I was not drunk when I made the speech but I did have a drink or
two and there were some things I said that I thought I ought not
to have said and I struck them out of the Record,--that part
about threatening letters. I was in a bad humor when I made the
speech or I would have confined the speech to the Sinn Feiners
and I would have given the facts about the Irish pretense in the
Revolutionary and Civil W a r s . ^

^®See Thomas Jefferson, His Permanent Influence on American
Institutions (New York: Columbia University Press), 1913. This is a
series of eight carefully edited lectures delivered at Columbia Univer
sity . See also "The University of Virginia and the Development of
Thomas Jefferson's Educational Ideas," an address before the St. Louis
meeting of the Association of State Universities, June 28, 1904;
"Federal Usurpations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, XXXII (1908), 185-211; "Control of Corporations, Persons
and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce," Ibid;, XLII (1912), 310-330;
and "The Only Peace Worth Having," Win the War for Permanent Peace (New
York: League to Enforce Peace, 1918), pp. 173-78. The latter is an
address delivered before a League to Enforce Peace assembly in Phila
delphia, May 16, 1918. Its style shows remarkable restraint and com
pactness in comparison with Williams' speeches appearing in the Record
during the League debates.
^ L e t t e r of John Sharp Williams to W. D. Vandiver, October 25,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
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Williams also apologized the following day to Irish-American Senator
James D. Phelan.
I am afraid I said some things in my speech yesterday calculated
to hurt your feelings and the feelings of some other good friends
of mine of Irish derivation.
I am awfully sorry for it.
I kept
my speech out of the Record with a view of revising it, and shall
revise out of it what I think could be offensive to anybody,
personally or racially.^®
On October 17, 1919, the Chicago Daily Tribune, exulted from its
front page that "Williams rips Irish from 'I1 to 'H' in Senate," "Goes
the limit despite friends' plea,

'cut it out.'""^

That newspaper's

account of Williams' remarks is verified by the account appearing the
• *

CO

same day in the New York Tribune.

Neither of these accounts agree

with the version of the same speech in the Congressional Record.
is

the only occasion during the entire debates in the Senate

League

This

of the

issue on which Williams' remarks in the Record do notcoincide
CO

with those published in the newspapers.
The texts of the speeches of John Sharp Williams which appear
in the Congressional Record are sufficiently authentic to justify
rhetorical analysis, including stylistic analysis, for the following
reasons:
1.

Williams was generally too busy to edit his speeches.

■^Letter of John Sharp Williams to James D. Phelan,. October 17,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
^Chicago Daily Tribune, October 17, 1919, p. 1.
~*^New York Tribune, October 17, 1919, p. 2.
C O

A few excerpts of the speech appear in the New York Times,
October 17, 1919, p. 2; but not to the extent that the Senator is quoted
in the anti-League Chicago Daily Tribune and New York Tribune.
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2.

The rush of the publication of the Congressional Record did
not allow Williams enough time to edit his speeches.

3.

The honor and good sense of the senators precluded their
tampering with their speeches.

4.

The senators stood on the Record texts as the official
version of the debates and never complained of having been
misquoted when quoted from that source.

5.

The Record text of Williams' speeches is essentially oral
rather than literary in style.

6.

The textual excerpts in the New York Times may be consid
ered unedited versions of Williams' speeches, and they are
decidedly similar to those texts in the Congressional
Record.

7.

Williams did not edit out of the Record texts extraneous
interruptions and other expressions which tend to place
him in an unfavorable light.

8.

Williams did not polish the style of the texts so that they
would be consistent with the literary style of his other
publications.

9.

On the one known occasion when Williams did edit his remarks
before their publication in the Record, he freely confesses
having made the deletions, and the newspaper accounts of
his remarks differ significantly from those appearing in
the Congressional Record.

The writer therefore considers the speech texts in the Congres
sional Record sufficiently accurate to evaluate their quality, or
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technical perfection, in terms of structure, logical proof, emotional
proof, ethical proof, and style.-*^

-^Detailed criteria for such evaluation are set forth in
Thonssen and Baird, jog. cit., pp. 331-404.

CHAPTER II

THE SPEAKER
John Sharp Williams (1854-1932), the descendent of distin
guished military forefathers who had served as officers in the Revolu
tionary, Mexican, and Civil Wars, began his own twenty-eight year
career in the public service with his election to the United States
House of Representatives in 1893.
Interested as a youth in such books as the works of Herodotus,
Plutarch, Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe, Swift, Pope, Fielding, Smollett,
Hume, Robertson, Gibbon, Burns, and Scott, John Sharp Williams began
his education during the Civil War in private schools in Yazoo City.^At the close of the war, when Williams was nine years old, he was
placed in a Memphis school.

Becoming seriously interested in religion

while in Memphis as a youth and from a family of Methodists and Presby
terians, he heeded the old Southern aristocratic myth that, of the many
roads to Heaven, a gentleman would travel only the Episcopalian way,
and joined the Episcopal Church.
At age thirteen Williams entered the Kentucky Military Institute
at Lyndon, of which he was later to remark, "I spent two years as a
cadet being taught the duty of not walking pigeontoed and [of] getting
up to a drumbeat and going to bed when a horn blew."
1
■•■Osborn, o£. cit., p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
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young cadet often played baseball, his primary interest was books,
especially those on history, English, mathematics, and Latin.
In 1870 the Mississippian began his college education at the
Episcopalian University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee.

Member of

the Sigma Epsilon Society, an excellent student, and popular with
faculty and students alike, Williams nevertheless failed to finish his
education at Sewanee because of his natural independence, a personal
characteristic which was to become more apparent during his later ca
reer in public life.

Failing one morning to salute the university's

President, General William C. Gorgas, the Mississippian was promptly
dismissed and sent back to Cedar Grove Plantation, where, within a
few weeks he had decided to continue his studies at what was then re
cognized as the leading institution of higher learning in the South,
the University of Virginia.
John Sharp matriculated at the University at Charlottesville
at the middle of the session of 1870-71, remaining there until the
close of the regular session in the summer of 1873.
Rhetoric, along with Latin, modern languages, history, and
literature, was part of his first year's program.

His second year's

studies included French and moral philosophy, the latter under the
famed Professor William H. McGuffey, in whose class John Sharp won the
professor's annual prize for best scholar.

German, natural philosophy,

history, political science, and literature completed his third year's
studies.
Among the most important of student activities at the Univer
sity of Virginia at this time were those of the two literary societies,
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the Jefferson and the Washington.

Each society annually awarded a gold

medal to the ipember chosen by his associates as the best debater in the
senior class.

On the "society closing night" of 1873, the Jeffersonians

presented Williams its gold medal, an award to which the Mississippi
Senator later referred as one of the proudest moments of his life.
That same year the Virginia Beta Chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa
honorary scholastic society made Williams a member, not the least of
indications of his ability as a scholar.
Since the requirements for a degree at the University of
Virginia included subjects that were of no interest to Williams, he
decided, rather than taking a degree, to continue his education abroad
at the University of Heidelberg.
Osborn indicates that Williams may have been discouraged from
extensive study at Heidelberg by his distaste for the Prussian military
system which was an integral part of life at the German university.^
After eight months of attending lectures at Heidelberg, the Mississip
pian moved to a branch of the College of France at Dijon, where, re
maining for more than a year, he took courses in French literature and
French history.
His two

years in Europeprovided the future statesman with a

storeof experiences and information which few of his

later contempo

raries in national politics could equal.
Already
his return from

ambitious for a career in public life by the time of
Europe in 1876, Williams decided that his fortune lay

in a legal education.

3Ibid., p. 19.

That same year he entered the law school at the

21
University of Virginia, then under the direction of Professor John B.
Minor.

Although only eighteen per

cent of Professor Minor's law students

during

the years 1870-1880 were awarded their degrees, John Sharp distin

guished himself, not only by being among the small group of graduates,
but by completing his studies in the record time of one year.
A graduate of the University of Virginia Law School in 1877,
Williams that same year married Elizabeth Dial Webb of Livingston,
Alabama, whom he had met during his earlier study at Charlottesville.
Having worked during previous summer vacations for the Memphis law firm
of Turley, Harris, and McKisick, the Mississippian, already a member of
the Tennessee Bar, decided to return with his bride not to Memphis but
to the family plantation, Cedar Grove.

In addition to managing the

debt-ridden plantation, the young lawyer that same year opened a law
office in Yazoo City in partnership with D. R. Barnett, who agreed that
Williams would not be heavily employed in the summer months between
sessions of court.

Accordingly, the Williamses spent the first three

summers of their married life in Charlottesville, where John Sharp con
tinued his political education by reading books from the university
library.
In 1890 Williams announced
tion for United States Congressman
sional District.

that he intended to seek the nomina
from Mississippi's fifth Congres

Undismayed by his loss of the nomination in this first

attempt, he would try again in 1892.

Williams lost his first campaign

to Joseph H. Beeman, the Populist candidate and prominent member of the
Farmers Alliance of Mississippi.

In his second attempt, this time

against Populist candidate and Methodist minister of Attala county,
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W. P. Ratliff, Williams won the Democratic nomination, which in Missis
sippi is tantamount to election.

Thus John Sharp Williams went to

Washington in 1893 for the last session of the Fifty-second Congress.
Describing Williams as one of the "bright spots" in the Demo
cratic delegation, Colliers magazine notes that
when Senator Williams first came to Washington as a youthful
and unreconstructed rebel, he wouldn't walk up the front steps
of a building that was flying the United States flag over the
stoop, but no one in Congress better represents enlightened
Americanism than the gentleman from Mississippi.^
During his tenure in the House of Representatives^, Williams dis
tinguished himself as a prominent spokesman
The first of these was

in several important debates.

the controversy over the

Dingley tariff.

A

member of the minority opposition to the tariff, Williams protested
against the bill as it

was before the House and

ridiculed it afterits

passage.

southern Congressman was

virtually helpless

Although the

against the Republican protectionist majority, his speaking attracted
the favorable attention of the national press, as did his speaking
against the Gold Standard Act of 1900.
Most important of the issues on which Williams spoke in his
early political career, however, was that of American imperialism.

He

advanced three arguments in several speeches in the House against
United States expansion into the Philippines:

(1) it would require a

vast standing army which would bleed the substance of the people; (2)
the territory was not near our base of operations; and (3) the Filipinos
could not be assimilated as Americans.-*

In developing the latter

4Colliers, LIX (April 21, 1917), 15.
^Osborn, ££. cit., p. 87.
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argument, Williams indicated that he would never vote to annex oriental
pauper laborers in competition against his own constituents.
Having received national attention in his ten years of service
in the House of Representatives, Williams' name was placed before the
House as Democratic nominee for Speaker of the Fifty-eighth Congress.
The Republicans, controlling a majority of thirty-one votes, elected
their nominee, Joseph G. Cannon; Williams automatically became minority
leader.

As minority leader, he was appointed to the powerful Committees

on Ways and Means and Rules.

Having secured these appointments, he

resigned his positions on the Committees on Agriculture, Foreign Affairs,
and Insular Affairs, on which he had served ten, four, and two years
respectively.
Osborn attests to the wisdom of the Democrats' choice for their
new minority leader.
The qualifications upon which Williams was chosen minority
leader seem to have been his keen intellect, which had been
developed through extensive as well as intensive education,
his readiness and versatility upon the floor on all occasions,
the sincerity of his loyalty in courageously defending the
principles of Jeffersonian democracy, and his ever-present
sense of justice and courtesy in parliamentary routine.^
Sydnor further suggests Williams' success as minority leader.
"His immediate predecessors had exercised little authority, and the
Democrats had become noted for being as unrestrained as a herd of wild
steers.

With little apparent effort, Williams speedily brought order

out of c h a o s . O s b o r n adds to the picture of Williams, the Represent
ative, who

6Ibid., p. 107.
^Dictionary of American Biography, XX (New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1936), 278.

Charles
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. . . did not have the opportunity of proving himself a construc
tive statesman during his career in the House as he was, with the
exception of his first Congress, a member of the minority. His
constructive influence is shown in amendments to Republican
measures, in the change in policy of the Democrate of the House,
and in his definite influence on the Democratic party.®
Williams won a bitter Democratic primary contest with Governor
James K. Vardaman in 1907 for the United States Senate term which began
in 1911.

Although victor by only 648 votes, Williams' nomination re

turned him to Washington, where, at the special session of the Sixtysecond Congress, beginning on April 5, 1911, he first appeared as a
member of the Democratic minority in the Senate.^
Of the Mississippian's senatorial career, Sydnor observes that
His career in the lower house gave him immediate recognition in
the Senate, where he attained membership in the finance committee
and on the foreign relations committee; but since he no longer
had to fight against radical leadership in his party or against a
dominant opposition party, he appeared less prominent than for
merly. He was in close agreement with President Wilson in respect
to the entrance of the United States into the World War and its
vigorous prosecution, and he also strove to secure the entrance
of the United States into the League of Nations.
It is this last aspect of Williams' senatorial career, his part in the
battle for Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty, including
United States entrance into the League of Nations, with which this study
will be primarily concerned.
Williams the Debater
Bailey has described in general the Southern senators who par
ticipated in the League debate.
Q
Osborn, ££. cit., p. 142.
9Ibid., p. 174.
■^Sydnor, Dictionary of American Biography, p. 278.
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Most of the Democratic senators were from the Solid South, where
party loyalty was a fetish closely associated with racial
supremacy and the "Lost Cause" of 1861-1865. They were gener
ally the products of a one-party system, and some of them had
been elected and reelected for decades with little or no opposi
tion. It was said with more than a grain of truth that if a
Southern Democrat maintained his party allegiance, voted the
straight ticket, and kept out of jail, he could be reasonably
sure of being returned to Congress. This situation did not
make for the ablest type of legislator
John Sharp Williams, however, does not seem to fit Bailey's stereotype
of mediocrity.

Gratham observes that

The most vociferous Southern Wilsonian, and probably the ablest,
was John Sharp Williams. He was constantly championing Wilson
and the League, was not connected with compromise negotiations,
and approved of only one of the Lodge reservations. He poured
contempt upon irreconcilables, and once charged the League
opponents with finding in the treaty "Sun specks, mare's nests,
new discoveries of presidential sins."^
Mowry describes Williams as ". . . brilliant, unconventional, and ami
able,

. . . the essence of cotton-planting traditionalism, an ardent

advocate of states' rights, and one of the last of Jeffersonians."^
Fleming briefly treats four of Williams' speeches during the course of
the debate and refers to the Mississippian as one of the keenest and
most independent minds in the S e n a t e , ^

In his study of Lodge,

Shriftgiesser evaluates Williams as ", . . one of the keenest students
of international affairs ever to sit in the Senate

■^Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 54.
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Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "The Southern Senators and the League
of Nations, 1918-1920," North Carolina Historical Review, XXVI (1949),
187.
E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912
Harper and Bros., 1958), p. 119. .

•^George

(New York:

•^Fleming, o]3. cit., p . 96 .

York:

■^Karl Schriftgiesser, The Gentleman From Massachusetts (New
Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 332.

O n Williams' retirement from the Senate, the New York Times
said of the senator:

"His wit, his satire, his ample scholarship are

as well known as the Capitol.

In the Senate, more and more, he has

taken a perfectly independent position . . . .
less.

B u t he got sick of the show.

He was frank and fear

He has gone back to his books and

his plantation."^
Also in 1923, Harold de Wolfe Fuller, editor of the Independent
observed that
Through the retirement of John Sharp Williams the Senate
suffers a loss it can ill afford. For the veteran Mississippi
Senator stood, not only by reason of his scholarship, his
brilliance as a speaker, and his political ability, but also
by reason of a quality which seems even rarer in the Senate
than any of these--genuine personal independence.^
Reviewers of the Osborn biography referred to Williams as
. . a significant and colorful Congressional l e a d e r ; a Southern
statesman who ".

. . spent thirty years in the House and Senate, scour

ing fools with his sharp tongue; overwhelming the clumsy in debate;
enriching public discussions with his wide knowledge and ready anecdote
and through it all, going his frank and independent way;"-^ " . . .

a

sharp and eloquent debater, a boon companion, a popular figure with

•^"Old Familiar Faces, (editorial), New York Times, March 6,
1923, p. 20.
■^"The Independent," (editorial), Independent, CX (March 17,
1923), 175.
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Francis Phelps Weisenburger, Review of John Sharp Williams,
Planter-Statesman of the Deep South, by George C. Osborn, Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XXX (September, 1943), 279.
•^David L. Cohn, Review of John Sharp Williams: PlanterStatesman of the Deep South, by George C. Osborn, Saturday Review of
Literature, XXVI (June 5, 1943), 34..
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the conservatives of both parties;"^® and ", . . a

favorite congress

man of scholars because he was a learned man, he had a political philos
ophy that gave maturity and consistency to his political actions, and he
could speak and write lucidly about his philosophy
Of those who were first-hand observers of Williams in action,
Wilson’s Vice-President, Thomas R. Marshall, who presided over the
Senate during the entire debate, is perhaps the most eloquent in his
praise of the Mississippian.

In a personal letter to Williams, follow

ing the Senator's reply to Borah of September 29, 1919, the VicePresident wrote:

"I have always been amazed at the clarity of your

thought and expression.

Of course like all impatient Presiding Officers

I have sometimes wished you would not speak.

But I would rather be the

author of the speech you made last night than all I have ever said."
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Marshall reserved highest praise for Williams again in 1925, when in his
memoirs, he wrote:
Of all the men I have ever known, John Sharp Williams had the
most intimate knowledge of world history and world politics.
At a moment's warning he was ready to defend the principles
in which he believed and to fortify them with historic illus
trations. His speeches were always luminous and entertaining,
and the records will disclose among them some of the most bril
liant passages in English literature. He had also the courage

Roy F. Nichols, Review of John Sharp Williams: PlanterState sman of the Deep South,by George C. Osborn, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 229 (September, 1943),
p. 211.
21

Charles S. Sydnor, Review of John Sharp Williams: PlanterStatesman of the Deep South,by George C. Osborn, The Journal of
Southern History, IX (November, 1943), 582.
22

Letter of Thomas R. Marshall to Williams, September 30, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 48.

of his convictions.
Follette. ®

He sat across the aisle from Senator La

Wilson's Treasury Secretary and wartime Director-General of the
Railroads, William G. McAdoo, recognized Williams as one of the most
prominent of Democratic senators.^
Mississippian as " . . .

In his memoirs, McAdoo lauds the

a scholar, and a brilliant one. .

and

". . . probably the best-read man in either house."2-*
"Uncle Joe" Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives
during Williams' tenure in that body, said that, as a rough and tumble
debater, Williams had no equal in American history.
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Cannon's

successor, Champ Clark, ranked Williams with the greatest debaters
America has produced.^
Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts believed that some of
Williams' sentences deserved to be ranked with Chaucer, and numerous
colleagues of Williams wrote to Osborn that the Mississippi Senator had
"enlivened and raised the usual humdrum debates to a level of intellec
tual stimulation."2®
Scholars in the field of speech have also emphasized Williams'
role as a speaker in the debate.

Braden writes that

2T
Thomas R. Marshall, Recollections of Thomas R. Marshall, A
Hossier Salad (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co., 1925), p. 301.
24

William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (New York:
Co., 1931), p. 266.

Houghton-Mifflin

25Ibld.
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George C. Osborn, (editor), Selected Speeches of John Sharp
Williams (Unpublished manuscript in Mississippi Department of Archieves
and History, 1938), i.
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Only John Sharp Williams, senator from Mississippi, was able
to hold his own with Borah and other League opponents. But
many of his speeches were extemporaneous and even impromptu.
Nevertheless, his interchanges with Borah are some of the
finest in the entire debate. Other Democrats demonstrated
little understanding of how to cope with the anti-Leaguers
Dickey lists Williams as one of the figures " . . .

who will

make rich research projects . . . " i n the study of southern oratory.
Dickey further notes that Mississippi " . . .
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need never apologize for

such men as John Sharp Williams in the twentieth century, but she has
been considerably impoverished in men noted for advanced thinking since
his retirement from the United States Senate in 1923."3 ^
Not all the reports of Williams as a participant in the League
debate have been complimentary.

Osborn notes that "one has only to

wade through the Record of this period to conclude that if anyone
needed protection against the 'gas attacks' of august Senators, it was
the Senate when listening to the senior Senator from Mississippi."*^
Similarly, in a discussion of the members of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations of 1918, the New Republic dismissed Williams as
", . . a n able partisan, but scarcely a discreet statesman.1,33
Williams characterized himself as ", . . simply a debater, a
very good one maybe, but still only a debater."
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Not quite so favorable

^^Waldo W. Braden, "The Senate Debate on the League of Nations,
1918-1920: An Overview," Southern Speech Journal,XXV (Summer, 1960), 281.
3®Dallas Dickey, "Southern Oratory: A Field for Research,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIII (December, 1947), 460.
31Ibid., 461.
-^Osborn, ££. cit., p. 357.
33"At the Capitol, Leadership in Foreign Affairs," New Republic,
XIV (April 27, 1918), 389.
3^Micken, ££. cit., p. 29.
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was the Mississippian1s evaluation of the Senate debate on the League
of Nations.

At the close of the debate, following the final defeat of

the treaty, in an address before the Mississippi legislature, Williams
denounced his opposition in the Senate as a "Poison Squad," and the
debate itself as the "most incoherent gabfest in human history.
Osborn refers to the debate, however, as "the most impassioned
fight of Willisma1 public c a r e e r , a n d

certainly some of the Senator's

utterances early in the debate indicate his sincere idealism,

as in

his reply of December 4, 1918, to Senator Reed.
There is or is not a God. And God either is or He is not a
prince of righteousness and justice.
If it be true thatfools
only dream of peace and fools only dream of an agreement
amongst nations whereby peace can be perpetuated, then there
is no God of righteousness and mercy and no God of justice and
no God of mercy, or else, on the other hand, if there be a God
of justice and righteousness and mercy He has given me and you a
common sense and a common conscience whereby we can be guided in
peace consummation.
Common sense means merely the sense of all
average men in the aggregate, and common conscience the con
science of the average man throughout the world. If He has
given us common sense and common conscience, He has given it to
us as an instrumentality whereby we can reduce the world to
order and to peace and to progress and to civilization, and
whereby we shall not be forced to go to the Prussian junker
system of universal armament, one man and one nation and people
suspecting the other all the time.37
Although opinion as to his value in the

Senate may be mixed,

most observers agreed that John Sharp Williams, the brilliant, unortho
dox planter-statesman, was indeed an important man, addressing an
important audience on one of history's most important problems:

the

preservation of world peace.

•^Jackson Daily News, March 26, 1920, p. 1.
•^Osborn, aj). cit., p. 360.
37u. S. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1918, LVII,
Part 1, 84.
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Appearance and Personality
As a "debutant" in the Fifty-third Congress, Williams appeared
. . . a slender man five feet, nine and one-half inches in
height, head medium for his body and topped with a heavy crop
of dark brown hair. His deep-set blue eyes
looked out beneath
thick, shaggy brows. These penetrating eyes were usually aided
by a pair of gold-rimmed spectacles. A straight, middle-sized
nose protruded above a brown, untrimmed mustache. This new
member was practically deaf in his right ear. He was clad in
plain clothes which had been adjusted with indifferent hands. °
Osborn later describes the Mississippian's first appearance in the
Senate, a special

session of the Sixty-second Congress called by Taft

to reconsider his

trade agreement with Canada.

Having changed in

appearance somewhat from his days as fiery minority leader of the House,
Williams'
. . . hair appeared to be a little grayer, and at a distance,
looked as though "it had been cuddled int'o shape by the eider
duck." His mustache was "a little scraggier" and drooped
"like moss of the trees of the Southern swamps." His mouth
looked as if it had "been lured away by heavy cuds of tobacco
or big cigars." Clear eyes, just as bright and all-seeing as
ever, pierced through gold-rimmed glasses over clothes that
"needed to be pressed just as much as ever." His girth had
expanded till he seemed "at all times well-fed." Mentally he
had grown even sharper— "till he should be known now as John
Sharper Williams.
Dickson further corroborates the Mississippian1s sloppy appear
ance as being
. . . blown, disheveled, extemporaneous, neglected, surprised
. . . in appearance; with his strange second-hand clothes of
the mound building period, his picturesque gaiters, his
mysterious and melancholy eyes, and his general air of incog
nito . . . .
It was even hinted that the Gentleman from
Mississippi bought coats and breeches ready made, off a shelf.
But nobody supplied him with hand-me-down opinions. These
0Q

J°Osborn, ££. cit., p. 36.
39Ibid., p. 178.
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were his own; and he had his own frank, fearless, vigorous
method of expressing them. ®
Lovable, humorous, the perfect southern gentleman, Williams was
intensely loyal to his friends and
. . . won and held the loyalty of other men. No bars of class
or wealth or position fenced them apart. His friends are
found among all kinds of people: the bluecoat at the streetcorner, tyranizing over traffic, the Irishman sitting as
keeper at a Senate doorway, the man mixing toddies behind a
bar, the diplomat representing our Government at the Court of
St. James, or the President directing the destinies of our
nation. ^
Osborn suggests, however, that Williams after midsummer 1918
was often very bitter in replying to an adversary, probably because of
his deep personal involvement in the war effort,^ his advancing a g e , ^
and the loss of his daughter, Julia.

Osborn reports that

In May, 1917, the Senator admitted to a friend that he was
getting too old to enjoy life. He was "suffering with a bad
case of Anno Domini; toddies don't taste good to me like they
used to; cigar flavor is not what it once was. I still enjoy
poetry and flowers and I enjoy my public life while the ex
citement and fight is on, but I have reached the point of life
when it bores me when the excitement and fight are o f f . " ^
Along with these factors, Williams' animosity toward Lodge may
have influenced the Mississippi Senator's behavior.

Williams' secretary,

who was with him in Washington until 1912, reports that his chief never
attempted to hide his contempt for the Sage of Nahant.

Although

^^Harris Dickson, An Old-Fashioned Senator, A Story-Biography
of John Sharp Williams (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925),
p . 107.
^ I b i d ., p . 124.
^Osborn, ££. cit., p. 332.
^ % e was sixty-four in 1918.
^Osborn, ££. cit., p. 332.
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writers frequently coupled the names of Lodge and Williams as the two
great scholars of the Senate, this always infuriated the latter, who
regarded Lodge as a "puritan mountebank."
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Williams' bitterness may have been given further stimulus by
his having been passed over in Wilson's selection of peace commissioners
to accompany him to Paris.

On

this subject, Micken

speculatesthat

There is only inference to
be drawn from the probability that
Williams would have liked serving on the Treaty
Commission
that President Wilson took
to Paris. As in the
case of
Hitchcock and Tom Walsh, one can only guess as to how this
omission by the President affected the intensity and effec
tiveness of Williams' defense of the treaty.
An additional factor to consider in an assessment of Williams'
personality is his hearing loss, present since childhood but having pro
gressively worsened by the time of the treaty fight.

The loss had not

reached an extreme stage by 1919, but Williams is pictured sometimes as
"going over close to an opponent and cupping his hand behind his ear in
an effort to hear what was being said."47

other senators made sarcastic

references to Williams' deafness on several occasions, as in Reed's
comment that "what I wanted to get before the Senate was this gentle
man's . . . statement which the Senator from Mississippi did not hear
throughout, I am sure, or he would not have singled out a single sentence
and made it the subject of his bitter criticism."
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During the Missis

sippian 's interchange of remarks on December 3, 1918, with Illinois

^ L e t t e r of Peter Stubblefield to the writer, July 8, 1963.
Stubblefield now resides in Vaughan, Mississippi.
^Micken, ££. cit., p. 32.
47Ibid.
4®U.S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., p. 85.
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Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman, James Watson, Senator from Indiana reports
that he walked up to his Republican colleague, Sherman, who was also
hard of hearing, and spoke into Sherman's good ear:

"Lawrence, you seem

to be having a pretty hard time here;" whereupon Sherman replied, "yes,
Williams and I are having a hell of a debate.

Neither of us hears a
AQ

word the other fellow says and neither of us gives a damn."
A final characteristic of Williams' personal behavior which
merits attention was his drinking.

Osborn insists that the Senator was

"never drunk while on official duty in the Senate."”'®

In his address

against Irish-Americans who put the welfare of Ireland above that of the
United States of October 16, 1919, however, the Mississippian indulged
in bitter invective that he later struck from the Record.

Afterwards

he confided to Senator Watson that, although not drunk, he had "had a
drink or two."-^

He further defended his behavior, telling the Indiana

senator that "one time I made up my mind that I would never take
another drink, that I would quit forever.

I abstained absolutely for

six months, and I tell you the honest truth, Jim, when I say that in all
that six months I never had an original thought."
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Although disheveled in appearance and often bitter in debate,
John Sharp Williams was generally held in high regard by his Senatorial
colleagues.

His hearing loss sometimes made him the butt of unfriendly

49

7James Watson, As I Knew Them (Indianapolis:
1936), p. 288.
•*®Osborn, ££. cit., p. 332.
-^Watson, og. c i t ., p. 288.
52Ibid.

Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
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criticism, and his drinking attracted some attention, especially on the
occasion of his address against the Irish-Americans of October 16, 1919.
In all, his appearance and personality could not always be considered
assets in his attempts to influence the public behavior.

Speech Preparation and Delivery
Aside from his appearances in the Senate, Williams did not
speak in public during this period.

Asked by Wilson's secretary, Joseph

Tumulty, to speak at the annual banquet of the Hudson County Bar Associa
tion in January, 1919, Williams, expressing his thanks for the invitation,
replied that "I have quit going out to make speeches . . . except under
CO

urgent circumstances
In all, twenty-three speaking invitations appear in the Williams
Papers during the period from January 24, 1919 through February 3, 1920,
all of which Williams declined for reasons of duty, health, or to be
with his family.

On February 4, 1919 he telegraphed Governor T. W.

Bickett of North Carolina that he would not be able to accept a speak
ing invitation at the North Carolina Conference for Social Service
because he was "sick."-^

He sent a similar wire to William H. Taft,

who had invited him to speak at the Southern Congress for the League of
CC

Nations in Atlanta.

In March, 1919, he declined the invitation of
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Letter of John Sharp Williams to Joseph P. Tumulty, January
13, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 43.
•^Telegram of John Sharp Williams to T. W. Bickett, February 4,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 43.
-^Telegram of John Sharp Williams to William H. Taft, February
17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.

36
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, stating as his
reason, "I want to get home to my children and grandchildren . . . and
to make a long trip back . . . would be more than I would like to stand."

56

On other occasions, Williams declined speaking invitations outside the
Senate because of his wife's poor health, his own health, and his obliga
tions in the Senate.

Invited to take to the lecture circuit by L. J.

Alber, President of Affiliated Lyceum Bureaus of America, Williams replied,
"You are mistaken; I am not 'filling a number of speaking engagements';
don't expect to fill any.
ture platform.

I don't see any chance to go out on the lec

Congress here of late is almost in continuous session;

and while it is in session, a Senator has no right to leave for the
purpose of making money for himself.
The senator's private papers indicate that no "urgent circum
stances" arose during the period of the debate on the League of Nations.
There is no evidence to indicate that Williams spoke publicly outside
the Senate chamber during this period at all.
Williams expressed his own views concerning Congressional
oratory, sometimes wishing that Senators would stop calling for a
quorum every time one of them made a speech.

This required the other

members to leave their offices to come to the floor to listen to long,
boring talks for hours at a time.

Much more good could be accomplished,

he felt, "than sitting here listening to one another."
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On another
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Letter of John Sharp Williams to Carl Kelsey, March 5, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 44.
•^Letter of John Sharp Williams to L. J. Alber, November 20,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 49.
•^Osborn,

ojd.

cit., pp. 191-2.
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occasion during the League debate, he wrote to a friend that only "God
could shut Senators' mouths, make them quit talking about nothing."
God alone, in Williams' opinion, could direct their attention to "what
is worthwhile, and to the weightier matters of the law.""^
All of Williams' speeches in the Senate during the League of
Nations Debate seem impromptu in nature.

Certainly the Mississippian

drew extensively on his broad education and his intimate familiarity
with world history and international law, but his speeches exude spon
taneity and lack the close organization of the manuscript.

There is

no evidence to indicate that any of his speeches during this period
were prepared in advance of their delivery.

Dickson lends further cre

dence to the impromptu nature of the addresses in his observation that
. . . since that first proud day when young John Williams began
to practise law before a Yazoo County Squire, he had reveled in
sporadic scrimmages. To prepare a set oration, to memorize and
spout, was not his forte. He preferred to take the words, the
reasoning, the logic from an adversary's lips, than demolish him
with stronger reasons and clearer logic of his own.^O
Dickson notes also Williams' preference for the debate during his
earlier career in the House of Representatives, as opposed to his later
speaking under the restrictive rules of the Senate.
The atmosphere of the House exactly suited him. He delighted
to mix in sudden emergencies that arose upon its floor, with
flash of rapiers, with thrusts given and received.
Quick
thinking and prompt action stirred his blood, kept him vividly
alive. Steadily his reputation grew as one of the very
readiest and most resourceful debaters that had ever appeared
in public life.®^

■^Letter of John Sharp Williams to T. H. Brown, August 14, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 47.
^Dickson, o£. cit., p. 136.
6^Ibid., p. 108.
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Of Williams' speech preparation, Osborn notes that "throughout
his entire public career the greatness of Williams lay in his ability
as a 'catch as catch can' debater.

Very few of his numerous speeches,

delivered in either chamber of the National Legislature, were prepared
69

speeches."

The only manuscript in the senator's Mississippi papers suggests
that he employed the extemporaneous method more often than the other
/TO

types.

Williams begins this address with the observation that "It is

my habit to speak extemporaneously when I have time to prepare in my
mind the thoughts that are to be clothed in words while speaking.

For

that I haven't had time for this occasion, and therefore have written
down a few things which I shall r e a d . " ^
Mr. Joseph Wills, Superintendent of the Senate Press Gallery,
a first-hand observer of the speaker, recalls that the senator never
spoke from manuscript.

Instead he always arose and spoke in an

impromptu m a n n e r . ^
Nor did Williams have time to prepare his replies to his adver
saries in the Senate during the League debates.
his opponents who spoke from manuscript.
69

He sometimes criticized

In his reply to Senator Sherman

*

"^George C. Osborn (editor), Selected Speeches of John Sharp
Williams (Unpublished manuscript in Mississippi Department of Archives
and History, 1938), p. i.
^Undated, unpublished manuscript of speech delivered before the
Jackson Kiwanis Club, found in Mississippi Department of Archives and
History. References to Babe Ruth's popularity may indicate that the
speech was delivered in the 1920's.
64Ibid., p. 1.
^Personal interview of the writer with Mr. Joseph Wills, August
12, 1963.
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on December 3, 1918, Williams observed sarcastically that "we were told
that there was going to be a regular hurricane--perhaps an explosion of
a volcano--and we have listened to the speech, or to the reading of the
writing, rather, of the

Senator from Illinois.

At another point in

the same address, Williams said of his opponent, "He read his speech,

of

course, and read it with good emphasis; read it in fine style, as he
usually does, and with a degree of acting that made it funny at times,
even when the Senator was seeking to be serious. . .
Williams further expressed his contempt for manuscript delivery
of speeches in his reply to Lodge on August 12, 1919.
The Senator can stand there and read,
his carefully prepared sentences with
politics in America as well as he can,
the fact that while I am a citizen of
6 ft
citizen of the world.00

read, reread--not speak-the view of controlling
but he cannot blot out
America I am also a

In the same address, Williams scorns Lodge's " . . .
midnight-light finished periods of his speech."

carefully drawn and

69

Williams preferred to speak extemporaneously, but in the League
debates he probably spoke impromptu.

Neither speech manuscripts nor

extemporaneous speech outlines or notes are to be found in the senator's
Washington papers.
Finally, Williams himself provides evidence that his speechmaking during the League controversy was entirely of an impromptu nature.
In a letter to a friend who had requested speech manuscripts, the
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U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 28.'

67Ibid., 29.
6R

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3785.

69Ibid., 3789.
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Mississippian confessed, "I haven't made any set speeches this session-didn't consider any of them worthy of being printed separately in
pamphlet form, hence I will just have to send you the Record containing
the respective speeches."^®
Evidence concerning Williams' methods of delivering his speeches
is extremely limited.

The writer has discovered no descriptions of the

Mississippian's voice.

Micken notes that it m u s t h a v e been durable to

have withstood the extensive use made of it by the Senator.^

Various

sources attest to the conversational manner in which Williams spoke,
in contrast with the "oratorical" poses of some of his opponents.

In

his comparison of Williams with Senator Joseph W. Bailey in a debate on
the tariff in 1911, Osborn relates that "Bailey orated; Williams talked.
The Texan's action showed carefully studied poses; the Mississippian's
manner was as 'democratic as a coon-skin cap.'"^
Dickson reports that Williams " . . .

never seemed to be 'making

a speech'; certainly he never acted the part of a statesman delivering
a masterpiece, never thrust his left handinto the
Albert
ence."^

breast of

coat while his right hand flourished theDeclaration of

a Prince
Independ

To this Dickson adds that "when hearing John Sharp Williams

the listener instinctively appreciates his earnestness, his direct
method of telling what he feels, and making the hearer feel i t . " ^

■^Letter of John Sharp Williams to Henry Cabell Dixon, July 28,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 46.
^^Micken,

oj>. cit., p. 31.

^Osborn,

££. cit., p. 184.

^Dickson, o£. cit., p. 110.
^ Ibid., p. 111.
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Williams' biographer, George C. Osborn writes
Had I found anything on Williams' delivery I would have in
cluded it in my book on him, but as I recall, I found nothing.
Only an occasional mention of his southern drawl, ribald
stories--though not vulgar--his sometimes raising the right
forefinger to point at the audience, but no walking back and
forth, no spell binder tactics, no hypnotic oratory. JSW was
essentially a debater, not an orator.75
Two first-hand observers have expressed difficulty in recalling
specific descriptions of Williams' delivery.

David Lawrence, a press

gallery reporter already of syndicated fame in 1918, writes of the
senator that "he had a very interesting manner of delivery, but I could
hardly describe it.

He did speak slowly at times, and depended a good

deal on satire.
John D. Rhodes, an official reporter of debates for the U. S.
Senate, who was a constant observer of Williams, writes that
I can recall how attentive we would all be when he spoke, for
"he spoke as one having authority." His hearing was impaired,
and he usually would have his hand cupped behind his e a r .
There have been Senators who would attract a big audience, and
I am sure Senator Williams was one of th e m . ^
In reply to a questionnaire concerning Williams' delivery, Rhodes
described the senator's posture as "erect and easy," facial expression,
"earnest"; intelligibility, "of course"; articulation, "good"; pro
nunciation, "perfect"; and sincerity, "marked."^®
Williams the impromptu debater was at home in the Senatorial
skirmishes on the League of Nations issue.

Evidence indicates that he

^ L e t t e r of George G. Osborn to the writer, August 6, 1963.
^ L e t t e r of David Lawrence to the writer, September 30, 1963.
^ L e t t e r of John D. Rhodes to the writer, November 11, 1963.
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did not specifically prepare any of the speeches he delivered during the
fifteen months of debate.

He was critical of colleagues who prepared

manuscripts and read them in the Senate.

Although observers of Williams

have expressed difficulty in recalling descriptions of the Mississippian's voice and physical behavior, it seems likely that he may be
described most accurately as a "debater" rather than an "orator."

CHAPTER III

THE PRE-COVENANT DEBATE

December 2, 1918 - February 14, 1919

The Occasion
This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the occasions
on which Williams spoke during the period, December 2, 1918 - February
14, 1919.

Secondly, it presents description of the audiences which

the speaker sought to influence, and finally it presents a detailed
analysis and evaluation of one representative speech made by Williams
during the pre-covenant debate.
John Sharp Williams had been appointed a delegate at large to
the World Court Congress which met at Cleveland, Ohio, May 12-14, 1915.
Unable to attend, he had expressed "heart sympathy for the inauguration
of a court which should constitute a sort of amphictyonic council of
the civilized nations of the world."'*'
Despite the fact that the President had not presented a treaty
to the Senate for its advice and consent, the senators began debating
among themselves, during the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress,
concerning the plausibility of a league of nations.
Asked by William Howard Taft, the former President, to submit

■*-Letter of John Sharp Williams to John Hays Hammond, April 29,
1915, Williams Papers, Box 10.
43

44
for publication his views on peace, the Mississippian suggested an inter
national council consisting of the United States, Great Britain, Japan,
France, Germany, Russia, and Italy, which would control the high seas.
Since the first three of these countries actually controlled the seas,
Williams believed that their membership in an international council
could guarantee its success.

The organization's objective, in Williams'

view, should be to "cut off from intercourse with the civilized world
any nation which confessed itself barbarian by refusing arbitration."

O

Any nation going to war without arbitration, then, would be considered
"beyond the pale of civilization."3

Retaliation against such a nation,

which had declared war without reference to the international council,
would include the cessation of commercial and personal intercourse,
blockading that nation's coast line, and allowing that nation to travel
upon the high seas only to its own three-mile limit.4
Following the World Court Congress in 1915, Williams' next expe
rience with an international organization devoted to the aim of world
peace came three years later.

Prominent among the group of speakers at

the national convention of the League to Enforce Peace held in Philadelphia
on May 16-17, 1918, Williams addressed the assembly on "The Only Peace
Worth Having."’*

Ruling out a "compromise peace" and an "armistice," he

observed that "in the present war a real peace is to be found in a world

^Letter of John Sharp Williams to William H. Taft, November 9,
1916, Williams Papers, Box 20.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
^Win the War for Permanent Peace (New York:
Peace, 1918), pp. 173-78.

League to Enforce

treaty, promulgated by us, constituting the concert of Europe and America,
and

accepted by Germany and her vassal s t a t e s . W i l l i a m s '

criteria

for "a peace which is a peace" must "remove, first, present occasions of
war; second, the world temptation of world armament which invited war;
third, all future recourse to new and barbarous war expedients."^

In

addition to advocating territorial and racial readjustments based on
self determination, Williams reiterated his previously stated views on
a peace treaty.

He further proposed strengthening the force behind the

treaty, noting that
The nation attempting to override agreed settlements or to break
promises must know that it will put itself "beyond the pale of
the law" of the civilized world, and that it will confront, first
the nonintercourse of the world in commerce, trade and passenger
traffic, as long as it remains outside the pale of the new
international law, and second, if that be found not sufficient,
must face its armed forces.
Also antedating Williams' participation in the first phase of
the Senate debate were his expressions of approval of Wilson's proposals
for ending the war and organizing the peace.
On August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV sent a communication to the
belligerent peoples expressing his desire to see the war end on terms
honorable to all concerned.

Voicing his objections to the Pope's, pro

posals in a letter to Colonel House, Wilson observed
(1) That no intimation is conveyed that the terms suggested meet
the views of any of the belligerents and that to discuss them
would be a blind adventure; (2) That such terms constitute no
settlement but only a return to the status quo ante and would
leave affairs in the same attitude that furnished a pretext for
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the war; and (3) That the absolute disregard alike of all formal
obligations of treaty and all accepted principles of inter
national law which the autocratic regime still dominant in Germany
has shown in the whole action of this war has made it impossible
for other governments to accept its assurances on anything,
least of all on the terms upon which peace will be maintained.^
In a conference on August 17, 1917 with Wilson and Senators
Martin, Pomerene, Swanson, Lodge, Knox, and Bradegee, assembled to dis
cuss the Pope's peace note, Williams thought that the Pope should be
told "with every diplomatic politeness . . . that it was none of his
business
Through Secretary of State Lansing, Wilson replied to the Pope
on August 27 that
No peace can rest securely upon political or economic restric
tions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass
others, upon vindicative action of any sort, or any kind of
revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered
intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Govern
ment, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who
have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did
not choose. . . .
We seek no material advantage of any kind.*^
Although Williams generally approved Wilson's note as "one of the best
papers ever offered to the world," the Mississippian noted that the
President's reply "went very far against any punitive measures."

12

Germany, in the Senator's opinion, should be compelled to pay for
damages and atrocities to Belgium.^

^Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VII
(New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939), 218-219.
1QIbid., 221.
■'■■'■James B. Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy Messages,
Addresses, Papers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 324.
•'•^Letter of John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson, August 29,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 1.
13Ibid.

47
To the Senator's letter, Wilson replied, " . . .

I am greatly

delighted that you thought so well of my answer to the Pope.

There

seemed to me no other answer and, therefore, this one was comparatively
easy to write.
Wilson first set his Fourteen Points before Congress as his
program for peace on January 8, 1918.

In a letter to the President,

Williams described the message as the best thing the former had done.
To this he added that he was saying a great deal because

the President

had "done some devilish good things of that sort."^
On October 14, 1918, the same day that Wilson sent his conditions-of-peace note to the German government, Williams expressed in the
Senate his own views as to what the peace proposals should be.

He

agreed with Senator Reed, who had preceded him on the floor, in that
both felt that the armistice must be a dictated o n e . ^

Moreover,

Germany must be told that "before we cease firing at you, you must drop
your arms, drop them where you a r e ."^7
proposals:

Williams further outlined eight

(1) the German government must guarantee that the armistice

negotiation period will not be used for reorganizing

its army; (2) the

Allies must be put in possession of Essen, Mannheim,

the steel and iron

works in Westphalia, and other strategic points that will prevent secret
reorganization of the army during the peace, negotiations; (3) before an
armistice can begin, German armies must withdraw from Serbia, the

^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, p. 245.
■^Letter of John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson, January 9,
1918, Williams Papers, Box 2.
16U. S, Congressional Record, o p . cit., 11217.
17Ibid., 11218.
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territory of the Czecho-Slovaks, Bosnia, and Herzegovina;

(4) there

must be a plebiscite of the German people to insure their support of a
peace treaty; (5) a commission should be organized to discover all
stolen property and send it back; (6) it should be declared in the treaty
that no indebtedness made by Germany or Austria in prosecuting the war
should ever be paid in order to discourage future investment in aggres
sive wars;

(7) Germany would pay a reparation equal to the total of the

indebtedness canceled; and (8) seized properties of German and Austrian
citizens and their ships should be sold and the families of people who
died on the Lusitania, Arabic, and Sussex indemnified as well as restora
tion of Belgium, northern France, and Serbia with the remainder.

Finally,

Williams expressed confidence in Wilson's ability to
organize one piece of machinery, if it might be so called, con
sisting altogether, nearly, of imponderabilia, and that will be
an "Amphictyonic council of the civilized world," a league of
nations to secure and enforce the peace of the world, first by
commercial pressure, and if that fail then by force itself, just
as the municipal law is ultimately enforced by force itself,
although in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a
thousand no resistance is made to its execution.

The Immediate Occasion
Having adjourned on November 21, 1918, the Sixty-fifth Congress
opened its third session on December 2, the same day that Williams re
turned to Washington from his home at Cedar Grove Plantation.
On December 3, 1918, several events occurred which shaped the
course of coming events and, in part, influenced the speaking of John
Sharp Williams.
In a letter to Albert Beveridge, dated December 3, Lodge outlined

18Ibid., 11219.
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the position he would take as leader of his party and as primary oppo
nent of Woodrow Wilson.
I think it would be a mistake to admit that the League would be
a good thing, but I think we should make a mistake if we met the
proposition with a flat denial. The purpose of the League--that
is, the preservation of world peace--we are all anxious to see,
but what we oppose is the method. Now the strength of our
position is to show up the impossibility of any of the methods
proposed and invite them, when they desire our support, to pro
duce their terms. They cannot do it. My own judgment is that
the whole thing will break up in conference. There may be some
vague declarations of the beauties of peace, but any practical
League that involves control of our legislation, of our armies
and navies, of the Monroe Doctrine, or an international police,
and that sort of thing, then our issue is made up, and we shall
win. We can begin by pointing out these dangers, and that I am
sure will be d o n e .
Republicans were quick to take up the Lodge strategy for defeat
of the League.

That same day, the day before Wilson sailed for Europe,

Senator Sherman of Illinois introduced a concurrent resolution in the
9n
Senate declaring the Presidency vacant. u

As soon as Sherman had

finished, Senator Knox of Pennsylvania rose and introduced a resolution
in which he

reiterated United States war aims:

"to vindicate the

ancient rights of navigation as established under international law and
...

to remove forever the German menace to our peace."

this observation, the resolution declared:

Following

(1) that Wilson should con

fine himself to the war aims at the Peace Conference;

(2) "That for the

safeguarding of those aims the first essential is a definite understand
ing that, the same necessity arising in the future, there shall be the
same complete accord and cooperation with our chief cobelligerents for

^Letter of Henry Cabot Lodge to Albert J. Beveridge, December
3, 1918, cited in Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932), p. 500.
S. Congressional Record, o p . cat., 21.
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the defense of civilization"; and (3) "That any project for any general
league of nations or for any sweeping change in the ancient laws of the
sea . . . should be postponed for separate consideration not alone by
the victorious belligerents, but by all the nations if and when at some
future time general conferences on those subjects might be deemed
useful."

21

Speech of December 3, 1918
Interrupting Sherman several times during his explanation of his
resolution, Williams spoke immediately at the conclusion of Sherman's
address.

The Mississippian, drawing upon his classical education, began

his defense of Wilson with a phrase from Horace's Epistle to the Pisos,
"Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus m u s ."
there is born a ridiculous mouse.

"Mountains are in labor:

OO

Thus began the first of five occasions on which John Sharp
Williams spoke in the Senate of the United States during the first phase
of its debate on ratification of the Versailles Treaty, with its accom
panying covenant of the League of Nations.
addresses were:

The dates of these five

December 3, 1918; December 4, 1918; December 6, 1918;

January 14, 1919; and February 15, 1919.
Since actual negotiation of the treaty could not begin until
after Wilson's arrival in Paris on December 14, the speaking done in
the Senate during the first three occasions on which Williams spoke
centered around the advisability of Wilson's going to Europe; senators
discussed the proposed league of nations only in general terms.

21Ibid., 23.
2^Ibid., 28 (From Horace's Epistle to the Pisos).
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Sherman's address of December 3 emphasized the cumulative evils
which would arise when Wilson left American soil.
How can the President receive ambassadors representing sovereign
power when absent from the seat of government, and particularly
if he be within an alien sovereignty? Is it possible for him to
make civil appointments even from the American ambassador's
department in France, or can he order troops on the application
of a State to protect it against domestic violence? Can he
pardon or reprieve offenders while absent in Europe? Who will
dispatch troops if required to enforce the laws of the United
States and the orders of courts? The President cannot execute
the laws under his oath of office while he is in a foreign
country and unable to exercise executive power at the seat of
Federal Government. J
To this tirade of questions, along with Sherman's avowal that
the absences of previous Presidents from American soil had been brief
and had "led to no such complications as the absence of the President
at this time might do,"24 Williams replied with a lengthy impromptu
address, the thesis of which was that Wilson's attendance at the peace
conference is in the best interests of the American people .^

In

support of this thesis, Williams contended, first, that Wilson would not
lose the sovereign power of the United States while abroad because the
President does not personify the sovereignty of the American Republic,
but shares the sovereignty with other elected representatives.

Arguing

analogously, Williams maintained that, just as kings do not lose the
sovereignty of their countries when visiting another empire, so the
President does not lose his official status when making a trip to-

23Ibid., 26.
24Ibid., 27.
25
This thesis was not overtly stated in the speech but was
clearly the implication of Williams' three major arguments.
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another country.

He noted that other Presidents including Washington,

Roosevelt, and Taft, had left the country without having been antagonized
by members of the opposing party.

Williams' strongest support for his

first contention was that the Constitution does not stipulate that the
absence of the President from the territorial limits of the United
States constitutes inability or temporary or permanent vacation of the
office.

The Mississippian further observed that this was not a Constitu

tional stipulation because the framers of the Constitution had foreseen
the necessity of Presidential absences.

In the remainder of the speech

Williams defended Wilson's choice of going to Paris, arguing, secondly,
that presidents are frequently misled and, therefore, need to understand
the actual situation at first hand, rather than leaving the work to
messengers.
Finally, Williams argued that a league of nations to abolish war
would be practicable because any civilized country daring to make war
without first submitting its grievances to arbitration could be declared
beyond the pale of civilization as "an enemy of mankind.
On December 4, 1918, Senator Reed of Missouri, in a lengthy
extemporaneous address, warned that a League of Nations would put t h e '
United States "into controversies and broils and battles and wars of
Europe":

27

a situation "contrary to every tradition of our country." '

Additionally, Reed argued that such a league would not work because of
the continuing prevalence of race hatred and race ambition.

Rather

than sending "an endless stream of courage and heroism, but still of
flesh and blood, across the distant seas to fight in foreign lands

26Ibid., 29-31.
27Ibid., 87.

over quarrels between races that do not speak our tongue and whose
rights and wrongs we do not understand," Reed recommended the course of
isolationism, the Fortress America.
It may be wicked, it may be the very acme of brutality, but I
protest that if this great country of ours but knows its mission
it will stay here within its seagirt shores, protect itself,
retain its independence, suffering no diminution of its sover
eignty by agreements with other powers, making only that character
of agreement I have so often referred to, and that it will seek
to continue as the great guiding influence upon the Western Hemi
sphere; that we shall bind to us by ties of commerce and of love
those great and virgin countries that lie to our south; that we
shall seek to direct the energies of our people and the energies
of their people to an honest interchange of products; that we
shall make the Monroe doctrine an inviolable doctrine of nations;
and that we shall seek always and at all times, by kindly counsel
and by generous aid, to help to maintain the peace and the happi
ness of this w o r l d . 28

Speech of December 4, 1918
Immediately following Reed's declaration of isolationism, John
Sharp Williams replied, accusing his adversary of avoiding and evading
the issue which he defined as the idea that all men who dreamt of a
permanent and just peace were fool s . ^

Reed had raised this issue by

reading a letter from one of his Kansas City constituents who made the
statement:

"Fools are running around dreaming foolish dreams, making

much noise, and disturbing sober thought.

We shall be induced to sell
Of)

our birthright for a mess of pottage if we are not careful.
Williams contended that just as the pioneers in Missouri and
Mississippi had formed a league of individuals to uphold law and justice
among themselves, so the nations of the world needed such a league.

54
Stating his point perhaps too simply, the Mississippian said
We are simply going to say that hereafter, by the grace of God
and by our own might, conjoined and not disunited, that "any
civilized country, or country pretending to be civilized, that
dares to make war upon another without either consenting to
arbitration when it is offered or offering arbitration upon
its own part shall become the common enemy of mankind,1.1 and we
will deal with it like the early pioneers in Missouri dealt
with a horse thief or a murderer, that is all.-^
Williams further cautioned that the world must learn that it is
wrong to let each man be his own judge and own executioner, otherwise
civilization will never be transferred into enlightenment.

In an

exchange with Reed concerning the Monroe Doctrine, Williams contended
that the Doctrine "will cease to be at all, because there will take its
place a Monroe Doctrine of the entire world, and a Monroe Doctrine merely
confined to the Western Hemisphere will cease to exist."3^

Reed then

countered that the European countries might be able to control the tri
bunal, thus overwhelming the might of United States military resources.
In making this contention, Reed implied that the United States would be
utterly without friends, including Great Britain, an implication for
which Williams sharply criticized the Missourian.
Mr. WILLIAMS. He [Reed] could not keep from betraying the fact
that back of it all was either a hatred or a fear of Great
Britain. He spoke very contemptuously of "the blockade of the
North Sea." If it had not been for the blockade of the North
Sea, we would have been whipped today; Germany would have been
successful.
Mr. REED. The Senator misunderstood me.
Mr. WILLIAMS. No; the Senator said:
"From whom do we fear
attack, unless it is from Great Britain herself?"
Mr. REED.
second.

Let me make the statement.

31Ibid., 88.
32

Ibid., 89.

It will take but one

55
The thought I sought to express was that there was but one
nation in the world that could injure us, and I said that it was
unthinkable that she would attempt it; but there was only one
that could, and that was Great Britain.
That is very different
from saying that I feared attack from her.
Mr. WILLIAMS. I understand* yes. The innuendo was there, however.
Mr. REED. Well, all right.33
Williams indicated further that he wanted the English-speaking
peoples, because they were peace-loving, to control the seas of the
world.

Additionally, he desired to see behind each nation's solemn

plighted word, "a force which the barbarous people of the world would
fear to defy.

His opponents had invoked the sacred name of Washington;

Williams believed, with Thomas Jefferson,
not in the perfection of humanity but in its "indefinite perfectability." You may tell me this, that, or the other
desirable thing can not be done because of human nature, but
my answer is that all you have got to do is to change your own
human nature and use your own influence to change other people's
human nature until there shall be a revolution in human nature
that will suit new conditions,3^
In the conclusion of this address, however, he recognized the
necessity of armed force, even to change human nature.

"Put force

behind your league or your alliance or your agreement or whatever you
call it.

Put behind it also the willingness that when fair arbitra

tors decide against-the other fellow you are going to make him submit."33
On December 6, Senator Borah of Idaho vigorously attacked the
idea of a league of nations.
Mr. President, let us be perfectly candid with the people of
this country and tell them what this scheme of a league to
enforce peace means. It means the creation of a superinter
national court and turning the Army over to their direction

33Ibid.
34Ibid., 90.
35Ibid.
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if it has any virility. It means the abandonment of Washington's
Farewell Address. It means the abandonment of the Monroe
Doctrine. It means that we will enter into entangling alliances
with Europe. I am not in favor of it. I am not in favor of any
league of nations which infringes in the least upon the sover
eign power of the people of the United States to direct and
control the destiny of this Nation.3^

Speech of December 6, 1918
In beginning his rebuttal of Borah's speech, Williams
the Idahoan's contention.

restated

"The whole sum and substance reduced to its

last analysis of all the Senator said most eloquently is that he con
tends we have a right to be the judge in our own quarrels ourselves.
That is all."37

Following this, Williams states his own thesis, the

exact opposite of what Borah's had been.

"I do not believe that any

individual or any nation has a right to say:

'I shall be the sole judge

in my own quarrel; I shall try the case; I shall give judgment; and I
shall execute the judgment.'"38
In support of this thesis, Williams noted that there are two
ways of keeping peace in the world:

by a league of civilized nations

or by the domination of one great power, the latter of which Prussia
and Germany had just attempted.

These two alternatives formed the

framework upon which Williams developed the remainder of his address.
The rejection of the League of Nations by the United States and the sub
sequent fruition of the second alternative, the Mississippian continued,
"must result in the carrying out of the German idea by somebody else and

36Ibid.. 196.
37Ibid., 197.
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impartial arbitrament, and as between nations there ought to be
the same thing.4 ^
Williams concluded his reply to Borah of December 6 with the
observation that a league of nations, far from being merely idealistic,
would be the "highest form of practicalness."

The Mississippian likened

a league of nations unto a federal league of states--the United States.
"If there is any pattern for a league of nations in the world today, it
is the American Republic, this Union of indestructible States, still
remaining States, but giving up a certain degree of independence in
order to accomplish a grander result."42
The world's attention during the next few weeks was focused not
upon the United States Senate, but upon Woodrow Wilson, welcomed in
Europe with receptions, popular ovations, conferences with leading
international figures, and projected by the press into a Messiah of
Peace.
Republican Senators, probably resentful that the President had
proceeded to Paris without taking any Republicans or even any Senators
of either party with him, were becoming more active in their campaign
of opposition to the President's scheme.

On December 18, during the

peak of Europe's enthusiastic reception of Wilson, Senator Knox ela
borated on his resolution of December 3 which had urged postponement
of consideration of a league of nations until after peace had been made
separately.

The former Secretary of State proposed, instead of a league

41Ibid., 199.
42Ibid.
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of nations, an understanding for "concerted action" by the United States
/

*5

and European powers, when their mutual interests were menaced.
Following a conference with Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot
Lodge on December 21 warned that the Senate might exercise its preroga
tive of rejecting or altering treaties if "extraneous provisions wholly
needless for a peace with Germany" were unwisely added to the document
to be prepared at Versailles.

Such provisions, the Sage of Nahant added,

"would surely be stricken out or amended, no matter how many signatures
might be appended to the treaty."44
Replies to Lodge and Knox came on January 2 and 3 from the
democratic Whip, Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois,4^ and on
January 7 from Senator Porter J. McCumber, Republican of North Dakota.
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On January 14, motivated by the announcement of the League to
Enforce Peace of its series of regional congresses to gain popular
support,4 ^ William E. Borah delivered his second address of the session.
Dismissing Wilson's suggestion of a league of nations as an organiza
tion of the "moral forces" of the world which "we shall watch with
interest . . .," the Lion of Idaho specifically attacked the proposal
of the League to Enforce Peace.

Avoiding direct attack upon Wilson or

upon any Democratic senator, Borah admonished that the adoption of a

43Ibid., 603-609.
44Ibid., 724.
45Ibid., 980-993.
46Ibid., Part 2, 1083-1088.
4^Waldo W. Braden, A Rhetorical Criticism of Invention of
William E. Borah1s Senate Speeches on the League of Nations, 1918-1920
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1942), p. 106.
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league of nations to enforce peace would mean the installation of peace
time conscription, the maintenance of a large navy, the imposition of
high taxes, the sending of troops abroad, and the renunciation of the
policies of Washington and of Monroe.

Borah further implied that,

while Wilson was recommending a league based on moral force, his admin
istration was making preparations for a league based on armed force.
The adoption of such a scheme, Borah prophesied, would signify the end
of Americanism.
Instead of our own Government, controlled and directed by the
intelligence and patriotism of our own people, instead of
American standards and American principles, instead of devotion
to our institutions and to our own flag, we are to have an inter
national superstate resting upon Prussian force, with a vast army
of repression, a superstate in which the national spirit stands
rebuked and the international flag is the sole symbol of our
hopes

Speech of January 14, 1919
Replying to Borah with equal conviction, John Sharp Williams
immediately delivered his shortest speech of this phase of the debate.
Senator Charles S. Thomas of Colorado having yielded the floor, Williams
proceeded to read into the Record two poems written by Katrina Trask
shortly after her sons had been reported to be dead in the action of
the war.

The Mississippian interjected that "this was written by a

woman whose boys were dead, not written by me or any other man who was
in the safest bomb-proof position on the surface of the earth, to wit,
the floor of the Senate of the United States.1,49

The poem closed with

the lines:

4®U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 1387.
49Ibid.. 1388.
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This potent league of nations will need no gun nor sword,
Its order is the law of the Everliving Lord-"The Everliving Lord," who still exists, I do not care
what you say about it-The law of harmony, all brutal war shall cease-Its corner stone is justice, its translucent walls are peace.
Rise, citizens! Arise from the weary, blood-drenched sod,
Proclaim the league of nations--sealed with the seal of God!
"Translucent walls!" Anybody not a fool can see through
them. They are translucent— God is behind them. Ultimately
you must see Him, whether you will or not.
"With the seal of God," and thank God, not with the seal
of the Senate of the United States, unless the Senate shall
hereafter indicate a sufficient degree of common sense to
affix its seal, which I doubt.^0
Immediately following this, Senator Borah caustically replied,
"Mr. President, may I thank the Senator from Colorado for yielding to
the Senator from Mississippi that we might be regaled by that profound
discussion of the league of nations?"*^
Despite the brevity of Williams' reply, Fleming argues that few
senators would have undertaken to reply spontaneously to so effective
an expression of hatred of the league idea as that of Borah's.

Fleming

further evaluates the exchange between Borah and Williams.
No better demonstration of the variety of men's minds need be
asked. Two of the keenest and most independent minds in the
Senate look at the same proposal:
one saw in it only degrada
tion to his beloved country and danger to human liberty every
where; the other saw only the hand of God himself pointing
inexorably to a safer and happier world in which there would
be greater freedom and less sorrow for all peoples.
The speech of January 14, 1919, concluded Williams' speaking

50Ibid.
51Ibid.
•^Fleming, o£. c i t ., p. 96.
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in the first phase of the debate, when the idea of a league of nations
had been only generally proposed by its proponents.
After speechmaking in Europe, Wilson succeeded on January 25 in
persuading the delegates to the Peace Conference to adopt a resolution
declaring that the League of Nations would be an integral part of the
treaty.
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On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the League

of Nations was completed, and the following day, as Wilson presented
the draft to the Conference, it was published in American newspapers
The debate would now proceed into its second phase, with un
official copies of the Covenant in the hands of the senators and Wilson
sailing home to exert as much persuasion as possible for its favorable
reception.

The Audience
Members of the United States Senate are concerned with influ
encing the behavior of three audiences.

First, they are concerned with

their colleagues in the Senate, upon whom rests the ultimate responsi
bility for success or failure of treaties submitted by the President.
Secondly, they are concerned, in varying degrees, with influencing their
home constituents--the American public.

The third and least important

group with whom senators are concerned are those who sit in the Senate
galleries.

An analysis of the three audiences John Sharp Williams

faced, then, includes the Senate, the public, and the galleries.

^ N e w York Times, January 26, 1919, p. 1.
54Ibid., February 15, 1919, pp. 1, 2.
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The Senate
Still a reality during the "lame duck" session of Congress which
convened December 2, Democratic control of the Senate, lost technically
in the November elections, would not give way officially to a shaky Repub
lican majority of two until March, 1919.

In addition to the natural

partisan division of opinion on the league issue, Democrats Reed,
Poindexter, Watson, and Penrose had denounced, while Republicans Walsh of
Montana, Owen, and Phelan had defended a league in the session prior to
the "lame duck," thus affording John Sharp Williams basis for immediate
audience a n a l y s i s . T o

these indications were added resolutions by

Cummins,38 Knox,37 Sherman,38 Frelinghuysen,39 and B o r a h , a n d

speeches

of K e l l o g g , a n d Sherman8^ to indicate further Republican disapproval of
a league.

Further criticism of the league idea came from influential

fi“j
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Republican leaders, Henry Cabot Lodge J and Philander Knox

and

33U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 11561-11567; 11622-11626.
56Ibid., 3d Session., 1918, LVII, Part 1, 3.
57Ibid., 23.
58Ibid.
59Ibid., 69.
6 °Ibid., 71, 124.
61Ibid., 73-77.
62Ibid., 26-27.
63Ibid., 603-609.
64Ibid., 723-728.
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Democrats, Smith of Georgia,®-* Thomas,®** and Myers.®7
Republican support of the league, on the other hand, came in
many public speeches from former President Taft,

68

from the outright

defection of Senator McCumber of North Dakota, and from the refusal of
some Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee to report the
Knox resolution recommending peace negotiations separate from creation
of a league of nations.®^

The Public
Modern techniques of polling public opinion were unknown at
this time.

Albig reports that public opinion polls prior to 1935 were

usually not systematic and were unrepresentative in their methods of

®5Ibid., 859.
66Ibid., 994-999.
®7Ibid., 1318-1331.
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On December 6, Taft addressed a group of editors and pub
lishers in New York City on the subject, "Why a league of nations is
necessary," Taft Papers on the League of Nations, edited by Theodore
Marburg and Horace E. Flack (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920),
pp. 156-168. Three days later he appeared on a program of the Southern
Commercial Congress, Baltimore, Maryland, with Oscar S. Straus, former
ambassador to Turkey; Dr. Nicholas M. Butler, president of Columbia
University; Edward Filene of the United States Chamber of Commerce. New
York Times, December 10, 1918, p. 12. The day following his address at
Brooklyn, he addressed the College Women's Club, Montclair, New Jersey,
on the subject, "The League: Why and How," Taft Papers on the League of
Nations, ££. cit., pp. 177-194. In addition to his speeches, he wrote
a series of articles for the Philadelphia Public Ledger in refutation of
arguments of anti-league forces. Ibid., pp. 160-177, 194-204. A large
mass meeting, indicative of the pro-league efforts, was held at Carnegie
Hall, New York City, under the joint auspices of the League to Enforce
Peace, the League of Free Nations Association, and the Association of
Neighborhood Workers. Among the speakers were Oscar S. Straus, Norman
Hapgood, Dr. Lawrence Lowell, Frank P. Walsh, Professor Samuel McClune
Lindsay of Columbia University. New York Times, January 11, 1919, p. 2.
®% e w York Times, December 19, 1918, p. 1.
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sampling.7^

One of the hazards of "straw-polling," as it was conducted

by newspapers during this period, was that ballots printed in the news
papers could be clipped and returned by readers who chose to do so.
Ardent partisans, therefore, might mail in large numbers of ballots to
make a good showing for their side.

Slightly less hazardous were the

street interviews of passers-by and the house-to-house polling conducted
by some newspapers.
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The more scientific methods of representative

polling began in 1935 with the formation by Dr. George Gallup of the
American Institute of Public Opinion.72

Other polling organizations,

the Fortune Quarterly survey, the Cross ley and the Roper organizations
began operations in the mid 1930's.73
In order to determine the climate of public opinion after 1917,
however, the senators were forced to rely primarily upon the reports of
pressure groups and newspapers.

A large segment of the public probably

remained inarticulate because of the inadequacy of the "straw polls."
Prior to 1917, virtually no dissent was recorded in the United States
to the idea of an organization of nations designed to preserve peace
and to replace the old balance of power concept which had repeatedly led
to war.7^
This section considers, first, the groups, individuals, and pub
lications which favored the League of Nations idea during this phase of
the debate

7®William Albig, Modern Public Opinion (New York:
Book Co., 1956), p. 177.
71Ibid., p. 179.
72Ibid., p. 181.
73Ibid., pp. 182-185.
■^Fleming, ££. cit., p. 12.
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Groups favoring the League
Most significant among the pro-league pressure groups was the
League to Enforce Peace.
League to Enforce Peace.

In order to influence the Senate to

ratify a peace treaty including a league of nations, the executive com
mittee of the League to Enforce Peace decided in January of 1919 to
hold regional, state, and local conventions, to initiate a campaign of
newspaper advertisements, and to enlarge the operations of its speakers
bureau.

To supervise this program an Emergency Campaign Committee was

created.^
During February, 1919, under the direction of the Emergency Cam
paign Committee, nine regional congresses, designed to arouse public
opinion, were held in New York, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, San
Francisco, Salt Lake City, St. Louis, Atlanta, and Portland, Oregon.
The same group of speakers attended all the congresses which were held
76

from February 5 to March 1. °

Traveling 8,000 miles and addressing 175

audiences attended by 300,000 people, the party of speakers included
William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Frank P. Walsh, Henry Van Dyke,

^ R u h l F. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 114.
^ T h e Atlantic Congress at New York City, February 5; the New
England Congress at Boston, February 6 and 7; the Great Lakes Congress
at Chicago, February 10 and 11; the Northern Congress at Minneapolis,
February 12 and 13; the Northwestern Congress at Portland, Oregon,
February 16 and 17; the Pacific Coast Congress at San Francisco, Feb
ruary 19 and 20; the Mountain Congress at Salt Lake City, February 21
and 22; the Mid-Continent Congress at St. Louis, February 25 and 26;
and the Southern Congress, at Atlanta, Georgia, February 28 and March
1. "A Peripatetic Pilgrimage,11 The Outlook, XXI (February 19, 1919),
298-299.
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Henry Morgenthau, George Grafton Wilson, James W. Gerard, Herbert S.
Houston, and Edward A. Filene.
Bartlett indicates that the congresses were highly successful
in creating public interest and in raising funds.^

Each congress

recorded its support of a league of nations by passing resolutions,
copies of which were sent to Wilson and senators from states within the
congress' region.
Three typical resolutions from the various congresses were:
Resolved: That in the formation of a League of Nations with
adequate economic and military sanctions to guarantee the peace
we see the triumph of American ideals, the realization of
American hopes and aspirations, the next step forward in human
progress, the beginning of a new era in material, moral, indus
trial and political well-being for ourselves and for all m a n k i n d .
We
pledgeour unrestricted support to the President of the
United
Statesin his advocacy of a League of Free Nations for
the purpose of securing and maintaining enduring peace.
We are convinced that the public opinion of the United
States is in favor of a League of Nations to maintain the peace
of the world . . .
Such were the
sure group

activities of this most powerful pro-league pres

duringthefirst phase of the controversy in the Senate.

Other Groups
On November 16, 1918, the Executive Committee of the Associated

^Bartlett, ££. ci t ., p. 114.
^Adopted by the New England Congress, Boston, February 8, 1919.
Cited in Bartlett, p. 115.

1919.

^Adopted by the Great Lakes Congress, Chicago, February 10,
Ibid.
^ A d o p t e d by the Atlantic Congress, New York, February 6, 1919.

Ibid.
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Advertising Clubs of the World sent a telegram to President Wilson pro
mising its support of the League.

After reviewing the President's

proposed league, the telegram declared that "this League of Nations
would be an essential agency of plan and progress in the era of recon
struction on which this world is entering
The League of Free Nations Association, whose object was "to
promote a more general realization and support by the public of the
conditions indispensable to the success, at the Peace Conference and
thereafter, of American aims and policy as outlined by President Wilson,"
issued its statement of principles, along with the signatures of 100
distinguished men and women on November 26, 1918.®^
Pope Benedict XV reaffirmed the support of the Catholic Church
of the League in his' New Year's message to America, issued December'31,
1918.

In his message, the Pope expressed the hope that the Peace

Conference might result in a new world order, with a League of Nations,
the abolition of conscription, and the establishment of tribunals to
QO

adjust international disputes.
Also on December 31, the faculty of Clark College, of Worcester,
Massachusetts, announced its unanimous endorsement of the plan for a
League.

President Edmund C. Stanford, along with histwenty-twofaculty

members, were among the first of such groups to officially endorse
aA

League.

^ N e w York Times,

November 17, 1918, p. 8.

^ I b i d . , November

27, 1918, p. 12.

^ I b i d ., January 2, 1919, p.. 1.
®^Tbid., January 1, 1919, p. 3.
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"American business records itself unqualifiedly in favor of
such international association as you have been advocating . .

re

ported the United States Chamber of Commerce, with reference to its
referendum taken in December, 1915, polling the national membership of
the Chamber.

A subsequent report, issued on February 4, 1919, noted

that ", . . it is reasonable to assume that a vote taken today would in
the light of larger experience and deeper thought upon this subject, be
productive of even larger majorities."®^
The last of the organizations to endorse the League idea during
this period was the Organization Committee of the American Labor Party
of New York City.

On February 27, the Committee adopted a resolution

in support of the League and recommended that the Central Federated
Union of New York, the Brooklyn Central Labor Union, and the Women's
Trade Union League take up the matter at their next regular meeting.

In

addition to endorsing the League, however, the Committee resolution
expressed the "confident hope that the plan now being considered will
be extended to include real self-determination in Ireland as well as in
all other disrupted territories.

. .

Individuals Favoring the League
Among the individuals outside the government who favored the
League were such prominent figures as William H. Taft; A. Lawrence
Lowell, President of Harvard; Frank P. Walsh, former Chairman of the
War Labor Board; and Oscar Straus, former ambassador to Turkey.
A surprising development occurred during the mass meeting at

^~*Ibid., February 5, 1919, p. 14.
®®Ibid., February 28, 1919, p. 2.
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Carnegie Hall on the evening of January 10.

Among the speakers was

Oscar Straus, who revealed the ’’innermost conviction" which former Presi
dent Theodore Roosevelt had expressed to him on December 23, when Straus
visited the hospitalized Roosevelt.

According to Straus, the Rough

Rider, who had previously opposed the League, had revealed a belief in
the necessity of a

league.^

Publications in the United States were generally favorably dis
posed toward the idea of a league during this period.

The committee on

information of the League to Enforce Peace reported that during the six
weeks prior to September 8, 1917, 149 of 152 newspaper editorial
comments were favorable to the principles of the League.

88

Fleming

indicates that this preponderance of sentiment for the league among
newspapers continued through 1918.®9
On December 11, 1918, the New York Times editorially observed
that public opinion favoring the League is "rapidly becoming univer
sal."^

"it is only by the force of public opinion," continued the

Times, "that the League of Nations project can be carried to international
enactment, and that in response to that force it will be enacted is more
than an inference, it is a practical certainty, because of the horror of
war engendered by the bloody strife ended by the armistice signed a
month ago today."^1

®^Ibid., January 11, 1919, p. 2.
®®Bartlett, o£. cit., p. 89.
®9Fleming, _o£. cit., p. 165.
90

"Peace and Public Opinion," (editorial), New York Times,
December 11, 1918, p. 14.
91Ibid.
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The Times again prophesied virtual unanimity of favorable public
opinion in its editorial of December 23.
It is . . . inconceivable that men of right mind and good
conscience are going to oppose a League of Nations. Differ
ences as to the constitution of the League, as to its powers,
the opportune time for its creation, there may be, but never
in the history of the world were there so many men to whom
conviction has been brought that the nations must league
together to destroy the plague of war and make peace lasting.^
In John Sharp Williams' home state of Mississippi, newspapers
of this period seemed much more concerned with local and regional
affairs than with international events.

Both major newspapers in Jackson,

however, declared themselves in favor of the League during this period.
Enjoying a high degree of independence from the whims of his home-state
constituents as well as their virtually blind admiration and pride in
having sent to Washington the last of the genteel planter-statesmen,
Williams was probably more concerned with public opinion on a national
scale than with the views of provincial Mississippians.
Finally, Fleming's sampling of newspaper editorial opinion
throughout the country during this first phase of the debate substan
tiates his view that such expressions of sentiment were overwhelmingly
in the League's favor.^

^ " T h e League and the End of the War," (editorial), Ibid.,
December 23, 1918, p. 10.
^J a c k s o n Daily Clarion-Ledger, October 17, 1918, p. 4, and
Jackson Daily News, December 14, 1918, p. 7.
^ T h e following newspapers favored the League during this phase
of the debate: Sjt. Paul Pioneer Express, Deluth Herald, Philadelphia
Public Ledger. New York Tribune, Richmond Journal, Manchester (N. H.)
Union, Pittsburgh Dispatch, New York Journal of Commerce, Baltimore
Su n , Oshkosh Northwestern, Indianapolis Star, New York Herald, Des
Moines Register, Topeka Capital, Chicago Evening Post, Richmond TimesDespatch, Indianapolis New s , Newark Evening News, Portland Oregonian,
Nebraska State Journal. Fleming, o£. cit., pp. 165-168.
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Opposition to the League
Not all reports of public opinion agreed with the generalization
that there was a great ground swell of pro-league sentiment.

This sec

tion considers the groups, individuals and publications which opposed
the League of Nations idea during this phase of the debate.

As early as

January, 1917, the New Republic reported gathering opposition to the
league principles generally, and particularly to the League to Enforce
Peace.
As we have indicated, the opposition springs from many diverse
sources. It derives from pacifists who repudiate use of force
even in the interests of international order, from militarists
who refuse to seek peace even by means of possible coercion,
and lawyers who resent any attempt to find a basis for inter
national law except abstract right, recognized precedent and the
voluntary consent of free and absolute sovereigns.
Of the three groups, the editorial indicated that the first and last
were to be feared, while public revulsion toward war would render the
second group powerless.9**

By December, 1918, the Wichita Eagle re

ported that, although there had been no opposition lately to the
President's peace program, there was now much "working assiduously
behind the scenes against the President’s plans."9^
Arguments voiced against the League declared that Washington had
warned against it; it would be a departure from the Monroe Doctrine,
would involve the United States in entangling alliances, would place it
in a subordinate position in a foreign organization, would send its
sons to die on foreign battle fields fighting for things in which the

^ " T h e Opposition Gathers," New Republic, IX (January 6, 1917),
255-257.
96Ibid.
9^Cited in Literary Digest, LIX (December 7, 1918), 21.
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United States had no interest, and would open the United States' gates
to hordes of oriental laborers.
Among the groups opposed to the League were the disenchanted
liberals, who had become increasingly concerned over Wilson's involve
ment of the United States in the war.

Having generously supported both

the foreign and domestic policies of the Wilson administration, many
liberals believed that their leader's peace proposals were designed to
perpetuate the evils of the old order rather than to promote democratic
war aims.
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Adler observes that the growing liberal unrest was a

definite factor in the formation of an anti-Wilson coalition.
group expected too much from the peace.

"The

If disappointed, they were

ready to give up hope of reforming Europe and to return to their older
task of cleaning house at h o m e . " ^ ^

Wilson's opponents rejoiced that

even his own former supporters now rejected his proposals.
Less significant but quite active groups with small membership,
the hundred percenters carried the nationalistic dogma to a
point, where they began to talk like home-grown fascists . A
magazine entitled America First wanted to bring patriotism to
homes and schools. Senator Borah thought the name "perfectly
captivating." The True American Publishing Company dedicated
itself to fighting the atheists who kept the name of God out of
the Treaty of Versailles. The league of Loyal Americans

^®"Shall America Join a Peace League?" Ibid., LIV (February
10, 1917), 324-325; "Will the United States Fight to Preserve the
Peace?" Current Opinion, LXII (February, 1917), 82-85; "An Illusion
of Today," 19th Century, LXXXI (March 8, 1917), 700-705. Cited in
Bartlett, ££. cit., pp. 80-81.
^Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power:
1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955), p. 111.

1898-

100selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth
Century Reaction. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, Ltd., 1957), p. 51.
This topic is treated extensively in the chapter "The Liberal
Defection."
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promised to fight for "one Tongue, One Ideal and One Flag."
The biographer, Louis A. Coolidge of Boston, headed the
Sentinels of the Republic, while an American Flag movement
aimed to put the national colors in each home in the land.
Springing up indigenously all over the country, these organi
zations represented the stirrings of a revived nationalism.
Whatever their immediate purpose or pet phobia, they all
shared one thing in common: they look back at an earlier
America that had been shielded from the world and they demanded
1 01
an end to European entanglements. u
One of the most prominent of individuals opposed to the League,
who made known his opposition during this phase of the debate, was
William Randolph Hearst.

At the Carnegie Hall pro-league mass meeting

of January 10, 1919, Norman Hapgood explained that Hearst was unable
"to understand the power of the soft answer, the only instrument of
progress which he could use was the axe."-*-^
Hard-pressed to find newspapers which publicly had announced
their opposition to the idea of a league during this phase of the debate,
Fleming cites, as League opponents, the Providence Journal, the New
York Sun, and, from deep in the home territory of Henry Cabot Lodge, the
Lowell Courier-Citizen.

The Galleries
The third audience, with whom Williams would be only nominally
concerned during this phase of the debate, was that group sitting in the
galleries.

A rule of the Senate prohibits any overt manifestations of

audience reaction from the galleries, such as laughter, applause, or
booing the speaker.

On two occasions during the speeches of December 3,

101Ibid., p. 116.
•*~^New York Times, January 11, 1919, p. 2.
^^Fleming, ££. cit., p. 167.
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1918, the Vice-President, presiding officer of the Senate, warned the
occupants of the galleries that he would clear the galleries if they
did not obey the rules of the Senate.

The instance of this invocation

of the rules followed a joke by Senator Sherman as he was replying to
Williams.

Sherman was expressing mock fear that the innocent Wilson

would be tempted into compromise by the decadent old Europeans.
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Also on December 3, during Williams' speech, the Mississippian
was interrupted by Senator Sherman who noted that, since Wilson had
previously instructed delegates to negotiate treaties for him, he
should do so on this occasion.

Williams replied that Wilson, thus far,

had not had any delegates in Europe to instruct, and added, ’’and by the
way, he had not instructed the Senator from Illinois, and if he had and
the Senator had obeyed his instructions, he would have been much wiser."
To the ensuing laughter and applause in the galleries, the VicePresident retorted:
Just a moment. This is the last warning of the Chair to the
galleries. They must stop their manifestations. The Chair
instructs the sergeants at arms at the doors that if applause
or any other manifestation occurs in the galleries the galleries
must be cleared.^ 5
The occupants of the galleries thus displayed their awareness of
John Sharp Williams' presence.

During the first covenant debate, however,

the galleries would be packed with Irish-Americans interested in securing
self-determination for Ireland and seeking to bring pressure to bear,
especially upon recalcitrant senators such as Williams.
Of his Senatorial audience Williams knew that opinion was divided

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 26.
105Ibid., 29.
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roughly along party lines during the pre-covenant debate.

With defec

tions on both sides, however, Williams could expect forty-three senators
to favor the league while fifty-three would probably oppose it.
The American public, on the other hand, was strongly in favor
of the league during the pre-covenant debate.

Groups which indicated

their approval included the League to Enforce Peace, the Associated
Advertising Clubs of the World, the League of Free Nations Association,
the Roman Catholic Church, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and
the Organization Committee of the American Labor Party of New York City.
William Howard Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Frank P. Walsh, Oscar
Strauss, and Theodore Roosevelt were among the prominent individuals
who declared themselves for the league.
Publications in the United States were almost unanimous in
their support of the league during the pre-covenant debate.
Among the few opponents of the league, however, were the dis
enchanted liberals, who, expecting too much from the peace settlement,
wanted Wilson to resume his programs of domestic reforms.

Small but

active groups of "hundred percenters" agitated for "America first,"
the nationalistic ideal of an America shielded from the world.

William

Randolph Hearst and a few newspapers also opposed the league.
Finally, the occupants of the Senate galleries who listened to
Williams during the pre-covenant debates expressed on one occasion
their approval of his proposals by laughing at and applauding his joke.
Williams' task, then, was to influence, so far as possible, the
votes of twenty-one senators.
required to ratify the Treaty.

Sixty-four votes in the Senate would be
Williams could only count on the votes

of forty-three of his colleagues.
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The Representative Speech
December 3, 1918
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with a detailed anal
ysis and evaluation of John Sharp Williams' address of December 3, 1918.
It has been chosen as the representative address of this phase of the
debate because it includes both a defense of Wilson's personal partici
pation in the Peace Conference and a defense of the idea of a league of
nations.
In addition to analysis and evaluation of the speakers' organi
zation, the representative speech is studied in terms of the speakers'
invention.

Invention includes the threefold division of logical,

emotional, and ethical proof.

The first of these is concerned with the

speaker's argumentative development.

Emotional proof refers to the

means Williams used for stimulating emotional responses within his
listeners, and ethical proof concerns Williams' methods of implementing
his audience's impression of the speaker as a man of integrity, intel
ligence, and good will.

An examination of the speaker's style, or word

choice and arrangement of words, is the third aspect of the representa
tive speech, and, finally, the effectiveness of the speech is measured
in terms of the immediate surface response to it, its readability, its
technical perfection, Williams' capacity for judging trends of the
future, the delayed response to the speech, and its long-range effects
upon the social group.

•^Thonssen and Baird, ££. cit., pp. 455-459.

Organization
Basic to an understanding of the speech is a general outline and
analysis of its structure.

Outline of the Speech:
Introduction
I.

Ridicule of Senator Sherman's tirade against Wilson:

parturiunt

montes, nascetur ridiculus m u s .
Body
Implied thesis:

(President Wilson's attendance at the peace conference

is in the best interest of the American people, for)
I.

Wilson will not lose the sovereign power of the United States while
he is abroad, for
A.

The President does not personify the sovereignty of the American
Republic.

B.

Kings do not lose the sovereignty of their countries when
visiting another empire.

C.

Other presidents have left the country without being antagonized
by members of the opposing party,

D.

(digression)

The Constitution does not stipulate that absence of the President
from the territorial limits of the United States constitutes
. inability or temporary or permanent vacation of the office.

E.

Short absences have never deprived kings, emperors, or presidents
of their official functions,

(repetition)

F.

This speech does not sound like Senator Sherman,

G.

The great men produced by this war cannot be torn down from the
pedestal on which humanity has placed them,

(digression)

(digression)
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II.

Wilson may be as ignorant of foreign affairs as Sherman assumes
him to be, for
A.

A President is frequently misled without first-hand information.

B.

Criticism of the President's participation in the peace con
ference has been a partisan matter,

III.

(digression)

A league of nations is practicable, for
A.

The allied nations alone, rather than the whole civilized world,
can agree to a treaty of peace.

B.

The threat of force will prevent any country from going beyond
the pale of civilization.

C.

The two English-speaking races by themselves can bring about
world peace for 100 years.

D.

Wilson must go to Versailles,

(digression)

Conclusion
I.

Republicans are making a mistake in criticizing Wilson.

Analysis of the Organization
In addition to a general outline of the speech, an analysis of
the organization in terms of its craftsmanship and in terms of its
adjustment to the audience is appropriate.

Craftsmanship may be evalu

ated in terms of the traditional scheme, basically the Aristotelian
plan which includes the introduction, the statement, the proof, and the
p e r o r a t i o n . C o n f o r m i t y of the speech to this traditional plan of
organization probably contributes to the effectiveness of the speaker
in accomplishing his purpose.

107Ibid., p. 398.

Thonssen and Baird point out that "most
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speeches will doubtless follow the traditional scheme, for experience
has fixed it as fundamentally good."^®
Thonssen and Baird observe, however, that
a speech conforming to the principles of good organization may
be ill-adapted to the specific audience for which it is intended.
In other words, the so-called natural or logical structure may
not coincide with the most effective sequence of presentation.
It may be necessary to alter the natural order sharply to
accommodate the speech to certain people.
Gray and Braden elaborate upon plans of organization other than the
traditional plan, which they classify as "deductive order," because the
speaker's thesis is stated at the outset of the s p e e c h . A c c o r d i n g
to Gray and Braden, other plans of organization include the problemsolution arrangement, inductive order, and implicative order.

The

problem-solution pattern is essentially inductive, since it concludes
with an "action step," or statement of the course of action the speaker
would like his audience to follow.

Inductive order differs from deduc

tive order in that the thesis is stated last in the speech.

Implicative

order is defined as leading up to the proposition indirectly, or making
the development of the speech "so pointed that the audience frames the
proposition without being told specifically what it is."

112

The speaker's selection of an organizational plan should be

108Ibid., p. 402.
IQ^Ibid., p. 401.
H ^ T h e thesis is called the "statement" in the traditional plan
of organization.
^■^G. W. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking; Principles
and Practice, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963X
pp. 361-364.
112

Ibid., p. 364.
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consistent with his analysis of his audience.

With a hostile audience,

the speaker may more effectively accomplish his purpose by advancing
from the least controversial points toward the points of greatest dis
agreement.

In short, he may wish to build a solid foundation before he

risks a direct statement of his proposition.
wish to risk stating his proposition at all.

113

In some cases he may not

If the audience is largely

hostile the speaker may present the proposition by implication.
Craftsmanship.

114

Thematic emergence, method of division and arrangement,

and rhetorical order in disposition are the concerns of an evaluation
of the craftsmanship of the speaker's organization.
1.

Thematic emergence.

Williams did not directly state his

thesis that Wilson's attendance at the peace conference was in the best
interests of the American people.

Rather, the three main arguments

advanced in the speech, that Wilson will not lose the sovereignty while
abroad, that Wilson may be ignorant of foreign affairs, and that a league
of nations would be practicable, developed the thesis by implication.
By asking in his closing remarks how the attacks upon Wilson and upon the
league would help the American Republic and American influence in Europe,
Williams implied that Wilson's presence at Versailles, unencumbered by
the attacks of political opponents, would be beneficial to the American
Republic and to American interests.
2.
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Method of division and arrangement.

In this, as in all of

Williams' speeches in the league debate, the basis of division and
113
^Ibid.,

p. 363.

^■*"^Tbid,, p. 364.
■*■^11. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 29,
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arrangement of the material was logical in order.

Of the types of

logical order described by Thonssen and B a i r d , W i l l i a m s ' address of
December 3, 1918 may best be characterized as refutative in nature.

In

his opening remarks Williams indicated that his speech would be refuta
tive .
Amongst the complex concatenations of endless adjectives to
which we have just listened I have failed to find any argument
of any description. I find, upon the contrary, that the con
tention of the Senator from Illinois violates the precedents of
Presidents who have reigned if not ruled in this country
hitherto, or, to use a true American term, have presided in this
country hitherto.
Williams made no attempt at a point-by-point refutation of Sherman's
speech, since he had, as he said, failed to find any argument.

Never

theless, Williams' address was a counter-attack in defence of Wilson
and in defense of the league, both of which had been attacked by Sherman.
3.

Rhetorical order in disposition.

Williams introduced his

lengthy remarks with a distinctly partisan view that Sherman had made
much ado about nothing in his accusations that Wilson had surrendered
the sovereignty of the United States.

Rather than attempting to render

his opponents favorably disposed toward him, Williams probably antag
onized them with the Latin phrase, "Parturiunt montes, nascetur
ridiculus mus," or "Mountains are in labor:

There is born a ridiculous

mouse," from Horace's Epistle to the Pisos.

Sherman himself responded

briefly to one of Williams' early barbs.

Laughter and applause in the

galleries followed one of Williams' comments, and the
threatened to clear the galleries as a result.

Vice-President

These responses indicate

^■■^Thonssen and Baird, ££. cit., pp. 396-397.
n 7u. S. Congressional Record, o p . ci t ., 29.
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that Williams1 introductory remarks at least enlisted the attention
and interest of the audience present.

In observing in his introduction

that Sherman had violated the precedents of other Presidents, Williams
prepared the way for the development of his first idea, that Wilson
would not lose the sovereignty of his office by attending the peace
conference.
Williams did not preview his main points, nor did he include a
statement of his thesis at any point in the speech.

The body of the

speech consisted of an elaboration of the three main arguments, although
Williams digressed in developing each of the arguments.

His conclusion

consisted of a series of rhetorical questions.
I want to leave you this thought: How is all this going to
hurt him? How is it going to help you? How is it going to
help your posterity? How is it going to help the American Republic?
How is it going to help American influence in Europe? How is it
going to accomplish any good end of any description for the purpose
of civilization or democracy or humanity?
By scolding his listeners in his concluding remarks, Williams
probably failed to inspire them with a favorable opinion of himself.

He

recalled, however, that the nation's interests were at stake and that he
believed these interests to be more important than any of the partisan
opposition that had been expressed toward Wilson and toward the league.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment
By December 3, all senators had not made public their views on
the league or on Wilson's plans to attend the peace conference.

In

addition to the normal partisan division of fifty Republicans and fortysix Democrats, however, Reed, Poindexter, Watson, and Penrose had

118T, . ,
o-i
Ibid., 31.
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have been more consistent with the speaker’s purpose.

In view of this

inconsistency it seems likely that Williams did not deliberately plan
the sequence of organization at all.
In addition to the inconsistency of the organization with the
nature of the content, a second criticism of Williams' organization with
respect to his audience adjustment may be raised.

The speaker made no

attempt at logical consistency in the arrangement of his materials.

Of

the seven arguments which should have supported the first main argument,
that Wilson would not lose the sovereign power while abroad, the fifth,
that short absences had never deprived the sovereignty of kings, was a
repetition of the second, the sixth, that the speech did not sound like
Sherman, a digression designed to discredit Senator Sherman, and the
seventh, that great men of the war cannot be torn down, a further digres
sion designed to compliment Wilson.

Of the two subsidiary arguments

supporting the second main argument, the second, that criticism of Wilson
had been partisan, was a digression aimed at leveling the charge of
partisanism at Wilson's opponents.

Finally, of the four arguments in

support of Williams' contention that a league of nations was practicable,
the fourth, that Wilson must go to Versailles, was a digression.
A third criticism of Williams' organization of his address of
December 3 is that, since it is impossible to be certain of the speaker's
organization in reading the text of the speech in the Congressional
Record, it must have been a hopeless task to comprehend the arrangement
of the material simply by listening to it.
soever as to the order of his presentation.
upon disorder.

Williams gave no clues what
Rather, he seemed intent

Williams' lack of clear organization made difficult not
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only listener comprehension but retention of the material as well.

For

tunately, those who were interested could read the Senator's remarks in
the Congressional Record.
Summary of the Organization.
In his speech before the Senate of December 3, 1919, Williams
advanced by implication the thesis that President Wilson's attendance
at the peace conference was in the best interests of the American people.
In support of the thesis, Williams argued that Wilson would not lose the
President's sovereignty while abroad, that it was desirable for Wilson
to negotiate in person at the peace conference, and that a league of
nations was practicable.

The speech was arranged in refutative order,

although the refutation was general in nature rather than specifically
point-by-point.
Williams ridiculed his most important listeners, his opponents,
in introducing his speech.

After preparing the way in his introductory

remarks for his first argument, he developed the three contentions,
digressing somewhat in each.

Finally, he concluded by again scolding

his opponents while reminding them of the importance of national inter
ests as opposed to partisan politics.
Williams failed to adjust effectively to his listeners.

His

implicative organization was inconsistent with the abrupt chastisement
of the speech.

Several logical inconsistencies are obvious in the

arrangement of the material, and the speech is so long, involved, and
so lacking in any of the organizational devices which implement the
listeners' comprehension and retention, that the speech must be deemed
organizationally incomprehensible.

Invention:

Argumentative Development

Thonssen and Baird note that:
. . . the ideas which live within the memories of succeeding
generations, and the ideas whose integrity is tested and
appraised more often in later history are the ones which
deliberative speakers have day^loped in addresses on the
burning issues of their time.
This description is appropriate to the ideas Williams developed in his
addresses before the Senate on the League of Nations.

In his address of

December 3, 1918, Williams responded principally to the remarks of
Senator Sherman of Illinois, who had questioned the wisdom of the
President's personally attending the peace conference at Paris.
This section tests not only the severity and strictness of the
argumentative development

of the speech but

evaluates the

credibility of Williams' arguments in terms of

logical

adjustment to his

lis

teners .
Argumentative Development
In support of the

of the Thesis
thesis

that Wilson's attendance at

thepeace

conference would be in the best interests of the American people,
Williams argued that the President would not lose the sovereignty of the
republic while abroad, that Wilson's critics could have been right in
their contention that the President was ignorant of foreign affairs, and
that a league of nations was practicable.
The logical validity of each of the major arguments may-be
tested by recasting them into syllogistic form.

As a hypothetical syllo

gism, the first argument may be stated as follows:

119Ibid., p. 334.

Major Premise:

If the President does not lose the sover
eignty of the American Republic while
abroad, his attendance at the peace con
ference will be in the best interests of
the American people.

Minor Premise:

The President will not lose the sovereignty
while abroad.

Conclusion:

His attendance at the peace conference will
be in the best interests of the American
people.

Since the question of whether Wilson could attend the peace
conference and still retain the nation's sovereignty had been raised by
Sherman and other opponents of the league, Williams probably assumed
that the minor premise of the argument should be supported.

He explained,

first, that the President could not lose the sovereignty because he did
not possess it according to the terms of the federal constitution.
. . . in no true sense does the President of the United States
personify the sovereignty of the American Republic any more
than a Senator does or a Member of the House of Representatives.
They are a part of the representatives of the sovereignty, which
is the people. ^
Williams thus made his argument more credible to the senators by con
tending that they themselves possessed as much of the sovereignty of the
republic as did the President.
Williams' second means of supporting the premise that Wilson
would not lose the sovereignty was by the inductive means of argument
from analogy.

He reasoned that, since kings did not lose the sovereignty

of their countries when visiting another empire, the President would not
lose the sovereignty while attending the peace conference.

This is among

the weakest of the Senator's arguments since the differences between a
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ruling monarch and an elected President of the United States outweigh
the similarities.

Williams apparently forgot the intimate familiarity

of his listeners with the Constitution of the United States as well as
their knowledge of the operation of forms of government other than a
republic.

The use of this analogy, then, seems inconsistent in that it

directly followed a supporting argument which depended upon the listeners'
knowledge of the Constitution.

It should have been obvious to Williams

that his listeners would immediately recall that an absolute monarch
could, if he wished, delegate absolute power to whomever he wished to
serve in his place during his absence from the country.

Since the Con

stitution allows a President of the United States no such luxury, how
ever, Williams' choice of analogy was poor.
Williams' third attempt to support the premise that the Presi
dent would not lose the sovereignty while abroad was a digression from
the issue.

Instead of contending that other presidents had left the

country without losing the sovereignty, he said that they had left
without being antagonized by members of the opposing party.

No one had

ever accused Washington, Roosevelt, or Taft of having lost sovereignty
because of trips outside the territorial limits of the United States,
the Senator maintained.

In essence, he contended indirectly that since

no complaints had been heard in these past instances of presidential
absence, there must have been no loss of sovereignty.

He possibly

assumed his listeners would, of their own initiative, take the argument
to its ultimate conclusion:

that since there must have been no loss of

sovereignty in past instances of presidential absence, there could be no
such loss in Wilson's case.

The argument, as Williams stated it, was
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irrelevant to the premise it should have supported:
not lose the sovereignty while abroad.

that Wilson would

As stated, the argument may have

constituted effective ethical proof, but if completed it could have
constituted effective logical proof as well.

If Williams believed many

of his listeners to be "narrow legalists," as he later accused them of
being, then he should have completed the argument.

A narrow legalist

would probably have been influenced more readily by the presence of logic
than by its absence.
Relying again upon his listeners' familiarity with the American
Constitution, Williams contended, as a fourth means of supporting the
premise that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty, that the Constitu
tion did not stipulate that absence from the territorial limits of the
United States constitutes inability or temporary or permanent vacation
of the President's office.

Williams recognized the one principle upon

which all senators agreed;

that the Constitution is the supreme law of

the land.

Because of this fact, this is the strongest of the support

Williams offered for his premise.

The argument is impressive when

stated in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.
Major Premise:

If the American Constitution does not stipu
late that the President's absence from the
United States constitutes a loss of sover
eignty, then such absence does not constitute
such loss.

Minor Premise:

The Constitution does not so stipulate.

Conclusion:

The absence of the President from the United
States does not constitute a loss of sover
eignty.

The syllogism is technically valid in that its minor premise affirms the
antecedent, and the conclusion affirms the consequent.

The strength of
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the argument, however, lies in Williams' analysis of his audience.

How

coiald any of his senatorial listeners, especially the narrow legalists,
resistthe force of the document
Williams'

they had sworn to uphold?

fifth argument in support of the premise that Wilson

would not lose the sovereignty while abroad was a restatement of his
second argument.

He reiterated his contention that kings, emperors, or

presidents had never been deprived of their official functions because
of short absences from their countries.

Williams made no attempt to

strengthen the analogy in using it a second time.
have added little
The sixth

Its repetition could

to the logical validity of the premise in question.
argument, that the speech had not sounded like Senator

Sherman, was a digression which could be considered useful as ethical
proof but logically irrelevant.

The same is true of the seventh argument,

that the great men produced by the war could not be torn down from the
pedestal on which humanity had placed them.
Williams' support for the premise that Wilson would not lose the
sovereignty while abroad could have been logically valid to his listeners
only in the two instances in which he invoked the American Constitution
in Wilson's defense by contending that the Constitution had not granted
the President any more of the sovereignty than it had to the senators
themselves and that the Constitution did not stipulate that short absences
of the President constituted vacation of his office.
Williams' assumption that only the minor premise of the syllogism
needed support may itself be questioned.

He apparently believed that

his audience would accept the major premise that if the President did
not lose the sovereignty of the American Republic while abroad, his
attendance at the peace conference would be in the best interests of the
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American people.

This premise assumed that the interests of the people

would be served by Wilson's trip because he would not lose the sover
eignty by going.

In addressing his remarks primarily to those in the

Senate who opposed Wilson's trip, Williams appropriately retaliated on
their own grounds, which had been the accusation that the trip would mean
the loss of national sovereignty.
Williams' second major argument, cast into the form of a
categorical syllogism, may be stated as follows:
Major Premise:

A President who is kept ignorant of foreign
affairs should attend the peace conference
personally rather than rely on messengers
to negotiate for him.

Minor Premise;

Wilson may be as ignorant of foreign affairs as
Sherman assumes him to be.

Conclusion:

Wilson should attend the peace conference
personally rather than rely on messengers to
negotiate for him.

Again Williams determined that the major premise would be accepted by
his listeners without question and that the minor premise should be
given support.

In attempting to support the minor premise, Williams

argued, first, that a president is very frequently misled.

He contended

that, like a king, a president is subject to the information that people
choose to give him.

To strengthen the analogy, Williams cited Presidents

Grant and Washington as having been misled.

Williams asserted that

Washington had been misled by the "whisperings of the New England
Federalists."

This instance is not historically accurate, since Washing

ton had maintained his policy of non-entangling alliances despite the
contrary advice of Hamilton and Jefferson.
121
sixth ed.,
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The record is somewhat

T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
(New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958), pp. 70-92.
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clearer in Grant's case.

Williams' observation that the Old Warrior

had been misled "very many times" may be authenticated historically.

122

Williams made no particular accusations regarding Wilson's advisers, but
merely intended to suggest a further reason in favor of the President's
attendance at the peace conference.

Among Wilson's opponents, to whom

Williams especially addressed his remarks, Henry Cabot Lodge, the formhr
Harvard professor of history, would certainly have challenged Williams'
accuracy in supporting his analogy.

That the Sage of Nahant failed to

challenge the Mississippian may have signified indifference or unwilling
ness to bother with such a minor detail.
Williams made no further attempt to strengthen the premise that
Wilson may have been ignorant of foreign affiars.

Instead he digressed

in order to castigate his opponents for partisanism in their criticism
of the President's participation in the peace conference.
Williams' final argument in support of his thesis that Wilson's
attendance at the peace conference would be in the best interests of the
American people was that a league of nations, presumably the product of
the conference, would be practicable.
to the thesis
Major

may beseen in the form
Premise:

The argument and its relationship
of a hypothetical syllogism.

If the United States can become a member of
a practicable league of nations, then Wilson's
attendance at the peace conference is in the
best interests of the American people.

Minor Premise:

The United States can become a member of a
practicable league of nations.

Conclusion:

Wilson's attendance at the peace conference
is in the best interests of the American people.

122Ibid., pp. 378-383.

As in the two preceding arguments, Williams again strengthened the minor
premise in order to prove that the league of nations would be practicable.
First, in support of the premise he contended that the allied nations
alone could keep world peace by isolating any offending nation.

He

observed that, since the allied nations controlled the seas, they alone
without the cooperation of any of the other nations of the world could
cut off any country that attempted to make war upon another country.
Williams further contended that the threat of united force would prevent
any country from going beyond the pale of civilization and that even
Hohenzollern would have been afraid to go into war against such a league.
If the allied nations could not all agree to support a league, Williams
maintained further, then the two English-speaking countries alone could
bring about world peace for 100 years.

Great Britain and the United

States controlled not only the sea power of the world but a significant
share of its resources as well, he asserted.

Arthur S. Link verified

the historical accuracy of Williams1 reasoning.

In 1916 Congress had

authorized the Navy Department to construct a new fleet comparable to
that of Great Britain.

Although the program had been shelved in order

to build destroyers and patrol craft designed to hunt submarines, in
December, 1918 the Navy Department presented plans to Congress for a
three-year building program that would give the United States definite
naval superiority over the British fleet.

io o

In addition, immediately

after the Armistice, the British expected to receive most of the ships
of the defeated German n a v y . ^ ^

Williams' listeners were, of course,

■^•^Link, ^oja. c i t ., p. 278.
124
E. P. Potter and J. R. Fredland, editors, The United States
and World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955),
p. 561. In 1919, however, the Germans sank most of their vessels to keep
them out of British hands. Williams, of course, could not foresee this
development.
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familiar with the plans for expansion of the navy, and his argument that
the English-speaking nations alone could control a league of nations and
make it practicable was logically creditable to the members of the Senate
as well as to the general public.
Summary of Logical Proof
Williams' logical strength in his address of December 3, 1918
lay in his methods of developing his three supporting arguments for his
thesis.

To the first of these arguments, that Wilson would not lose the

sovereign power of the United States while abroad, Williams lent logical
credibility for his audience of senators by contending that Wilson could
not lose the sovereignty because the Constitution had not delegated it
exclusively to him and that the Constitution did not stipulate that
Presidential absence from the United States constituted a loss of
sovereignty.
Williams' second supporting argument, that Wilson may have been
as ignorant of foreign affairs as Sherman had assumed him to be, was
weak in that the speaker presented no evidence of Wilson's ignorance.
Rather, he relied upon the historical examples of misinformation of
Washington and Grant, the former of which was historically inaccurate.
Williams' third supporting argument, however, was logically valid
to his listeners in that he contended that a league of nations could be
practicable even if only the two English-speaking countries supported it.
His listeners, knowledgable of the naval strength of the world's powers,
probably accepted his observation that the two English-speaking countries
were dominant in terms of naval power and resources.
Aside from his frequent digressions during the speech which may
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have antagonized many of his listeners, Williams' logic was probably
acceptable to most of the members of the Senate.
As previously noted, the general public had had no opportunity
to express opinion concerning Wilson's proposed attendance at the peace
conference.

Their favorable reaction toward the league idea itself, how

ever, probably indicated a similar willingness to accept Williams'
defense of the President's trip.

Invention:

Emotional Proof

Thonssen and Baird observe that logical proof ". . . i s not
enough, by itself, to complete the task of inducing belief or action."

125

Bower Aly clarifies this concept by offering the Aristotelian interpre
tation that "if audiences were perfect, the only means necessary to
persuasion could be found in the enthymeme, a kind of rhetorical syllo
gism constituting reasonable proof.

But since audiences are not perfect,

the public speaker must employ other means of persuasion as

w e l l .

"^6

The other two means of inducing belief or action are those of
emotional proof and ethical proof.

Of emotional proof, Aristotle noted

that audiences might be persuaded "when they are brought by the speech
into a state of emotion; for we give very different decisions under the
sway of pain or joy, and liking or hatred."127
Thonssen and Baird delineate the means of analyzing emotional
proof as a consideration of the speaker's audience analysis and
125
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°Bower Aly, The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 32TT
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'Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York:
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. 9.
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adaptation in terms of his specific appeals to various impelling motives
and their corollaries.

19 ft
°

Audience Adaptation
John Sharp Williams was addressing himself primarily to his
fellow senators who would or would not act upon Senator Sherman's con
current resolution declaring the Presidency vacant when Woodrow Wilson
departed for Versailles.
the Congress,

A seasoned veteran of thirty years service in

Williams knew his audience as did few others in the Senate.

In his address of December 3, 1918, he appealed primarily to the motives
of self-preservation and patriotism, or national pride.

The very reason

for a league of nations was that of self-preservation, so it is natural
that Williams based much of his emotional appeal upon this motive.
Williams' first appeal to the motive of self-preservation was in
his observation that the Constitution had taken care of the American
people and was very much superior to any form of bolshevism or autocracy
in the world.

His point in this reference was that the Constitution has

not stipulated that brief absences from office rendered the Presidency
vacant. ^29
A second instance of this appeal was in Williams' warning not to
leave the job of peace negotiation to messengers.

He admonished that

". . . with all of the errors that may occur of misinterpretation and
misconstruction, there is a danger of our fighting one another.
what becomes of the dream of peace?

Then,

What becomes of 'the parliament of

■^®Thonssen and Baird, o£. c i t ., p. 359.
1 2 % . S. Congressional Record, o p . c i t ., 29.

m a n 1?

What becomes of the 'federation of the world'?

What becomes of

the dream of the poets and the vision of the seers?"130

Thirdly,

Williams appealed to the motive of self-preservation by pointing out
that Wilson
. . . is going to do what he thinks is right, not only for
America, but for the world; and he is going to try to get out
of this, if he can, by heart-to-heart talks with Lloyd George
and Clemenceau and the Italian premier and the Belgian king
and the balance of them, a comparatively permanent and a just
peace and, if possible, a league of nations to preserve the
peace of the world.131
Self-preservation included the declaration of war if necessary, as
Williams indicated in his fourth appeal to this motive.

If a nation

offended the league of nations by making war upon one of its members,
that nation would be ostracized commercially and militarily and declared
"beyond the pale of civilization."

Williams asserted that the league

of nations would declare that nation to be the "enemy of mankind," and
1^2
the group would "make united war against it."iJ
In his final appeal to self-preservation, Williams warned that
continued attacks on Wilson would result in weakening the country and
undercutting its international influence.
We want to have all of the influence we can over there with
them to bring about a permanent and just peace; as nearly as
possible "a parliament of man and a federation of the world";
and what are you doing here? Weakening your own agent every
day, throwing adjectives at his head, accusing him virtually
of idiocy, of un-Americanism--weakening him in the council,
so that if you can help it America shall not predominate but
somebody else will.133

130Ibid., 30.

132Ibid., 31.
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Williams 1 second type of motive appeal in his address of December
3, 1918 was that to the corollary motive of patriotism or national pride.
As a first instance of this appeal, Williams attempted to impress his
listeners with the greatness of Wilson, a reason for national pride.
A second example of an appeal to the motive of national pride was in
Williams 1 indication of the strength of the United States as a world
power.

He pointed out that, even though most of the other countries of

the world might oppose a

league of nations,theUnited States and Great

Britain would be able to enforce the idealsof such a league.
These United States have the second largest navy in the world,
and before many years roll around we will have the largest.
I tell you that if nobody else goes into the league of nations
except the English-speaking races, . . . they and we, with our
law, our language, and our courage and resources on land and
at sea, are enough.
A final instance of Williams' appeal to the motive of patriotism
was his definition or explanation of Wilson's trip to Versailles.
was going

to Europe, the senator maintained,

".

Wilson

. . t o try to consummate--

the dream of poets, the vision of prophets, the heart-wish of good men
and good women for a thousand years--peace, honorable peace, permanent
peace, just peace.

. . .

Thus Williams attempted to associate the

United States with the altruistic purpose for which its President left
the country.
Williams' use of emotional proof, then, was limited to appeals
to two motives:

self-preservation and patriotism.

Invention:

Ethical Proof

Two thousand years before Emerson declared that "what you are
134_,.,
0Q
Ibid., 29.
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thunders so loudly I cannot hear what you say," Aristotle had recognized
that a speaker's personality and character exert perhaps the strongest
I07
of all influences upon the reception of his ideas.

Aristotle adds

that this influence, or trust, should be created by the speech itself,
rather than left to depend upon antecedent impressions of the speaker.^38
Thonssen and Baird further define this concept of "ethical proof" as the
speaker's skill during his speech in establishing credibility through
high character, or integrity, intelligence, and good will toward his
listeners.

1O Q
7

This section is concerned with an analysis of John

Sharp Williams' attempts, in his address to the Senate of December 3,
1918, to reinforce his personal credibility in terms of his integrity,
intelligence, and good will.

Integrity
Williams revealed his high moral character generally by associ
ating himself with Wilson and with the cause

of world peace, both of

which he portrayed as virtuous and elevated.

In one instance of this

association, Williams also managed to castigate his opponents in the
same phrase.
Mr. President, I believe in loyalty to a cause when it is a
good cause, to a man when he is a good man and a strong man
and an able man. . . .
He [Woodrow Wilson] is so much greater,
he is so much wiser, he is so much longer visioned, he is so
much gentler visioned than the men who think they are making
political capital by attacking him that there is.no comparison. ^
1^7

Cooper, o£. c i t ., p. 9.

138Ibid.
•^^Thonssen and Baird, ap^. cit., p. 385.
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Williams further associated himself with Wilson's objectives:

"...

peace, honorable peace, permanent peace, just peace; just even to our
enemies, but not overmerciful to them, because in order to be just they
must pay retribution."^-4^
The Mississippian emphasized his own lack of partisan selfish
ness by pointing out his loyalty to national objectives above those of
his party.
I stood upon this floor six months ago, I believe, or eight, and
I said that if the blackest Republican ran against the best
Democrat that ever existed, and that Democrat had not supported
this war from beginning to end and the Republican had, I would
vote for the Republican. I was accused of partisanship for
making that statement. As a matter of fact, it was the most
extremely unpartisan utterance that could be made by anybody.
Throughout the address, Williams bestowed enthusiastic praise
upon Wilson and his cause.

He attested to Wilson's great wisdom in

personally going to Versailles several times in the speech.

He referred

to Wilson as one of the nation's five greatest Presidents, a prophet,
and one of the greatest of world leaders to emerge from the war.

He

indicated that Wilson was intent upon doing "what was right" not only
for the United States, but for the world.

Williams associated the

league of nations with the best interests of the people of the world.
He exclaimed that Wilson's cause could "bring about the peace of the
world for a hundred years

..."

143

He combined his praise for the

President with criticism of his immediate listeners.
. . . there is not one of you that will go to your bedside
tonight and tell God in secret converse that you believe that

141Ibid., 31.
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he [Wilson] is either unpatriotic or dishonest or that he has
any purpose in the world except not only the good of the
American Republic but the general welfare of the civilized
world.^44
Williams' third means of revealing his high moral character was
that of linking his opponents in the Senate with what was not virtuous.
This was his most frequently used form of ethical proof.

He appeared

to be angry that the Republican Senators would sponsor such a joint
resolution as that of Sherman's which would declare the office of the
Presidency vacant on Wilson's departure for Europe.

In his introductory

remarks Williams castigated the Illinois senator.
We were warned of a tornado of dissent to the President's
trip. . . . we have listened to the speech, or to the reading of
the writing rather, of the Senator from Illinois.
That, I
suppose, is the tornado and the volcano and the explosion which
were to take place; and we are now left with the results.
Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus m u s . (Mountains are in
labor:
there is born a ridiculous mouse.
The Mississippian further pointed out that Sherman's speech had
contained no argument.

Sherman's contention had violated the precedents

of Presidents who had in the past departed from the country without such
criticism.
resolution.

Further, Sherman was making a mistake in presenting such a
Williams expressed disbelief that Sherman would be "guilty"

of such an "endless concatenation of complex adjectives."

Williams

attacked Sherman's method of delivering his speech.
He read his speech, of course, and read it with good emphasis;
read it in'fine style, as he usually does, and with a degree of
acting that made it funny at times, even when the Senator was

145Ibid., 28.
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seeking to be serious, and still funnier at other times when he
was not seeking to be serious.
He urged that "no real lawyer, publicist, or real man of real common
sense" could believe that Wilson was doing wrong.

Not only were the

opposition senators not genuine lawyers or men of real sense, but they
may not even have been human.

"Gentlemen may bark and gentlemen may try

to bite--'try to bite,1 I say; they cannot bite; they may bark--."^4^
The Republican senators who had gone to hear Wilson speak on December 2
had been impolite, and, because of a "gentlemen's understanding," had
refused to applaud the President.

Further, they were "hypocrites" for

charging Wilson with a crime because he wanted Democrats elected to
office.

The senators, he maintained, had short memories because they

had forgotten that all great Presidents had been members of political
parties and had been loyal to them.
Lodge by exclaiming:

To this he added a slap at Senator

"Going all the way, I reckon, from the remote West

plumb to New England, where the Brahmins live!"

Not only did Williams

refuse to believe the accusations Sherman had made, but he refused to
believe that Sherman himself believed them.

He accused the opposition

senators of being unpatriotic, of attempting to weaken America by
attempting to weaken her chief agent of foreign affairs.

Additionally,

he accused the Republicans of not having respected the Constitution
until they had been able to use it against Wilson.

"All at once, nicely

caught with the little complexities of constitutional toilet arrange
ments, cosmetics upon the face, chiefly, you try to make a scapegoat out

146Ibid., 29.
147Ibid.

of Wilson."148

jn a withering blast of sarcasm, Williams declared, "Of

course, when a Senator attacks anybody he is being attacked by a sort of
a German superman; almost an American Hohenzollern, that is capable of
everything wise and nothing foolish, not even an utterance accidental
ly.

hj[s concluding words, the Mississippian again pilloried the

Republicans with the advice that their criticism of Wilson would do the
country more harm than good.
A fourth means of establishing his high character consisted in
Williams' removing the unfavorable impressions of Wilson's trip to
Europe that had previously been established by the opposition senators.
Williams emphatically urged the absolute necessity of Wilson's personal
presence for the treaty making in Versailles.

This would far outweigh

the inconvenience of having the chief executive out of the country for
a short time, and it would under no circumstances indicate a vacation of
the Presidency as the Republican senators had claimed.
The creation of the impression of complete sincerity was
Williams' fifth means of establishing his high character.
tions against his opponents were straightforward and open.
particular attempt at subtlety.

His accusa
He made no

As a public servant of thirty years,

he had become familiar with most of his colleagues in the Senate.
» '

He

felt no compunction or even restraint in. severely chastizing those
responsible for the anti-Wilson resolution.
Intelligence
Williams first attempted to establish his intelligence in terms
148 ...
_n
Ibid., 31.

105
of "common sense" by emphasizing the practicality of the league idea.
He compared this enormous international scheme with the justice and pre
servation of peace at the local level.
You never see the force of the constable and the sheriff behind
the justice of the peace or the circuit court, except when he
opens court and declares it adjourned; but everybody knows it is
there, and, as a consequence, nobody defies it, or at least
nobody but a very reckless man. And so in this agreement you
will not have to whip the country that wants to get beyond the
pale of civilization, because it will not get there. It will
be afraid to try. Even Hohenzollern would have been afraid to
go into this war if he had known the civilized world was going
to face him.150
A second illustration of Williams' intelligence was his famil
iarity with the issues at stake in the partisan controversy over Wilson's
trip and the league idea itself.

Additionally, his intimate knowledge

of history was apparent in the references to the activities of past
Presidents comparable to Wilson.

Finally, Williams demonstrated his

familiarity with the classics of literature in his apt quotation from
Horace's Epistle to the Pisos:
m u s , "mountains are in labor:

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus
there is born a ridiculous mouse."

Good will
There is one instance of praise for the Republican opponents in
Williams' address.

He pointed out that the American people had returned

a Republican Congress in the 1918 elections because, on the whole, the
Republicans had been more loyal to the war effort than had the Democrats.
"I have come to the conclusion that the American people put you in
office in these two Houses because they thought maybe you could be more
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safely trusted to stand behind the President than a lot of our fellows
could be."151
Williams' second method of gaining the good will of his lis
teners was by means of identifying himself with their problems.

He

realized that American influence in the treaty-making at Versailles
would be imperative, and that most Americans were anxious for permanent
peace following the recent holacaust.

He therefore used the first per

son plural to identify himself with all Americans:

"We want to have all

of the influence we can over there with them to bring about a permanent
and just peace; as nearly as possible

'a parliament of man and a federa

tion of the world. " ,15^
A third method of establishing good will, as already mentioned,
was Williams' candor and straightforwardness.

Finally, to offset any

personal partisanism that may have been attributed to him, Williams
freely said that he would have bolted the party to vote Republican had
there been Democratic candidates unwilling to support Wilson and thei war
effort in the recent elections.
Consciously or unconsciously, Williams relied most heavily on
ethical proof to accomplish his purpose--the defeat of the Sherman reso
lution--^ his address of December 3, 1918.

He attempted to implement

his high character, intelligence, and good will by means of (1) associat
ing himself and Wilson with the cause of world peace;

(2) emphasizing

his own lack of selfishness; (3) enthusiastically praising Wilson and
his cause;

(4) linking his opponents with what was not virtuous;

151
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(5)
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removing unfavorable impressions of himself, of Wilson, and the cause
of world peace;

(6) creating the impression of complete sincerity;

(7)

using "common sense"; (8) showing familiarity with the issues of the
day;

(9) praising his listeners;

listeners' problems;

(10) identifying himself with his

(11) proceeding with candor and straightforward

ness; and (12) offsetting any personal reasons he may have had for giving
the speech.

Style
In addition to the rhetorical aspects of organization and inven
tion, the latter encompassing logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, a
third aspect of the speaker's art should be examined.

This aspect is

style, which Bryant and Wallace define as "that quality in speaking
which results from the selection and management of language."153

From

the point of view of the rhetorical critic, an analysis and evaluation
of style is important because the speaker's " . . .

language, inter

preted by the delivery, creates in the listener the first and quickest
impression of the message of the speech, the sort of person the speaker
is, and the tone and mood of the occasion."

154

Concerning the evalua

tion of the speaker's style, Thonssen and Baird observe that " . . .
there are two sets of materials which are more likely to open listeners'
minds to the ideas of the speaker:

(1) elements that make for clearness,
ICC

and (2) elements that make for impressiveness in discourse.

This

■^■^Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals of Public
Speaking, third ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960),
p. 252.
•'••^ I b i d ., p. 251.
•*--^Thonssen and Baird, o£. cit., pp. 430-32.
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section, then, is concerned with these two elements in John Sharp
Williams' address to the Senate of December 3, 1918.

Clearness
Any attempt to analyze Williams' style must be prefaced with a
note on the speaker's delivery.

The impromptu nature of his delivery

affected the nature of his style to a considerable degree.

There is no

evidence to indicate that Williams ever addressed the Senate from manu
script or even made use of notes.
their speeches from manuscript

He criticized his colleagues who read
The nature of the occasion demanded

either that a senator make an impromptu reply to an adversary or that
he prepare his reply to be given several days following the initial
speech, depending upon the schedule of business in the Senate.

Williams

invariably chose to make his replies on the spur of the moment, gaining
the advantage of immediacy at the expense of an extremely loose style.
However loose Williams' oral style may have been, it could never
be described as obscure.

First, Williams thoroughly understood the

ideas he expressed in his speeches.

His familiarity with the machinery

of treaty-making and with the issues involved seems to justify VicePresident Marshall's praise of the Mississippian's "intimate knowledge
of world history and world politics
A second element of Williams' style that failed to contribute to
its clarity was his word selection.

The bluntness of his criticism may

have offended many of his colleagues, and many may have failed to
X56
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understand him.

His classical allusion to the words of Horace was prob

ably familiar to some of the senators, although it may have been puzzling
to many of the average Americans who read the speech in the Congressional
Record.

In context, Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus was

clearly criticism.

Williams' selection of words was not appropriate,

then, in the sense that he could have been misunderstood.

There are no

words in the text of the speech which are obsolete even today.

Some of

his words, however, may have been unfamiliar to the senators.

To demon

strate the variety of vocabulary at Williams' command, he referred to
Sherman's speech as a "concatenation," to the objective of the league as
"impartial arbitrament," and to the right of every language to "homolo
gate" itself with its own nationality.

Within the same text, however, he

often used such forceful monosyllabic verbs as "rid," "cut," "lost,"
"doubt," "bite," "bark," "tear," "die," "jumps," "hurt," and "beat."
The lack of appropriateness

and intelligibility failed to contribute to

Williams' clearness in terms of discerning word selection.
A third element of style that contributed to its clarity was the
simplicity of sentence structure.

Probably because of the impromptu

nature of the speech, Williams' sentences were anything but simple in
structure.
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He made frequent use of compound, complex, and compound-

complex sentences.

In a sampling of ten paragraphs from the speech,

159

Williams used a total of twelve simple, eight compound, twenty complex,
and fifteen compound-complex sentences.

Of the 55 sentences, only

As I show later, the average sentence length is 40 words.
icq

The speech contains 51 paragraphs.
I counted the types of
sentences in every fifth paragraph for my representative sampling.
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twelve were simple in structure.

This seems to indicate a tendency

toward complexity which probably detracted from the element of clarity
in style.

Indeed, such sentences as the following 133 word example give

the impression of being "endless concatenations" in themselves.
Does the Senator from Illinois imagine that the President does
not know that heart-to-heart talks with the other great men
whom this war has developed--without taking it for granted now
that the President regards himself as a great man; I merely so
regard him; but my opinion is not worth more than that of the
Senator from Illinois, and the Senator from Illinois regards
himself, perhaps as most Senators do, as a greater man than
Woodrow Wilson--but supposing he is right; the President is
here; he occupies the position; he must act; and wanting to
act, the more ignorant he is, as the Senator assumes him to
be, the more he ought to want to confer with these great men
and to find out from them what ought to be done.
A fourth element that contributed to clarity of style was the
use of definitions, examples, and illustrations to clarify ideas.

By

means of definition, Williams clarified what he meant by the sovereignty
of the United States.

His definition clearly showed that since the

President did not personify his country's sovereignty, the President
could not lose the sovereignty by leaving the country.
clearly defined the concept of a league of nations.

Williams also

He stipulated in

layman terminology the various means by which such an organization would
preserve peace.

Williams probably used too many examples and illustra

tions in this address.

Fewer examples and illustrations would have

served his purpose more effectively in this writer's judgment.
A fifth element of clarity in style was control over the details
in the speech.
details.

Williams seemed not always to be in control of the

Rather than tersely, directly coming to the point, the

■^®U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 29.
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Mississippian unnecessarily labored each point with involved elabora
tions.

In reading the text of the address, it is not always apparent which

materials were essential and which were less essential.

In the midst of

so much invective against the Republican members of the Senate, the
reader often loses sight of the justification of Wilson's trip and of the
league idea itself.

The details of the speech, excessive and not always

relevant, did not contribute to clarity of style.
A sixth element of clarity was organizational integrity, or the
orderly sequence of ideas.
orderly sequence.

Williams' ideas were in anything but an

Again, this appears to have been the fault of the

occasion--an impromptu reply to Senator Sherman.
A seventh element of clarity was that of proper transition mate
rials designed to bridge the gap between parts and to suggest the direc
tion in which subsequent material will move.

There were no such

transitions in this address discernable to this writer.

The speech was

completely unplanned, and it appears that Williams had not formed the
habit of employing transition material to serve as guideposts to his
listeners.
A ninth element that contributed to clarity in style was the
adequacy of the logical materials:

assumptions, evidence, and argument.

As pointed out in an earlier section of this chapter,
cal proof was generally valid.
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Williams logi

It suffered somewhat, however, from the

Senator's constant tendency to digress.
A final element of clarity was that of suitable summaries
designed to refresh the listeners' memories with the outline of the

• ^ S e e p. 96.
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speech and with the interrelation of details within individual points.
Williams did not employ this technique at all.

There were no summary

statements to be found in his address of December 3, 1918.
In attempting to assess the clarity of Williams' speaking style,
it is necessary to consider not only the ten elements just discussed,
but the nature of the occasion as well.

There may have been compensa

tion for the speaker's lack of clarity in the very impromptu nature of
the speech which contributed to its obscurity.

Surely such spontaneity

must have made some contribution to clarity of style.

Impressiveness
The first element of style that may have contributed to impres
siveness was that of the sources of persuasion:
and ethical materials .^62

logical, emotional,

As pointed out earlier in this chapter,

Williams' strongest form of proof was his ethical materials, with which
he attempted to implement the force of his personal character.

He was

probably most impressive in his attempts to link his opponents with what
was not virtuous.
A second element of impressiveness was the use of imagery.

The

seven types of imagery, visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, kines
thetic, tactile, and thermal, are defined as ". . . the avenues by which
impressions may enter our awareness."

16 ^

Williams appealed first to visual imagery in his Latin quotation,

■ ^ S e e the specific sections of this chapter concerning each of
these types of proof, pp. 96, 100, 105-6.
■^^G. W. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking: Principles
and Practice, second e d ., (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963),
p . 488.

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus m u s .

Most of his fellow senators

were probably able to understand this allusion, and visually to enjoy
or despise it, depending upon their affiliation.

A second instance of

visual imagery was Williams' hypothetical pretense that he was Wilson.
He said that he would not want to stay in Washington and send cable
grams to his representatives to insist upon this or to "die in the
trench" for that, etc.

The reference to dying in the trench was prob

ably powerful visual imagery to listeners who had so recently experi
enced war.

A third instance of visual imagery, also reminiscent of the

war, was Williams' explanation that Washington's second administration
had failed because he had not had the support of an organized political
party but only " . . .

volunteers in every little engagement

Williams ' fourth example of visual imagery was his insistence that the
American people would recognize Republican malice and hate for what it was.
He asserted that if his opponents should give themselves "two weeks' rope,"
that "at the end of two weeks of unlimited rope the American people will
have spotted you, and there will be enough of them getting religion and
going on the mourners bench and confessing before God and man that they
made an awful mistake in the vote they cast at the last election.

. . ."

A fifth instance of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Wilson's
"Scotch jaw," a symbol, according to the Mississippian, of fearless
leadership.

00

Sixth, Williams, in explaining the practicability of the

league idea, asserted that " . . .

when the first man started and told

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., p. 30.
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people that they had to stop their private rows and quit killing one
another and go to a court of justice . . .," somebody had said it would
be impractical.

167

In a further militant vein, Williams noted the hypo

thetical words of someone who might ruefully say that such a humanitar
ian idea as the league could not work because "Sherman will not put his
weapon up, and Williams will not 'bury his club.

. . ,1"168

^

eighth

instance of visual imagery was the Senator's sarcastic observation that
the Republicans had never respected the Constitution until it became
useful to them.

"All at once, nicely caught with the little complexities

of constitutional toilet arrangements, cosmetics upon the face, chiefly,
you try to make a scapegoat out of Wilson."

169

Finally, Williams again

inveighed against the Republican opponents of Wilson by comparing them
individually to a "German superman" or an "American Hohenzollern," both
references of which would stir visual images of the outspread mustaches
of the Kaiser.1^®
Williams employed two instances of auditory imagery in his
address of December 3, 1918.

First, he ridiculed his opponents by tell

ing them that they might "bark" but not "bite," or that they would have
great difficulty defaming Wilson.

171

Second, the Senator urged Wilson's

opponents, upon discovering any of the Chief Executive's mistakes, to

167Ibid.
168Ibid.
■ ^ I b i d . , 31.

l^Ibid .
171Ibid., 29.

"call attention from the housetops.

. . ."172

guch practice, he in

sisted, would be appreciated by everyone, especially the President.
The third type of imagery that Williams employed was kinesthe
tic.

The first example was his explanation of instances when rulers of

other nations had been deposed because of absence.

This had only

happened, he maintained, when revolutions had occurred in the ruler's
absence.

These absences, he observed further, had actually been "flights

for fear" of revolution that was anticipated.

173

A second instance of

kinesthetic imagery was Williams' observation that a President might
"run down to Mexico" and exchange courtesies with Diaz without vacating
his office.^74

Third, he noted that Great Britain had just demonstrated

the meaning of domination of the sea;

"constriction, throat-grappling,

IlC

starvation if necessary.

. . ."■L/J

Finally, he chided his opponents by

telling them that, rather than hurting Wilson, they were "digging their
own graves."176
Tactile imagery was the final type employed in the December 3
address.

First, Williams caustically remarked that "gentlemen may bark

and gentlemen may try to bite.

. . ."
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Second, he warned his oppo

nents that they could not "tear" Wilson down from the pedestal on which
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humanity had placed him.^78

A third instance of tactile imagery was

Williams' criticism of members of his own party who had been " . . .
sticking the President every chance they got with a fine Italian
dagger

Williams' final example of tactile imagery was his criti

cism of his opponents as having had little respect for the Constitution
until they thought they could use it to their own advantage.
iron hand in the velvet glove. . .," Williams insisted.

"Oh, the
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Williams employed four types of imagery in his address of
December 3:

visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile.

These instances

of imagery probably contributed to Williams' impressiveness.

Had this

been a prepared speech, perhaps the speaker would have had even more
opportunity to employ this means of implementing his style.
A third element of impressiveness was variety in sentence struc
ture as to length, complexity, and form, or position of words.

Probably

because of the impromptu nature of Williams' speaking, his speech was not
characterized by short sentences.
115 words in length.

His sentences ranged from three to

The average sentence length in the speech of

December 3, 1918 was 40 words.

According to Flesch's standard, then,

1Q 1
Williams' style was "Very Difficult ."xoL

in addition to being lengthy,

the sentences were generally complicated in structure.

Williams piled

178Ibid.
•*~7^Ibid., 30
18QIbid., 31.
^8^I have used Rudolf Flesch's formula to determine Williams'
sentence length. The formula is as follows:
(1) I took numerical samples
from every third paragraph in the speech; (2) Each sample started at the
beginning of the paragraph; (3) Each sample consisted of the number of
words in complete sentences by the number of sentences in the sample.

117
clause upon clause, tied loosely together with semicolons and commas.
Had he prepared a manuscript in advance, the sentences would probably
not have been as long or as loosely constructed.

As mentioned earlier,

however, the urgency of immediate reply to Sherman's attack upon Wilson
seemed to outweigh the advantage of a polished manuscript which would
have been delivered several days after Wilson had embarked for Europe.
As already discussed, Williams' tendency toward complexity of
sentence structure did not enhance the clarity of his style.I®2

It is

equally unlikely that this tendency enhanced his impressiveness.
Raymond G. Smith lists five forms of sentences in terms of the
position of words:

the question, the periodic sentence, the loose sen

tence, the balanced sentence, and the parallel sentence.^®®

gf these

types the loose sentence is least likely to enhance a speaker's im
pressiveness.^®^

The loose sentence, however, was the form most

This gave me the average number of words in Williams' sentences; (5)
Then I compared the sentence length with Flesch's descriptions:
Very Easy
8 or less
Easy
11
Fairly Easy
14
Standard
17
Fairly Difficult
21
Difficult
25
Very Difficult
29 or more
Rudolf Flesch, The Art of Plain Talk (New York: Harper
and Brothers
Publishers, 1946), p. 195.
182See pp. 109-10.
■^Raymond G. Smith, Principles of Public Speaking (New York:
Ronald Press Co., 1958), 139-142.
l^^Means 0f gaining emphasis in sentences in terms of the posi
tion of words include: changing loose sentences to periodic sentences,
putting words out of usual order, as in questions; and using balanced
construction. John C. Hodges and Mary E. Whitten, Harbrace College
Handbook, 5th ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.), pp. 305313.
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frequently used by Williams in his address of December 3.

Of the 55

sentences in the sampling taken, ten were questions, five periodic, 36
loose, one balanced, and three parallel.

185

The looseness of Williams'

sentences could not have enhanced the stylistic impressiveness, either
with his listeners or his readers.
Stylistic impressiveness may be achieved in a fourth way:

the

use of devices for emphasis, such as repetition, climax, rhythm, tropes,
and figures.

Williams made effective use of the device of repetition.

His first instance of repetition in the address was with reference to
the men who wrote the American Constitution.
They
were
with
even

were men who excited the admiration of Gladstone; they
men who excited the admiration even of Napoleon Bonaparte,
all his war madness; they w?££ men wh° received the praise
of the Hohenzollerns. . . .
In seeking to detract from his opponents' effectiveness, Williams

repeated his "theme" from Horace at three different points in the speech.
Additionally he sought to place his enemies in a bad light by observing
that Sherman " . . .

read his speech, of course, and read it with good

emphasis; read it in fine style.

187

. . ."i0/

Further, the Mississippian

doubted ". . . i f any real lawyer, any real publicist, any real man of
real common sense believes that Woodrow Wilson is doing anything
wrong.

. . ,"188
1 85

This is the same sampling as used to determine the simplic
ity of sentence structure. I again counted the types of sentences in
every fifth paragraph for my representative sampling.
186

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 29.

187Ibid.
l88Ibid.
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Williams maintained that, if he himself were President, he would
not want to remain in the United States sending instructions to his
delegates by cablegram ". . . t o insist upon this or insist upon that,
or die in the trench with this proposition or that, for France may not
want it, or Italy may not want it, or England may not want it. . . ."

189

Leaving the work of peace negotiation to messengers, Williams insisted,
might lead to disaster.

"Then, what becQpies of the dream of peace?

What becomes of 'the parliament of ma n ? 1 What becomes of the 'federa
tion of the world?1

What becomes of the dream of the poets and the

vision of the seers?"190
In another repetitious series of questions, Williams attempted
to prick the consciences of his opponents in the Senate.
Is there one of you who does not really think in the bottom of
your heart that he is doing the best he can?
Is there one of
you who thinks he is guided by a dishonest purpose?
Is there
one of you who thinks that he is motivated by an unpatriotic
purpose?
Is there one of you who thinks he deserves the adjec
tives that have been poured out on his defenseless head this
morning?191
Williams concluded his address with another series of questions
designed to vindicate his Commander-in-chief.
How is all this going to hurt him? How is it going to help
you? How is it going to help your posterity? How is it going
to help the American Republic? How is it going to help
American influence in Europe? How is it going to accomplish
any good end of any description for the purposes of civiliza
tion or democracy or humanity?

189Ibid., 30.
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Repetition was Williams’ most effective method of implementing the im
pressiveness of his style.
As pointed out earlier, Williams rarely used the device of
climax, or the periodic sentence.
consistent rhythm in the speech.

Additionally there was no discernible
The impromptu nature of the address

probably ruled this out entirely.
Final considerations of devices for emphasis which contribute
to impressiveness in speech were tropes and figures.

Of the types of

tropes and figures considered by Thonssen and Baird, Williams used
allegory, synechdoche, irony, hyperbole, and catachresis.
Williams first allegorically noted that Americans would see
Republican malice toward Wilson for the partisanism it truly was.

"All

in the world you have got to do is to give yourselves two weeks' rope,
and at the end of two

weeks of unlimited rope the American people will

have spotted you, and

there will be enough of them getting religion and

going on the mourners bench and confessing before God and man that they
made an awful mistake in the vote they cast at the last election.

. . ."193

Williams' reference to the hypocricy of his opponents as "the iron
hand in the velvet glove," constituted his use of synechdoche.^94
Williams' only use of irony was in his description of Senator
Sherman's speech.
We were told that
there was going to be a regular hurricane-perhaps an explosion of a volcano--and we have listened to the
speech, or to thereading of the writing,
rather of the Senator
from Illinois. That, I suppose is the tornado and the volcano

193Ibid., 30.
194Ibid., 31.
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and the explosion which were to take place; and we are now left
with the results. Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.^-*
The Senator may have been heeding his own injunction against
the use of irony, which he voiced to a friend the following year.
Jokes in the United States Senate, especially long drawn,
delicate irony, are dangerous. The audiences there and in
the country are not quite intelligent enough to take it in
the proper spirit. I have had some little experience trying
irony before audiences who had no particular ironical gift.*96
Williams made use of hyperbole in five instances in his speech.
First, he said that his opponents would not be able to tear any of the
great men produced by the war from the pedestal on which humanity had
placed

t h e m .

^97

Second, he noted that, were he Wilson, he would not

want to stay at home instructing his delegates by cablegram ". . . t o
insist upon this or insist upon that, or to die in the trench with this
proposition or that.

igo
. . ."■L-70

His third instance of hyperbole was in

again accusing the opponents of ". . . sticking the President every
chance they got with a fine Italian dagger."*99

Fourth, he warned the

Republicans that "you are digging your own graves when you try to dig
his. . . ."200

Finally, he urged his opponents, if they found that

Wilson had made a mistake, to call attention to it "from the housetops.' .201

195Ibid., 28.
l ^ L etter of John Sharp Williams to Wickes Wamboldt, September
3, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 47.
W 7 u . S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 29.
198Ibid., 30.
•*~99Ibid.
200Ibid., 31.
201T. ..
Ibid.
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Catachresis was the final type of trope in the address of
December 3, 1918.

Williams first warned his opponents that they "may

bark" and "try to bite," thus borrowing the descriptive language appropriate to dogs to entreat his opponents.

202

Second, he substituted the

word "asses" for "men" in his observation that every man of good sense
occasionally lacks confidence except for those who are asses.2®3
Finally, he noted that humanitarianism was probably useless, since
"Sherman will not put his weapon up, and Williams will not 'bury his
club. 11,204
Failing to use any figures in his address of December 3, Williams
employed the tropes of allegory, synechdoche, irony, hyperbole, and
catachresis.

Of these he most frequently employed the hyperbole.

Evaluation of Williams1 Style
Although Williams thoroughly understood the issued involved in
the debate and chose ideas that were readily intelligible to his lis
teners, his effectiveness as a speaker probably suffered because of
several shortcomings in his style.
sentences often seem endless.
organization.

First, he was too verbose.

His

Second, he was almost totally lacking in

Third, he used words which may not have been instantly

intelligible to his listeners.

These weaknesses were particularly

damaging to Williams' clarity as a stylist.
Despite effective use of several types of imagery, a particu
larly engaging ethos, effective use of repetition, and a penchant for

202Ibid., 29.
203Ibid., 30.
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pithy hyperbole, Williams fell short of stylistic impressiveness because
of his excessive complexity and length in sentence structure.
In view of Williams' education at the University of Heidelberg,
it seems unfortunate that he was not influenced by Schopenhauer's con
cept of "chastity" in style.

Effectiveness
As John Sharp Williams stood at his desk on December 3, 1918 to
address the President of the Senate, he was surrounded by galleries
that were "well filled"^^ and whose occupants were apparently enthusi
astically concerned with the issues being debated.

Vice President

Marshall, the presiding officer of the Senate, had previously cautioned
the occupants of the galleries against laughter during Senator Sherman's

aa

address.

207

,
The spectators again violated the Senate rule against overt

manifestations during Williams' reply to Sherman.

Sherman interrupted

Williams to observe that Wilson had all along been instructing his
foreign representatives from the White House rather than personally
traveling to foreign lands to issue instructions.

To this Willians

retorted "Well, he has not had any delegates over there thus far, and
by the way, he has not instructed the Senator from Illinois, and if he
had and the Senator had obeyed his instructions, he would have been much
205

^Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art of Literature, (London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1891), p. 30.
^ ^ Washington Post, December 4, 1918, p. 1.
207u. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 26.
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wiser ."208

^g

listeners in the galleries responded with "laughter and

applause."209
The Senators themselves responded with customary partisan in
difference to their opponents.

The Atlanta Constitution reported that

"the debate between Senators Sherman and Williams continued about two
hours, but no other senators joined in the discussion except to ask
occasional questions.

Many Republican and Democratic senators left their

seats when the speaker of the opposition party was addressing the
910
Senate." •LU

No senator other than Sherman interrupted Williams.

reports thatmany Democratic senators were
to go to Paris.

Fleming

unhappy with Wilson's decision

"Many of the President's friends in his own party, dis

pirited by the election, shared in the discontent.

Some felt that the

taking over of the cables by Executive Order at this time was a blunder;
others that the cabinet needed overhauling.

Democratic morale was low

911
as the President departed." x
Bailey explains that the idea of Wilson's trip to Paris was a
natural target for his Republican opponents.
He was the only Democrat since Andrew Jackson to serve two
consecutive terms, and he had pushed through Congress a sweep
ing program of domestic reform. These measures had trod on
the toes
of many big-business tycoons, who were preponderantly
Republican and who were determined to turn back the clock to
the good old days of conservatism.
If the President were to
dictate a liberal peace, his prestige would soar so high that

2Q8Ibid., 29.
209Ibid.
2 ^Atlanta Constitution, December 4, 1918, p. 1.
911
^•^Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the League of
Nations, 1918-1920 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 62.
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he might run for a third tern, or possibly hand-pick his successor.
Wilson and his work had to be undone at all costs.
Delayed response to Williams' defense of Wilson came from the
Christian Science Monitor, which termed the address " . . .
ablest speeches of his long parliamentary career."

213

one of the

Recognizing the

significance of the league idea and Williams' attempt to defend it along
with Wilson's duty to attend the conference, the New York Times edito
rialized
John Sharp Williams has said many memorable things in the last
four years. While America was neutral he was not afraid to
say that the war involved moral issues more important than the
incidental financial losses its operations might bring to some
individuals. On the eve of the Peace Conference he has spoken
again in words that the whole American people ought to
remember: "The United States and Great Britain can maintain
a League of Nations even if other nations refuse to have a part
in it. We can agree that any civilized nation that makes war
upon another without first submitting the questions in contro
versy to an arbitration tribunal shall be outside the pale of
civilization; that the freedom to operate on the high seas shall
be denied to her; that access to the raw materials and markets
which the two nations control shall be denied to her; and in
that way we can keep peace in the world for a hundred years if
we only have the courage to do it.
The League of Nations begins with the collaboration of the
English-speaking peoples. That, says Senator Williams, is
what the President is going to Europe to accomplish, and so on
such an errand the President must have the full sympathy of
all Americans who have studied world politics
The New Orleans Times-Picayune indirectly approved of Williams'
stand in his address of December 3 by castigating his opponent.

^■^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People, 6th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958),
p. 603.
^■^Christian Science Monitor. December 4, 1918, p. 1.
214"The Firm Foundation," (editorial), New York Times,
December 5, 1918, p. 12.
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In total disregard of the lessons taught by the world war re
garding the need of unity and harmony in the ranks of those
who fight for a common cause . . . Senator Sherman of Illinois
puts his faith in the efficacy of oratorical barrage of fire,
and bombards the Democratic Party and its leaders in and out
91 q
of season, whenever the spirit moves.61-3
The conservative New York Tribune, on the other hand, severely
criticized Williams' defense of Wilson and the League.

Of the address,

the Tribune editorialized
It illustrates the absolute befuddlement of the public mind
with regard to the President's purposes so that no one can
take Mr. Williams' remarks seriously. They fly in the face
of any normal and commonsense interpretation of the league of
nations and freedom of the seas declarations embodied in Mr.
Wilson's Fourteen Articles. They are extravagantly contradictory
of the ideas which the President seemed to be conveying in the
statements of peace conditions which he has been making for the
last twenty-three months.
What is Mr. Williams' definition of freedom of the seas?
It is that the two leading naval powers in the world--Great
Britain and the United States— shall assume joint control of
the seas. No other nation is hereafter to make war without
being boycotted by these two naval powers, without suffering
exclusion from the high seas and an embargo on all the raw
materials and other products carried in ocean commerce.
Pope
Alexander VI divided the South Atlantic between Spain and
Portugal. Great Britain and the United States are to divide
all the seven oceans between them and their fiat is to be law
on all, just as Secretary Olney once said that, under the
Monroe Doctrine, the fiat of the United States was law on the
American Continent.
This is a curious elaboration of the sense of President
Wilson's Article II, which promises:
"Absolute freedom of
navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in
peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or
in part by international action for the enforcement of inter
national covenants."
If the policing of the seas is to be put into the hands of
two paramount nations, what becomes of the theory of a league
of nations, great and small, free and equal? Mr. Williams is
not the man to run away from his own logic. He says:
The two English-speaking countries, the United States
and Great Britain, can maintain a league of nations,
even if France, Belgium, Italy, and other nations refuse
to have a part in it. If the two English-speaking

‘^•’"Republicans Fall Out," New Orleans Times-Picayune, December
10, 1918, p. 8.
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nations go into it we can, by our sea power, by our con
trol over raw materials, by our control over natural
resources, force the other nations of the world to do the
league1s bidding.
Is this the promised end of Mr. Wilson's dream of inter
nationalism? We cannot•believe that Mr. Williams is right when
he says: "That is what Woodrow Wilson is going to Europe for."
Great Britain is a friend of the United States. But when did we
renounce our traditional friendship for France? Or Italy?
Or
Belgium? Or Japan? When did we lay aside our chivalrous regard
for the sovereign rights of the smaller nations?
The natural assumption must be that Mr. Williams doesn't
know any more about the President's intentions than do the other
99,999,999 Americans in whose behalf the trip to Paris was pro
jected.
If he is right about the freedom of the seas then the free
dom of the seas is already a ghost out of the international law
books.
If he has accurately forecast the form which the league of
nations is to take then Heaven help the league of nations.
This was the most severe treatment given Williams by a large metropolitan
newspaper during this phase of the debate.

The Tribune's criticism of

Williams is unjust in that the senator is quoted out of context and
made to appear a war monger rather than a preserver of peace.

Williams

pointed out that in order to keep peace, all nations must cooperate to
prevent one nation's declaring war upon another.

But even if all

nations could not agree to prevent any one among them from warring, then
the allied, or English-speaking nations, could accomplish the task.
Hereafter we will declare beyond the pale of civilization any
civilized country that dares make war upon another without
having previously offered to leave the question in controversy
to a fair and impartial arbitrament; and if any country will
do it, that country will be declared beyond the pale of
civilization.217
Then, following this explanation of the goals of the League, Williams
outlined the measures that would become necessary should a country

216"out of Darkness Into Darkness," (editorial), New York
Tribune, December 5, 1918, p. 8.
217

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 30-31.
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decide to make war upon another without reference to the League organi
zation.

Only in this instance, according to the Williams proposals,

would the United States and Great Britain resort to rigid control of
the seas.

So long as nations were content to live in peace with each

other, there would be no "joint control" of the seas, nor would there be
a division of the seven seas, as the Tribune charged Williams with
advocating.

Williams' recommendations did not, as the Tribune melo

dramatically predicted, indicate that "freedom of the seas is already
a ghost out of the international law books."
No other major American newspaper expressed opinion on Williams'
speech of December 3.

The San Francisco Chronicle voiced doubt that

21 o
the Senate would ratify the treaty, xo but later itself endorsed the
League proposal.219
The St_. Louis Post-Dispatch praised Wilson's intention to go to
Paris and decried those who attempted "to weaken or hamper him in the
effort to realize his program and the national aims in the peace
settlement,"220
The Atlanta Constitution urged that the senators defer their
debate on the peace treaty until it came before them in "the regular
and orderly

way.

"221

The pro-League Baltimore Sun enthusiastically praised Wilson's

218"The President's Trip," (editorial) San Francisco Chronicle,
December 5, 1918, p. 16.
219"League of Nations" (editorial) Ibid., December 9, 1918, p. 14.
^ ^ " U n i t y on Our Peace Aims," (editorial), St. Louis PostDispatch, December 4, 1918, p. 18.

221 "Untimely Debate," (editorial), Atlanta Constitution, December
6, 1918, p . 8.
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efforts and condemned Sherman as an "ass."^^
A final indication of delayed response to Williams1 address of
December 3, 1918 was that the resolution proposed by Sherman that the
office of the Presidency be declared by the Congress to be vacant on
Wilson's departure for Europe was never considered for a vote.

While

it is unlikely that Sherman seriously thought that his resolution would
be considered at all, Williams' immediate denunciation of it may have
contributed to its failure.
In addition to the measure of immediate surface response and to
delayed response to a speech, Thonssen and Baird recommend four other
tests of effectiveness:

(1) readability;

(2) technical perfection;

(3)

the speaker's wisdom in judging trends of the future, and (4) longrange effects of the speech on the social group.
It is probable that Williams 1 address did not appeal to the
general readers of the Congressional Record.

As pointed out in an

earlier section concerning style, Williams often unnecessarily labored
his points, his average sentence length was 40 words, and his sentences
were excessively complex.
The speech of December 3, 1918 was not a model of technical
perfection.

Its organization was rambling with frequent digression, it

was not always logically sound, and it was stylistically poor.

Williams'

use of ethical and emotional proof was superior, but hardly "perfect."
Not enough information concerning delivery exists to make a judgment.
Williams was, on the other hand, perceptive in judging the

222

"Sherman of Illinois," (editorial), Baltimore Sun, December
7, 1918, p. 6.
^•^Thonssen and Baird,

ojj.

c i t ., pp. 455-58.
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trends of the future.

Unfortunately for the United States, the "future"

would come only at the conclusion of another international holacaust
beyond the imagination of anyone who sat in the chamber of the Senate
in 1918.
Although the proposals expressed in Williams' addresses during
this period have been embodied in the United Nations Organization, it
is impossible to establish a causal relationship.

This is particularly

true since Woodrow Wilson, rather than Williams, was the source for
most of the ideas voiced by the latter.
Was John Sharp Williams an effective speaker during the preCovenant debates?

This critic replies that he was effective despite his

shortcomings of organization, style, logic, and tangible results.

He

was an effective speaker in that, by means of ethical appeal primarily,
he made himself credible to his audiences.

Because of his intrinsic

ethos, Williams was worthy of belief.
r*

CHAPTER IV

THE UNOFFICIAL COVENANT DEBATE

February 15, 1919 - July 10, 1919

The Occasion
The unofficial text of the Covenant was published in American
newspapers on February 15 and was favorably received by the press.

The

S t . Louis Globe Democrat, speaking for many newspapers, assessed it as
primarily a moral force, and was
inclined to think that the main value of the League, both in
the preservation of the peace and in the promotion of the
welfare of mankind, will be found in the machinery of inter
national cooperation which it creates, and in the habit of
mutual consideration it will establish. It is sufficient for
the moment that it is born, and no birth of history, save one,
is of greater importance to mankind.*That same day, February 15, Lodge requested in the Senate "that
the terms of the League of Nations, printed in all the newspapers, may
be printed in the Record and also as a Senate document for convenience
and use."

Pittman of Nevada immediately asked that to this be added

the remarks of the President at the time of his presentation to the Third
Plenary Session of the Peace Conference.

Wilson had said, "it is prac-

tical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate."
and Knox declined comment on the Covenant until they had read it

^Fleming, o£. cit., p. 118.
^Public Papers, V, 428.
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132
carefully.

John Sharp Williams, however, presented, on February 15, a

defense of Wilson and the League, although he made no specific refer
ences to the newspaper version of the covenant.

This would be the first

of three occasions during this phase of the debate on which Williams
spoke.

The remaining two were June 5, and June 9, 1919.
Speech of February 15, 1919.

Williams argued, first, that three

sets of people were "trying to throw cold water" on the President:

the

Bolshevists, the female bonfire burners in Lafayette Square, and a few
senators and representatives in the Congress of the United States.
observed that a League of Nations would be practical:

He

"Idealism in its

highest form is the most practical thing in this w o r l d . H e

declared

that Wilson needed, above all else, the sympathy of his own people.
Finally, Williams'argued that any possible league of nations would be
better than none at all.
I have never insisted upon the league of nations because I was
not competent to define the league of nations until our allies
had had their equal say. But I have insisted upon a league of
nations, and as I said here upon the floor of the Senate once
before, I would rather it would begin with 14; but if it could
not begin with 14, I would rather it would begin with the 7
allies; and if it could not begin with the 7 allies, then I would
rather it should begin with France, Great Britain, and the United
States; and if I could not have it begin in that way, I would have
it begin with the English-speaking, self-governing Commonwealths
of the British Empire and the English-speaking, self-governing
States in these United States rather than not to begin at all.
After the beginning it will evolve itself just as this American
Union evolved itself from the old New England confederacy and
from the commercial agreement between Virginia and Maryland.^That same evening Williams received from Wilson in Paris a cable
indicating that the President had finished drafting the Covenant the
q
JU. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3442.
4 Ibid.
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preceding night.

Wilson invited Williams to dine with him at the

latter's earliest convenience after the President's return so that they
could consider the Covenant of the League article by article before it
came up for debate in

Congress.^

The Senator accepted the invitation

provided that his health continued to improve.^

Wilson sent similar

invitations to all members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

He then made a public announce

ment that he was returning and that he had asked that the members of Con
gress not discuss the League until he had held his conferences with the
committee members.
On February 17, Williams asked that a speech by former President
Taft, delivered at Missoula, Montana, be inserted into the Congressional
Record.

Williams praised the speech, urging public support of the

League of Nations:

"It bears the usual Taft earmarks of clarity and

brevity of expression and legal and judicial ability."?
Unimpressed with the President's request for postponement of
debate by Congress until his arrival, Senator Vardaman of Mississippi
on February 18, urged that the whole proposal be discussed, vivisected,
and analyzed, and torn to pieces until its every defect be found, but
always without partisanship and without the "spirit of fault-finding."
He warned against the twin evils of the "mesmeric power of the

-’Letter of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, February 14,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.
^Letter of John Sharp Williams to Joseph P. Tumulty, February
17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.
?U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3538.
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President's personality" and the influence of "presidential patronage."®
Completely disregarding the President's request, Senator Miles
Poindexter
19.

of Washington

began the assault on the Covenant on February

Poindexter raised five specific objections to the League:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

That under it we surrendered the power of disarmament;
That it called for compulsory arbitration of all questions,
without exception;
That it would compel the United States to "participate in
the wars and controversies of every nation" and to assume
the burdens of a mandate over any part of Europe, Asia, or
Africa that was assigned to it;
That the International Labor Bureau would interfere in our
domestic affairs;
That the United States would surrender to other nations the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations in arms
and ammunition.^
To Poindexter's address there was no formal reply from the Demo

cratic s i d e . S u m m o n i n g the ghost of Washington on February 21, however,
Borah, speaking to crowded galleries and a large attendance of the Senate
itself,11 declared that the treaty violated the Monroe Doctrine and gave
the British Empire five votes to our one.

19

Reed of Missouri added to the onslaught the following day,
arguing that Great Britain would control the League and that, in any con
troversy, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan would always vote against the
United States.

Talking to packed and excited galleries, Reed discussed

the articles of the Covenant one by one, discovering in each one multiple

^Ibid., 3656.
9Ibid., 3748.
l^New York Times, February 20, 1919, p. 1.
^ Ibid., February 22, 1919, p. 1.
12

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . ci t ., 3748.
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evils which, when combined, he claimed, would destroy United States
sovereignty.
On February 24, the date of Wilson's return from Paris, Senator
Lewis of Illinois replied to the League critics.

Lewis insisted that the

United States had an obligation to preserve the peace and that best means
of insurance was a League of Nations.

He reminded the League critics

that if Britain had five votes, the western hemisphere controlled fifteen
votes.

He argued that the combined power of a league could overwhelm

any power that wanted to make war on one of its members.

After all,

Germany would not have attacked had she realized what she ultimately
would be facing.

The power and usefulness of the League would be deter-

mined by the force of public opinion behind it.

13

Wilson returned to the United States from Paris on February 23,
1919.

H i s -ship landed at Boston, where, at the invitation of Bostonians,

he delivered a speech at Mechanics Hall that same evening.

Wilson had

received conflicting counsel from two different groups of advisors.

One

group wanted him to say nothing specific until he had held his confer
ence with Congressional leaders; the other group urged him to repiy to
the League critics.

The fact that Wilson was going to speak in Boston

annoyed Lodge, who commented bitterly, "Mr. Wilson has asked me to
dinner.

He also asked me to say nothing.

and makes a speech--very characteristic.

He then goes to my own town
Wilson attempted in his

Boston address to please both factions of his personal advisors.

First,

13Ibid.. 4125-4135.
■^Letter of Henry Cabot Lodge to W. R. Thayer, February 21,
1919, Lodge Papers, cited in John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge. A
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 351.
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he talked of what he had done in Paris and of the reasons for delay.

He

reported that our country was trusted throughout the world and that no
nation suspected the motives of the United States.

In the latter part of

the speech, however, Wilson attacked his opponents with a withering blast.
We set up this Nation to make men free and we did not confine
our conception and purpose to America, and now we will make men
free. If we did not do that all the fame of America would be
gone and all her power would be dissipated.
She would then have
to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial purposes
which seem so dear to some minds that have no sweep beyond the
nearest horizon. I should welcome no sweeter challenge than
that. I have fighting blood in me and it is sometimes a delight
to let it have scope. . .
On February 26, thirty-four senators and congressmen attended
dinner and the conference with Wilson at the White House.
Borah and Fall were the only absentees.

Senators

Borah had written Wilson's

Secretary, Tumulty,
I am sure no suggestion of mine would modify in the slightest
the views of the President, and nothing could induce me to
support the League . . . or anything like it. . . . It would
not be fair to accept information which I could not feel per
fectly free to transmit to my colleagues or use in public
debate. . . .
I mean no personal disrespect to . . . the
President. . .
At the White House Conference the President was questioned on a
wide range of subjects.

One of his chief inquisitors was Brandegee of

Connecticut, who afterwards issued the famous statement:

"I feel as if

I had been wandering with Alice in Wonderland and had tea with the Mad
H a t t e r . F l e m i n g notes that "on the major question of surrender of

^ Public Papers, V. 432-440.
1
■^Letter of William E. Borah to Joseph Tumulty, February 18,
1919, Borah Papers, cited in Marian C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 153.
^ C i t e d in Fleming, o£. cit., p. 134.
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sovereignty, the President was said to have taken the position that reces
sion of American sovereignty was not a new precedent, being an incident
of every treaty."18
Despite warnings from Calvin Coolidge of popularity of the League
in Massachusetts, Lodge had determined to go ahead with his criticism of
Wilson's scheme without regard for political consequences.^^

To Wilson's

complaint that Lodge and Knox of Pennsylvania had refused to ask questions
or take part in the conference, Lodge replied that he had asked "at least
three" questions covering "some rather essential points," although he
felt that the group had "learned nothing."2®
On February 27, Hitchcock of Nebraska, acting Minority Leader of
the Senate, spoke in defense of the League much in the same idealistic
vein as the Wilson defense:

the future would embrace a new age of

liberty, statesmanship, and philanthropy, guided by the League of
91

Nations.

L

Lodge, however, presented on February 28 what Fleming has referred
to as the "classic" first speech for the negative in any debate.

Urging

caution and giving some indication of the dilatory tactics to which he
would later resort, the Sage of Nahant admonished that
We are asked . . . to give up in part ou r ‘sovereignty and inde
pendence and subject our own will to the will of other nations
. . . . We are asked, therefore . . . to substitute international
ism for nationalism and an international state for pure
Americanism. . . .
I am not contending now that these things
must not be done. I have no intention of opposing a blank
negative to propositions which concern the peace of the world
. . . but I do say, in the strongest terms, that these things
18Ibid.
•^Garraty, o£. c i t ., p. 351.
20Ibid.
S. Congressional Record, o p . c i t ., 4414.
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I have pointed out are of vast importance. . . . What I ask,
and all I ask, is consideration, time, and thought.^
During this time Williams became active in inserting editorials
supporting the League into the Record.

On February 25 alone, he requested

that a letter on the League crisis, the Boston speech of President Wilson,
and three other editorials be printed.

Senator Smoot of Utah interrupted

Williams' last request to scold, "I think, Mr. President, that the Sena
tor from Mississippi has already asked today to have put into the
Record

two or three editorials.

I want to say to the Senator from Mis

sissippi that every page of the Record costs the government of the United
States over $60."

Smoot subsided, however, when Williams reminded him

that he had the right not only to have these items printed but to read
OO

them aloud on the floor. J
Declining a friend's invitation to make a speech because the
dentist had been trying to "assassinate" him for about two weeks, Williams
at this time was physically unable to take part in the debate.2^

He

would have to wait for new bridgework to replace the extracted teeth
before he would be again in action.

Among those who recognized the loss

at this critical time to the proponents of the League was William H.
Taft, who expressed to the Mississippian his wishes for quick recovery.^
During the remaining days before adjournment of the third session

22Ibid., 4528.
Cited in Micken, op. ci t ., p. 34.
^ L e t t e r of John Sharp Williams
Williams Papers, Box 44.

to A. V. Snell, March 3, 1919,

^ L e t t e r of William H. Taft to John Sharp Williams, February 21,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.
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of the Sixty-fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, Senators Knox, Lenroot,
Frelinghuysen, Hardwick, and Sherman joined Lodge in voicing opposition
to the Covenant in the Senate, while McCumber, unconstrained by the
dictates of his party leaders, was the sole Republican defender of the
League.
In the course of his defense of the Covenant on March 3, 1919,
McCumber insisted that what "we ought to do is be absolutely honest with
ourselves.

If we do not want any kind of an agreement to maintain the

peace of the world, in Heaven's name let us say so and be done with it."

2f i

Also of the opinion that the Senate needed to take a forthright
stand on the issue, Senator Brandegee, early on Sunday morning, March 2,
suggested to Lodge that such a declaration should be made public.
Brandegee, Lodge, Knox, and Cummins together obtained thirty-seven signa
tures during March 3, and, just before midnight of that same day, Lodge,
the master parliamentary strategist read it into the Record in the most
effective way.

Any attempt to pass a resolution with only thirty-seven

signers, not all of whom were present, would meet certain defeat.

Garraty

notes that "for it to be presented, voted upon,and defeated would have
destroyed a good deal of its psychological value, if not of its actual
i m p o r t a n c e . I n this delicate position, Lodge placed his faith in the
impetuousness of the Democrats."

With steady voice but perceptibly

shaky hand, Lodge read
. . . Resolved . . . That is it the sense of the Senate that
while it is their sincere desire that the nations of the world
should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the
constitution of the league of nations in the form now proposed

26U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 4882.
2^Garraty, o£. cit., p. 354.
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to the peace conference should not be accepted by the United
States; and be it Resolved further, That it is the sense of the
Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States
should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the
urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany . . .
and that the proposal for a league of nations . . . should be
then taken up for careful consideration.
I ask unanimous con
sent for the present consideration of this resolution.
Garraty explains that "this was the critical point.
consent were granted the resolution would be voted down.

If unanimous

But Lodge was

clearly out of order, and his resolution was a direct attack on the
Democratic leadership.

Surely, he had reasoned, someone would object.

2q
He was not d i s a p p o i n t e d 7

Senator Swanson immediately objected to the

introduction of the resolution.

Lodge replied, "Objection being made,

of course I recognize the objection.
explanation, the following:

I merely wish to add, by way of

The undersigned Senators of the United

States . . . hereby declare that, if they had had the opportunity, they
would have voted for the foregoing resolution.

..."

30

Lodge then

proceeded to read off the names of the thirty-seven signers, a dramatic
thrust at the League proponents.
There was some feeling that Wilson would be reluctant to call a
special session of the Republican Congress.

To insure the calling of a

special session before July 1, therefore, certain vital appropriations
bills were ignored, and the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress
adjourned on March 4, 1919.
That same evening Wilson and Taft together addressed New Yorkers

2®U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4974.
^Garraty, o£. cit., p. 354.
30

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 4974.

141
in the Metropolitan Opera House.

It was here that Wilson warned the

senators that when he returned again from Paris with the official treaty,
they would find it impossible to separate the Covenant from the treaty
"without destroying the whole vital structure
Wilson nonetheless had been warned that there would certainly be
a battle in the Senate.

In addition to. his "Round-Robin" resolution,

Lodge had disclosed his inclination toward delay of the treaty in
committee.

Lenroot added the possibility of amendment as a strategy

against the Covenant:

"In my judgment the country will approve the pro

posed constitution if certain material modifications are made and other
provisions simplified and made clear."

Finally, Johnson, Reed,

Brandegee, Moses, McCormick, Knox, La Follette, Poindexter, Thomas, and
their leader, Borah, the "Mirabeau of the Batallion of Death," promised
the strategy of outright rejection.
Despite his boast in New York, Wilson, back in Paris, obtained
changes in the Covenant to meet the objections that had been raised in
the Senate.

Having successfully threatened to quit the conference and

return home, Wilson managed to secure a means for withdrawing from the
League, an addition to Article XV exempting domestic matters from the
consideration of the League, while leaving the definition of domestic
issues to the discretion of the Council, a provision making the accept
ance of a colonial mandate voluntary, and a further amendment that
"nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional

~^New York Times, March 5, 1919, p. 1.
-^U. S. Congressional Record, o p . c i t ., 4569-4572.
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understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the peace of the
world."33
The new draft of the Covenant with Wilson's amendments was un
officially published on April 28, and on April 29 Lodge held an important
conference with Borah in which the Idahoan conceded that his fondest hope,
the outright defeat of the League, was not possible.

He agreed, however,

to cooperate with Lodge forces in supporting amendments, although he
would still vote against final passage of the treaty.

According to this

arrangement, the Irreconcilables would have their way if the treaty
failed, but if not, the amended treaty would still be less objectionable
than the Wilsonian proposal.
Determined to hold out for more drastic alterations in the
Covenant than those Wilson had been able to arrange, Lodge later in the
afternoon of April 29 joined Senator Curtis of Kansas in telegraphing all
party colleagues requesting that they refrain from commenting upon the
revised Covenant until after a party strategy conference.

Successful in

this move to "hold the party line, Lodge's next step would be the packing
of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

But the first session of the Sixty-

sixth Congress would not convene until May 19, 1919.
During the interim period Senators Borah, Reed, and Thomas con
ducted a rousing anti-league meeting in Boston, after which Borah toured
Troy, Rochester, Albany, Cleveland, and cities in Colorado and the West.
Relatively inactive because of his health, John Sharp Williams

33Fleming, o£. cit., pp. 184-185.

returned to Cedar Grove Plantation and made no public appearances during
the interim period.
Financed by the Frick and Mellon millions and prepared for battle
by strategy conferences, the anti-League forces were also in control of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, with Majority Leader Lodge its chair
man, at the beginning of the special
Speech of June .5, 1919.

Not

again see action on the Senate floor.

session on May 19.
until June 5 did John Sharp Williams
On May 20 Senator Johnson had

introduced Senate Resolution Number 12, calling on the Secretary of
State to transmit a copy of the Peace Treaty, then under discussion with
the Germans, to the S e n a t e . ^

A lengthy debate ensued concerning the

advisability of making the treaty public at this time.

The debate reached

its peak on June 5 when Hitchcock proposed a resolution that there be a
Senate investigation into Lodge's and Borah's claim that "New York
interests" had received advance copies of the treaty.

Williams insisted

that the treaty, during its negotiation, was none of the Senate's busi
ness.

He quoted George Washington as having denied the right of the

Senate to interfere with treaty negotiations.
Washington used is this:

"The language that General

'The nature of foreign negotiations requires

caution, and their success must often depend on
Arguing that the President should be

secrecy.

.. .'"

left alone to perform

35

his constitu

tional function until the treaty was completed, Williams declared that
. . . from the beginning of this discussion down to now there
has been a plain, palpable, and obvious effort and desire, or
something that looked like it, to nag and worry and bedevil the

3^U. S. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Sess., 1919,
LVIII, Part 1, 677.
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President of the United States, not with regard to the making
of a treaty but with regard to its negotiation, and every
possible step has been taken to create in foreign countries
the impression that his own people are not behind him.'*®
Following speeches of McCumber, who believed that printing the
treaty would not be inappropriate, and Thomas, who branded the motion to
print the treaty a political move, Borah concluded the day's discussion
with the observation that the League was a party issue and that no one
should deny it as such.

The Lion of Idaho praised the Republican party

for its belief that America should continue to control its own affairs
and, upholding the principles of Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, and
Lincoln, stand aloof from the broils of Europe.^
Also on June 5 the question of Irish independence was inter
jected into the debate.

A resolution approved by the Foreign Relations

Committee and presented by Borah requested the American Peace Commission
to secure a hearing before the peace conference for representatives of
Ireland.

Remarking that the resolution was "very ill advised," Williams

objected to its immediate consideration.

When the vote on the resolution

was taken on June 6, Williams was the only senator voting "no."

Williams

received heavy criticism from the Irish element in the United States, but
the Mississippian did not care "a continental damn if all the Sinn Feiners
in the world passes [sic] a resolution condemning me.

. . 1 will sleep
OO

just as sound, eat just as well, and drink just as cordially."

. He

simply believed that the United States Senate had no more right to pass

37Ibid.. 680.
OQ

Letter of John Sharp Williams to E. S. Edwards, June 17, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 46.
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a resolution advising England to grant Irish independence

than the

British Parliament had a right to pass a resolution advising the United
States to grant the Philippines their independence.

Representatives of

the Irish-American Union, who often crowded the Senate galleries during
the League debate, would have their chance to retaliate vocally against
Williams.
Contrary to John Sharp's wishes, on June 6 both Johnson's reso
lution to transmit the treaty to the Senate and Hitchcock's resolution to
investigate the "New York interests" passed.
Speech of June 9_, 1919.

On June 9 Borah called for unanimous

consent of the Senate to print the final draft of the treaty which he
had obtained from Frazier Hunt, staff correspondent of the Chicago Daily
Tribune.

In a heated and personal debate, McCumber, Pomerene, Hitchcock,

and John Sharp Williams voiced strong objections to the publishing of a
text as a breach of faith with the United States peace commissioners.
Williams took issue with Lodge and Borah, who had maintained that the
League was strictly a partisan issue.
Williams argued that the discussion of the treaty in the Senate
had not been fair.

In support of this thesis, he contended, first,

that partisanship had entered the debate.

He made the forthright accusa

tion that both Borah and Lodge had publicly indicated that they consid
ered the Covenant a political party issue.

Then, the Mississippi

senator asked to be corrected, if wrong, about either of his colleagues.
Borah granted his silent assent; Lodge had by this time, "disappeared
from the Chamber.

3%.

S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.

A second reason for the unfairness of the Senate discussions of
the treaty had been, according to Williams, that the senators were
attempting to usurp the power of treaty negotiation from the President.
Williams declared that the senators "have been engaged for days and weeks
and months in trying to destroy the confidence the American people ought
to have in him [Wilson] as their representative."^
chided his colleagues:

Following this, he

"You have full power to make or to amend or to

modify a treaty, but you have no power to negotiate one at all."41
After inserting as a part of his remarks an editorial entitled,
"Reason or Passion," which attacked Senator Reed's argument that the
majority of peoples in the proposed League would be colored, the Mississippian exclaimed that " . . .

nothing was ever more stupid than that

appeal of the Senator from Missouri."^

In refutation of Reed's argument,

Williams contended that the white man's country would continue to be
governed by the white man; that " . . .

not a single move could be taken

that would affect the interests of the United States of America in the
league of peace, or in the council of the league, except upon a few unim
portant matters of parliamentary and administrative procedure, without a
unanimous vote;" and that, even without a veto in the League, the vote
of the United States, great, strong, popular, and military as it is,
would constitute a veto.

43

Following his third contention, essentially that Reed had been
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unfair in his demagogic appeal to the southern people, Williams main
tained, fourth, that Lodge deliberately took positions opposite to those
of Wilson because of partisanship.

As an instance of this, Williams

cited Lodge's objection to the exclusion of the Monroe Doctrine from the
original draft of the Covenant.

When Wilson later announced that he had

secured within the Covenant the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the
entire world, the Mississippian continued, Lodge was again disagreeable,
maintaining that the Monroe Doctrine is not a regional question and that
no country, outside the United States, has a right to decide or pass on,
or interpret it.44
Following this accusation of extreme partisanship on the part of
Lodge, Williams contended, fifth, that Borah's position in the debate is
that of an American "junker."4-*
I do not mean by that that he sympathized with the Germans in
the war. I do not mean by that that the Germans could have
gotten any more help from him than from me--not a particle; but
his idea of State sovereignty is exactly the same as that of
Bismarck and as that of Kaiser Wilhelm and as that of the
Prussian junkers. His position is that there must be no limita
tion upon the sovereignty of a country, its independent sover
eignty. He nods his head in approval. I knew he was honest,
and I know I was honest, and I knew that I could not misrepresent
him.4**
Williams characterized Borah as a reactionary who would have the United
States go directly back to its isolationistic status of 1913.
Williams' sixth reason for arguing that the discussion of the
League had not been fair was that its opponents lacked imagination.

44Ibid., 796.
45Ibid., 797.
46Ibid.
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were the "legalists who can see nothing in the present and hope for
nothing in the future except as based upon a precedent in the past."47
As for himself, the Senator explained that
I belong to that class of men who dream, and who are not
ashamed of dreaming; who dream of a better world and want it, and,
in so far as they are worthy to pray to God at all, pray to Him
for it, a world where not only individual men shall govern them
selves, though in my own case I may have failed, but where communi
ties shall govern themselves, and where nations shall govern
themselves, and where, above all things in the world, humanity
all over the world shall govern itself by common concert of action
and common accord between nations in behalf of the right and
justice and peace.48
Finally, Williams admitted that the entry of the United States
into the League of Nations would mean self-limitation of sovereignty.
But, he argued, the Constitution
of

sovereignty.

limitation.

itself had imposed a self-limitation

He emphasized the self-limitation as opposed to outside

A treaty, a world treaty, or a league

of nations is self

limitation of sovereignty, which Williams identified as the ultimate
assertion of sovereignty in his eloquent conclusion.
. . . when the State of Mississippi has a suit with the State
of Idaho it becomes outside limitation in a certain sense by
the decision of the Supreme Court. But was it the surrender of any
essential right of sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why
not? - Because each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other
words, because the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an
assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty.
Mr. President, I reckon I have talked enough.
Williams spoke once more during this second phase of the debate.
On June 16 he again asked that large passages from the New York Times
be inserted into the Record as part of his remarks.

47Ibid., 798.
48Ibid.
49

Ibid., 799.

Senator Smoot again
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objected to the insertions, and Williams replied that he found the
"great editors of the great metropolitan papers . . . know so much more
about the situation . . . "

that he wanted the public to have a chance to

read t h e m . ^

The Audience
As in Chapter III, this section will attempt to describe the
observable trends in the three audiences with whom John Sharp Williams
was concerned as he spoke:

the members of the Senate, the American

public, and the audience seated in the galleries.

The Senate
Additional senatorial alignment on the league issue came as a
result of the publication of the first draft of the Covenant on February14.

In newspaper interviews, Senator Smith of Michigan, Senators New,

Wadsworth, and Spenser declared their opposition.

Although Democratic

Senator King branded the League a threat to the Monroe Doctrine, Demo
crats Robinson, Ransdell, McKellar, Shafroth, Thompson, Pomerene, and
Pittman issued their enthusiastic praise.

Cl

The anti-league New York Sun on February 26 published a poll of
the senators serving in the forthcoming session.

Indicating thirty-rone

for, twenty-one "disposed to favor," twenty-two opposed and twenty-two

^ Ibid., Part 2, 1156.
^^New York Sun, January 16, 1919, p. 5; February 16, 1919, pp.
1, 7; February 18, 1919, pp. 1, 3. New York Times, February 18, 1919,
p. 1.
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"inclined against" the League , ^ the poll disclosed that, although a
majority of all the senators were favorably inclined, the issue was
divided primarily along partisan lines.
Despite the dramatic indication of the Round Robin that more
than thirty-three, or the one-third plus one of the Senators needed to
kill the treaty, were opposed to the treaty with a league of nations,
all hope was not yet lost.

The League to Enforce Peace on April 30

issued a poll, published in the New York Times~*^ which indicated

CO

J For the League: Ashurst, Beckham, Culberson, Fletcher, Gay,
Gerry, Harris, Henderson, Hitchcock, Johnson (S.D.), Jones (N.M.),
Kendrick, Kirby, McCumber, McKellar, Myers, Norris, Nugent, Owen,
Phelan, Pittman, Pomerene, Ransdell, Robinson, Sheppard, Smith (Ari.),
Trammell. Harrison, Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.), Wolcott.
Disposed to favor: Bankhead, Capper, Chamberlain, Curtis, Dial,
Gronna, Jones (Wash.), LaFollette, McNary, Martin, Nelson, Overman,
Shields, Simmons, Smith (Md.), Smith (S.C.), Stanley, Swanson, Townsend,
Underwood, Williams.
Against the League:
Borah, Brandegee, Cummins, Dillingham, Fall,
Fernald, Elkins, Harding, Knox, McCormick, McLean, Moses, New, Penrose,
Poindexter, Reed, Sherman, Smoot, Spenser, Wadsworth, Warren, Watson.
Inclined against; Ball, Calder, Colt, Edge, France, Frelinghuysen,
Hale, Gore, Johnson (Cal.), Kellogg, Kenyon, King, Keyes, Lenroot, Lodge,
Newberry, Page, Phipps, Smith (Ga.), Sterling, Sutherland, Thomas.
New York Sun, February 26, 1919, p. 2.
53

Disposed to favor but later to become opponents, Gronna,
La Follette, Curtis, and Norris may have indicated indecision, while
Democrats Reed, Thomas, Gore, King, and Smith (Ga.) served notice that •
they would not be administration followers.
-^Democrats for the Covenant: Ashurst, Bankhead, Beckham,
Chamberlain, Culberson, Fletcher, Gay, Gerry, Gore, Harris, Harrison,
Henderson, Hitchcock, Johnson (S.D.), Jones (N.M.), Kendrick, King,
Kirby, McKellar, Martin, Myers, Nugent, Overman, Owen, Phelan, Pittman,
Pollock, Pomerene, Ransdell, Robinson, Sheppard, Shields, Simmons,
Smith (Ariz.), Smith (S.C.), Smith (Ga.), Smith (Md.), Stanley,
Swanson, Thomas, Trammell, Underwood, Walsh (Mont.), Williams, Wolcott.
Republicans for the Covenant: Capper, Cummins, Curtis, Elkins,
Edge, Kenyon, Keyes, Kellogg, Gronna, Jones (Wash.), McCumber, McNary,
Norris, Nelson, Sutherland, Spenser, Sterling, Smoot, Townsend.
Doubtful:
Brandegee, Ball, Calder, Colt, Dillingham, Fernald,
Hale, France, Harding, Johnson (Cal.), Lenroot, La Follette, Newberry,
McLean, McCormick, Page, Phipps, Warren, Walsh (Mass.), Watson.
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sixty-four for, twenty doubtful, and twelve senators opposed to the
Covenant.

In partisan terms, this poll listed only Reed and Walsh of

Massachusetts as Democratic opponents, while Republicans were more widely
scattered among the three groups.
Adding to the confusion was a poll conducted supposedly by
league opponents which appeared the same day in the anti-league Washington
Post.55

Citing thirty-four Republican opponents, this poll listed all

fchh opponents whose names had appeared in the League to Enforce Peace
poll.

Capper, Elkins, Gronna, Janes, Kellogg, Kenyon, McCumber, McNary,

Nelson, Norris, Smoot, Spenser, Sterling, and Townsend, whose names had
appeared in the favorable column of the former poll, however, were ex
cluded entirely from the latter poll.
An informal poll published on May 16 listed fifty-five senators
as favoring amendments, thirty-four opposed to any amendments, and seven
undecided

Opposed: Borah, Sherman, New, Lodge, Reed, Moses, Frelinghuysen,
Fall, Wadsworth, Penrose, Knox Poindexter. New York Times, May 1, 1919,
p. 1. The above poll was incorrect in that it substituted Pollock for Dial.
-W a s h i n g t o n Post, May 1, 1919, p. 2.
JOSenators favoring amendments: Ball, Bankhead, Borah, Brandegee,
Calder, Capper, Chamberlain, Colt, Cummins, Curtis, Dillingham, Edge,
Elkins, Fall, Fernald, France, Frelinghuysen, Gore, Gronna, Hale, Harding,
Johnson (Cal.), Jones (Wash.), Kellogg, Kenyon, Keyes, Knox, LaFollette,
Lenroot, Lodge, McCormick, McCumber, McLean, McNary, Moses, Nelson, New,
Newberry, Norris, Page, Penrose, Phipps, Poindexter, Reed, Sherman, Smoot,
Spenser, Sterling, Sutherland, Thomas, Townsend, Underwood, Wadsworth,
Warren, Watson.
Senators opposed to any amendments: Ashurst, Beckham, Culberson,
Dial, Fletcher, Gay, Gerry, Harris, Harrison, Henderson, Hitchcock,
Johnson, Jones (N.M.), Kendrick, Kirby, Martin, McKellar, Nugent, Overman,
Pittman, Pomerene, Ransdell, Sheppard, Simmons, Smith (Ari.), Smith (Md.),
Smith, (S. C.), Stanley, Swanson, Trammell, Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.),
Williams.
Senators undecided: King, Myers, Owen, Phelan, Shields, Smith
(Ga.), Wolcott.
Ibid., May 16, 1919, p. 1.
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On July 9, the day before Wilson presented the Treaty to the
Senate, Republican leaders announced their poll of the Senate, favoring
the passage of reservations to the treaty, a feat requiring only a simple
majority rather than the two-thirds majority required to pass the treaty
itself.

In addition to forty-nine sure votes for reservations, the

Republican leaders confidently predicted the support of Myers, Thomas,
and Walsh of Massachusetts, doubtful Democrats who reportedly favored
reservations with respect to Article X, the Monroe Doctrine, and domes
tic questions.

The Republicans conceded thirty-eight sure votes to the

group against reservations.-^

The Public
During this phase of the debate, public opinion was such that
even the League's principal Senate opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, expressed
despair at the great wave of enthusiasm for the League.
The great mass of the people, the man in the street,
to use a common expression, the farmers, the shopkeepers, the
men in small business, clerks and the like, in short the people
generally, did not understand the treaty at all, had had no
opportunity even to read the provisions of the League except in
the draft which Mr. Wilson had brought back when he returned in
February, and that knowing nothing about any of the details of
the treaty their natural feeling was, "Now the war is over, and
let us have peace as quickly as possible. . . . The vocal
classes of the community, most of them clergymen, the preachers
of sermons, a large element of the teaching force of the
universities, a large proportion of the newspaper editorials,
and finally the men and women who were in the habit of writing
and speaking for publication, although by no means thoroughly
informed, were friendly to the League as it stood and were
advocating it.^®

~^New York Times, July 9, 1919, pp. 1, 3.

York:

-*®Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 146-147.
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This analysis of public opinion during the unofficial covenant
debate includes a discussion of the groups, individuals and publications
which favored the League, followed by an exposition of the groups, indi
viduals, and publications which, during the same period, opposed the
League.
Groups Favoring the League
A.

The League to Enforce Peace.

As in the first phase, the League to

Enforce Peace during the second phase of the debate was the best organ
ized and most active of the groups favoring the League.
Bartlett reports that the leaders of the League to Enforce Peace
were "overjoyed" with Wilson's amendments to the Covenant, which in
cluded six of the seven proposals made by Charles Evans Hughes, the
majority of the suggestions made by Elihu Root, and all of the recommendations made by Taft, Lowell, and the League to Enforce Peace itself.

59

The Emergency Campaign Committee of the League made plans at its
April 30 meeting for a series of state "Ratifying Conventions," which
would coordinate activities of all pro-League organizations and workers.
Concentrating effort in fifteen states, which included New York,
New Jersey, the New England states, Pennsylvania, and the Middle West
as far as Nebraska, the Ratifying Conventions, held in a series like the
regional congresses, began in Burlington, Vermont, on May 21 and con
cluded in Albany, New York, on July 7.^®
Prominent among the speakers at the Ratifying Conventions were
William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Hamilton Holt, Herbert S. Houston,

-^Bartlett, o£. cit., p. 126.
60Ibid., p. 127.
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Stephen S. Wise, Dwight W. Morrow, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Frank Crane,
President William 0. Thompson of Ohio State University, and Dr. Anna
Howard Shaw, the foremost leader of woman suffrage in America.
The League to Enforce Peace became active during this phase in
publicly circulating pamphlets, circulars, speeches, and articles by
prominent pro-league figures.

Beginning May 21, a series of twenty-

seven articles designed to explain to the public the exact nature of the
Covenant was distributed to about eighty selected newspapers.

Patterned

after the Federalist Papers, the articles were called "The Covenanter."
They were written by Dr. Lowell, William H. Taft, Henry W. Taft, and
George Wickersham, and were later widely distributed in pamphlet form.^
The League aimed its activity frankly at the creation of public
opinion which could be converted into pressure upon the senators for
ratification of the Covenant.
Bartlett notes that the League reached the peak of its activity
during May and June, 1919.
Its headquarters staff of 115 employees occupied two entire floors
of the Bush Terminal Sales Building.
It had state organizations
in all the states, and county organizations in at least one-third
of the counties of the nation. Ten thousand people had official
positions in the various branch offices of the league, 50,000
people were enrolled as volunteer workers, and its list of avail
able speakers reached 36,333 persons.
It was estimated that during
May, 1919, 12,000 addresses per day were being given by league
speakers. Its mailing list contained the names of approximately
300,000 enrolled members.
It was not considered unusual for the
New York office to send out a half million copies of a particular
publication.**2
The League was active additionally in publicizing its own public

6 1Ibid., p. 129.
62Ibid., pp. 127-128.
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opinion polls.

In March, 1919, the League issued the statement that 150

leading newspapers of the country favored the League of Nations .^

By

April 27, the League polls reported that seventeen state legislatures
had passed concurrent resolutions favoring the League of Nations during
1917-18, while thirteen legislatures had followed suit in 1 9 1 9 . ^
Other polls released by the League reported that the League of
Nations was favored by (1) the necessary two-thirds of the Senate,
sixty-four senators;*^ (2) the majority of the 12,000,000 farmers of the
United States;^ and (3) the majority of big business.^'7
^ New York Times, March 17, 1919, p. 2. This report also indi
cated that a recent vote on the question taken at Amherst disclosed 300
students in favor of the League, with only 6 opposed. Also cited was a
poll conducted by the Portland Oregonian, which registered 17,825 for
the League and 109 against it. Senator Capper of Kansas was cited as
the authority for the statement that Kansas was overwhelmingly in favor
of the adoption of the world alliance.
64
1917: Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas.
1918: Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin.
1919: Arizona, Arkansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin,
Washington, Vermont.
Two state legislatures not included in the list for 1919 ap
proved the League although not by direct concurrent resolution endorsing
the League without reservation. In Missouri, instead of ratifying the
resolution, the House of Representatives adopted one of its own which
approved the League so long as the League did not interfere with
national sovereignty and the Constitution. The resolution adopted by the
Massachusetts Legislature called for a peace treaty first and the forma
tion of a league afterward. New York Times, April 28, 1919, p. 2.
^ Ibid., May 1, 1919, p. 1.
^ Ibid., May 6, 1919, p. 2.
This report additionally indicated
that resolutions had been adopted by 193 organizations, including the
American Agricultural Association, Farmers' Educational and Co-operative
Union of America, Farmers' Equity Union, Farmers' National Council,
Farmers' National Reconstruction Conference, National Board of Farm Or
ganizations, National Federation of Gleaners, National Grange, and the
Non-Partisan League. It also reported that fifty-five prominent agricul
turists, representing every state in the Union, were mobilizing the farmers
of the country for a "drive" on the United States Senate when the League
of Nations treaty was presented for ratification.
67u. S. Congressional Record, o p . c i t ., Part 2, 2063.
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B.

Women's Organizations. Women's organizations were particularly

active during the phase of the debate in expressing their support for the
League.

On February 14, the Interallied Suffrage Congress, meeting in

Paris, adopted a resolution, proposed by Mrs. Juliet Barret Rubles of
the United States delegation, which declared that "the coming peace
should be a peoples' peace, which it could not be if women were not con
sulted, and that the League of Nations should not be an alliance of
Governments only, but a general alliance between the peoples of the
world."68
With Carrie Chapman Catt as its President, the National American
Woman Suffrage Association passed resolutions on March 28 endorsing the
League of Nations and urging the government of the United States "to
bring about the prompt redress of all legitimate grievances" as a
safeguard against revolution by violence.6^
At its closing session of the National Chapter, the Daughters
of the American Revolution on April 19 urged ratification of the League
Covenant by the Senate.78
Finally, a group in New York, under the leadership of Miss
Elizabeth Marbury, formed a League of Nations Association, the purpose
of which was to "crystallize in the minds of the American people the
value of the League."

Apparently not an organization composed exclu

sively of women, the League of Nations Association elected as its Presi
dent Judge Martin T. Manton.7^

68New York Times, February 15, 1919, p. 10.
6^Ibid., March 29, 1919, p. 4.
70Ibid., April 20, 1919, p. 2.
7*Ibid., June 4, 1919, p. 14.
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C.

Labor Organizations.

Also significant during this phase of the

debate were the endorsements of labor organizations.

James P. Boyle,

head of the Central Labor Union of Brooklyn, explained to a luncheon of
the League of Free Nations Association at the Hotel Commodore on March
8 that the members of the newly organized American Labor Party favored
the League

C o v e n a n t .

Other speakers at the same luncheon, Richard

Roberts, pastor-of the Church of the Apostles of Brooklyn; Dr. J. Ryan
of the Catholic University, Washington; and Mary E. McDowell, head of
the University Settlement, Chicago, "united in emphatically asserting
that labor desired that a League of Nations be constituted at the Peace
Conference."73
The national convention of the Brotherhood of Trainmen, meeting
in Columbus, Ohio,passed a resolution on May 18 favoring ratification
of the League Covenant.

The convention additionally assured President

Wilson by letter that he had the Brotherhood’s "fullest confidence and
wholehearted support in your endeavor for the welfare of humanity."7^
On June 9 at its Atlantic City meeting, the Executive Council
of the American Federation of Labor reported that it felt the terms of
the Covenant would make the world "safe for democracy.”73

On June 21

the poll of the entire convention indicated that 29,750 members supported,
76

while 420 members opposed the Covenant. °

This endorsement, however,

was qualified by a statement showing sympathy for Ireland.

^Ibid., March 9, 1919, p. 1.
73Ibid.
74Ibid., May 19, 1919, p. 17.
73Ibid., June 10, 1919, p. 5.
7^Ibid., June 21, 1919, p. 3.
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D.

Farmers1 Organizations.

In addition to the active support of the

League to Enforce Peace, various women’s organizations and labor groups,
farmers were active in expressing their support of the League during
this period.
On March 3, 1919, five national farmers organizations pledged
their support of the League of Nations in a memorandum addressed to
President Wilson.

The memorandum stated that "unless such a League can

be established the war will have been fought in vain," although it
additionally proposed some amendments to the League constitution.^
• The National Grange, which had expressed its support of the
League as early as November of 1918, issued a statement on March 27,
1919, that the League had "won the united support of the farmers of the
country."

E.

Educators and Students.

Groups of educators also expressed approval

of the League during this phase of the debate.

Meeting in Chicago on

February 28, 1919, a national convention of educators adopted a resolu
tion favoring the

League.

^9

On March 1, 1919, the Department of Super

intendence of the National Education Association endorsed the League.®®
In addition to the opinions expressed by educators, groups of
students were polled during this phase of the debate.

Ninety-eight per

cent of the student body of Williams College were found to be in favor

^ Ibid., March 4, 1919, p. 2.
78Ibid., March 30, 1919, p. 9.
^ Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28, 1919, p. 10, cited in
Braden, "Rhetorical Criticism of Borah's Speeches," p. 280.
®®New York Times. March 1, 1919, p. 3.
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of the League;8^- a vote taken at chapel at Denison • University showed
300 for and 29 opposed;8^ and at Yale, 814 students were for and 284
against.

F.

Religious Groups.

The One-hundred and thirty-first General Assembly

of the Presbyterian Church, meeting in St. Louis on May 19, adopted
resolutions approving the proposed League of Nations,8^1 as did the
United Synagogue, maintaining that world peace was an ideal of the
Jewish people at its annual convention at the Jewish Theological SemiOC

nary in New York on June 17.
Individuals Favoring the League.

Only one individual of promi

nence outside the government endorsed the League during this phase of
the debate.

On March 11, William Jennings Bryan proclaimed that "the

League of Nations is the greatest step toward peace in a thousand years.
The idea of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international disputes is in itself an epochmaking advance."

86

He further

suggested amendments to the proposed constitution of the League, which,
among other things, would preserve specifically the Monroe Doctrine,
enlarge the proportionate voting power of the United States, and make
it clear that each member nation might decide for itself whether it

^ Boston Post, March 23, 1919, p. 8.
8^New York Times, April 1, 1919, p. 10.
8%.

S, Congressional Record, o p . c i t ., 2067.

8^New York Times, May 20, 1919, p. 17.
85Ibid., June 17, 1919, p. 20.
86Ibid., March 12, 1919, p. 1.
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would support decrees of the League's General Council.®^
Publications Favoring the League.

As the following table in

dicates, the nation's newspapers were active during this phase of the
debate in conducting straw polls of public opinion.

These polls indi

cated, as Lodge predicted, an overwhelming majority of opinion favorable
to the League without modification.
A newspaper poll conducted by the Literary Digest confirmed the
view of Lodge, Borah, and other prominent figures in the debate, that the
nation's press generally favored United States entrance into the League.
In a questionnaire sent to editors of all daily newspapers in the United
States, the Digest asked the editors for their views of their respective
communities toward joining the proposed League.

Of the total of 2,042

daily newspapers in the United States, 1,377 replied to the question
naire.

The Digest reported that 718 editors unconditionally favored the

League, 181 opposed, and 478 favored it conditionally.

88

Politically, the independent and Democratic editors favored out
right ratification, while Republicans favored it conditionally.

Sec-

tionally, strongest support for outright ratification came from the
southern editors, while others were more equally divided.

In each

clearly defined region, the sentiment was for the League, and in no one
state was there an opposing majority.

The great majority of the editors

favored a league of nations in some form.

Notable exceptions were the

Boston Transcript, the New York Sun, the Kansas City Star, the Chicago

87ibid.
QQ

Literary Digest, LKI (April 5, 1919), 13-14.
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TABLE I
NEWSPAPER POLLS

Name of Newspaper
___________ Favored Modified
Binghampton (N. Y.) Press
Boston Post
Bridgeport Standard
Telegram
Chicago Daily News
Dallas Times Herald
Des Moines Capital
Grand Rapids (Mich.) Press
Houston Chronicle
Los Angeles Times
New Brunswick (N.Y.) Times
New York Globe and Commercial
Advertizer
Rochester Times Union
Sioux Falls (S.D.) Press
Syracuse Journal
Topeka Capital
Washington Herald

Joining League
Opposed

Undecided
112
1,831

657
11,247
3,266
6,112
1,440
328
4,172
1,593
1,850
103

1,425
1,425

50

65,250
2,737
70
1,295
1,138
4,875

956
4,709
4,709
118
78
481
54
89
48

2,438

22,324
419
37
274
387
1,163

SOURCES:
Boston Post, March 15, 1919, p. 1; March 31, 1919, p. 13; April 7, 1919,
p . 13.
Chicago Daily News, April 5, 1919, p. 1.
Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1919, Part 11, p. 1.
New York Globe and Commercial Advertizer, April 8, 1919, p. 1.
Washington Herald, April 4, 1919, p. 3.
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Daily Tribune, the Washington Post, and the Hearst chain of newspapers.®^
Among the pro-league newspapers cited by Fleming during this
phase are Springfield (111.) Republican. Philadelphia Inquirer. New York
Evening Post. Minneapolis Tribune, and B t . Joseph News-Press.

The New

York Tribune, a pro-league newspaper during phase one, had by this time
become an important member of the opposition press.
In Williams' home state, the Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger re
mained a steadfast supporter of the League and of Wilson during the second
phase of the debate.

On June 14, 1919, the Clarion-Ledger editorially

described the Versailles Treaty as "a document of interest, of inter
national interest, and [one that] will live in history as one of the
greatest productions of the w o r l d . " ^

On July 10, 1919, the Clarion-

Ledger editorialized that
President Wilson is a man of great force and firm decisions and
usually gets what he goes after. A few Republicans, assisted by
Senator Reed of Missouri, who misrepresents the Democracy of
that state in the United States Senate, have vociferously declared
that the League of Nations will never be endorsed by the body of
which they are members. It now remains to be seen whether Presi
dent Wilson or these blatant politicians, headed by Borah and
abetted by Reed, stand highest in the confidence of the people.^
Church periodicals and farming journals were also surveyed during
this phase of the debate:

both were overwhelmingly in favor of the

League.
on
o;7George Harvey, Henry Clay Frick (New York:
1928), pp. 325-326.

Scribners' Sons,

90"Full Text of Peace Treaty," (editorial), Jackson Daily
Clarion-Ledger, June 14, 1919, p. 4.
^"Confident of Success," (editorial), Ibid.. July 10, 1919,
p. 4.
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The Literary Digest, in its issue of March 29, 1919, disclosed
that
Party ambitions and party issues are plentifully charged in the
lay press as explaining attitudes for or against the League of
Nations. Violent language may be used in some cases, but,
without violent language, just as deep conviction seems to
actuate the religious press, with this difference--that not one
member of it, so far as we have observed, opposes the League
in toto.9^
Professor W. J. Campbell, Rural Extension Secretary of the League
to Enforce Peace, conducted a nation-wide canvass of the agricultural
press on the subject of League ratification which revealed an "over
whelming proportion" of farming journals in favor of ratification.9*^
Of the sixty-six farm papers surveyed, including "nearly every prominent
publication of this kind,"9^- sixty-two unqualifiedly favored the League,
two favored ratification conditional upon a clearer understanding of
the Covenant's meaning, one was non-committal, and only one paper, the
Tennessee Farmer and Southern Statesman, published in Knoxville, was

95

absolutely opposed to the League. J

One aspect of the indirect audience which plagued John Sharp
Williams as well as other league advocates was the growing public apathy
and lack of concern with foreign affairs after the declaration of the
armistice.

Swollen with wartime prosperity and eager to relax the ten

sions and responsibilities of Wilsonian idealism, the American public was
increasingly less aware of the struggle over peace negotiations and the

^ Literary Digest, LX (March 29, 1919, 32.
9% e w York Times, June 16, 1919, p. 15.
9^Ibid.
95Ibid.
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league and more aware of the skyrocketing inflation, the violent and dis
turbing industrial disputes, the bloody race riots in major cities, and
the rumors of Bolshevik activity which dominated the newspaper headlines
of 1919.

Link notes that the successful establishment of the Bolshevik

dictatorship in Russia in November, 1917, followed by the spread of
communism into Germany, Hungary, and other parts of Europe, and the crea
tion in Moscow on March 2, 1919, of the Third International, or Comintern,
. set off a wave of new hysteria in the United States.

No other

development of the postwar era so well reflected the insecurity of the
American people as the way in which they react to fantastic rumors of
an equally fantastic Bolshevik uprising in their midst."

96

Groups Opposed to the League.
A.

The League for the Preservation of American Independence.

In March,

1919, the League for the Preservation of American Independence was
organized to counteract the efforts of Taft and the League to Enforce
Peace.

With the former editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Colonel

Henry Watterson, as its president, the organization made plans for the
establishment of a speakers bureau and an intensive publicity campaign
throughout the country, all of which would be supported by voluntary
contributions.97

The organization was to have eight regional, Vice

presidents who were to "mobilize" American thought in their eight sections.
The objective of this "mobilization," according to one of the organiza
tion's press releases, would be having every voter "thrust upon him the
necessity for thinking over the issues involved and giving consideration

96Arthur S. Link, American Epoch (New York:
1955), p. 241.
97n b w York Times, March 14, 1919, p. 1.

Alfred A. Knopf,
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to the American rights which the 'declaration of principles insists
are at stake and for which the country has fought more than once."'

98

In its Delcaration of Principles, released to the public on
March 31, 1919, the League for the Preservation of American Independence
raised eleven objections to the existing Covenant of the League of Nations.
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

"It legalizes war in seven cases and makes it compulsory in
three."
"By binding us to protect distant nations from aggression
it will force us, in the event of trouble between any two
league members, either to default on our promise as to the
price of peace, or again to send our boys to fight overseas,
no matter what we may think of the merits of the quarrel."
By forcing us to abandon the Monroe Doctrine it binds us to
submit ourselves to the decision of an international council
in case a foreign nation were to gain a foothold on this
continent by acquiring Cuba or Mexico, or were to menace our
Pacific coast by securing a naval base at Magdalena Bay.
It violates United States sovereignty.
It may force us into a war "without even the right on our
part to determine on which side we shall fight.
It forces conclusions of an international labor bureau upon
American laborers.
It may prevent us from protecting ourselves from undesirable
foreign immigration.
It will not destroy secret diplomacy.
There are no provisions for withdrawal.
It will bring permanent and entangling foreign alliances.
"If the constitution is not intended by its framers to mean
what fair interpretation finds in it, then its ambiguity,
vagueness, and uncertainty are such as to require its
thorough reconstruction or prompt rejection.
Even with Reed, Borah, and Poindexter participating in the draft

ing of preliminary plans, the organization was slow in getting started
and lacked adequate funds.

On April 21, 1919, the chairman of the organi

zation's Executive Committee, George Wharton Pepper, wrote to various
senators that unless adequate funds were made available, the "wisest plan"

^ I b i d ., March 31, 1919, p. 2.

9^Ibid.
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was to suspend activities.^®®

In May, however, Henry Clay Frick and

Andrew Mellon began to finance the o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s aid, along
with that of the Irish-Americans,

1 09

enabled the organization to finance

speaking campaigns, mass meetings, and to disseminate literature, includ
ing speeches by Borah, Thomas, Knox, Johnson, and other prominent antileaguers.^-®^

Disagreement arose during the fall of 1919, however, over

support of mild or strict reservations and over which speakers to
finance.^®^
B.

The Hyphen Groups.

The three principal "hyphen groups," the German-

Americans, the Italian-Americans, and the Irish-Americans, expressed
their opposition to Wilson by opposing American entrance into his League
of Nations.
German-Americans associated Wilson with their own mistreatment
and suppression during the war, and they believed that the terms reached
by the Peace Conference were unjust.

Bailey provides vivid description

of many of the German-Americans.
These people hated Wilson for having asked Congress to declare
war, and for having prosecuted the war. They hated him for
having visited a punitive peace on Germany, with its repara
tions, territorial excisions, and various humiliations--a11
seemingly in violation of the Fourteen Points. They were- com
pletely impervious to the argument that if it had not been

-*-®®Letter of George Wharton Pepper to James Reed, April 21,
1919, Borah Papers, cited in Braden, "Rhetorical Criticism of Borah's
Speeches," p. 288.
^-®-*-George Harvey, o£. cit., pp. 326-330.
•^William H. Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years (New York:
M. A. Donahue and Co., 1936), pp. 73-74.
^•®^Braden, "Rhetorical Criticism of Borah's Speeches," p. 289.

^■®^Tbid.

167
for Wilson the peace would undoubtedly have been more severe
than it actually was.'*-®-’
A second major "hyphen" group opposed to American entrance into
the League was the Italian-Americans, especially concentrated in New
York and Massachusetts.

They bitterly resented Wilson’s efforts to wrest

control of the Yugoslav port of Fiume away from Italy.

Speaking to an

enthusiastic crowd of Italian-Americans in Boston on Columbus Day, 1919,
Dr. Joseph Santosuosso vigorously attacked Wilson's Fiume policy and
even condemned Mrs. Wilson for having accompanied her husband to
Europe.one

of the most active of Italian-American agitators against

Wilson was the president of the New York City Board of Alderman and
future mayor, Fiorello H. La

Guardia.^7

Most vociferous, powerful, and best organized of the "hyphen"
pressure groups was the Irish-Americans, who wanted self-determination
applied to Ireland.

Although the German-Americans outnumbered the Irish-

Americans nearly two to one, Bailey observes that the Irish were more
important politically because
First of all, the German-Americans were normally Republicans
anyhow, and could be counted on to oppose the Democratic Wilson.
Secondly, the Irish were generally Democratic and were vital
elements in the great urban machines which controlled pivotal
states like New York and Massachusetts. Every Irishman whom the
Republicans could turn against Wilson represented a gain of more
than one vote;
one taken away from the Democrats and one added
t o t h e R e p u b l i c a n s .108

York:

A.
Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New
Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 23.
1 0 6 t, . ,

0/

Ibid., p. 24.

1Q7lbid.
108Ibid., p. 25.

Believing that Wilson would favor a policy of self-determination
for Ireland as a part of his negotiations at Versailles, the IrishAmericans were among the ranks of League supporters during the first
phase of the debate and continued as such until March, 1919.

One

national Irish leader, Reverend F. X. McCabe, president of DePaul Univer
sity declared in an address in Chicago on December 8, 1918 that
We are here to settle once and for all where the people of
Chicago stand on the question of self-determination for Ireland.
We are here to voice our support of the greatest man in history,
travelling today across the seas in the interests of the small
nations--Woodrow Wilson.
A mass meeting of Irish-Americans in New York's Madison Square
Garden on December 10 passed a resolution asking that Ireland be per
mitted to apply the principle of self-determination.^®

In the course

of the meeting, Cardinal O'Connell referred to the President as "once
Wilson of America, now Wilson of the World.
A prominent speaker at the series of regional congresses of the
League to Enforce Peace in February, 1919, was the Irish-American spokes
man, Frank P. Walsh, of New York, former joint chairman of the War Labor
Board, later a vigorous League opponent.
Five thousand Irish-American delegates from all areas of the
United States attended the Friends of Irish Freedom convention in
Philadelphia February 22-23, 1919,at which the delegates:

(1) organized

a fund-raising campaign with a goal of $1,250,000 for the following six
months;

(2) passed a resolution urging Wilson in his Versailles
109

Chicago Daily Tribune, December 9, 1918, p. 1.

•^®New York Sun, December 11, 1918, p. 14.
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negotiations "to apply to Ireland the great doctrine of national selfdetermination;" and (3) dispatched to plead the cause of Irish selfdetermination personally before Wilson a committee consisting of Daniel
F. Cohalan, justice of the New York Supreme Court; John F. Goff, former
justice of the New York Supreme Court; and Edward F. Dunne, former
governor of Illinois.

119

Unable to see the President during its first

week in Washington, the committee was finally granted a brief interview
on March 4.

Wilson refused to hear the committee, however, pending the

withdrawal of Daniel F. Cohalan, who had been implicated in the Sinn
Fein Anti-British plots during the W a r . * ^
The Sinn Feiners, regarding this as an insult, hissed the names
of Wilson, Taft, and Lloyd George at a meeting attended by one-thousand
members at the Central Opera House of New York on March 6 . ^ ^

With

Cohalan as their guest, delegates of four Irish Societies of Boston
passed an anti-Wilson resolution at a meeting on March 17:
Americans of Irish blood were grievously offended at the action
of President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York
last night in refusing to meet a committee named by the Irish
Race Convention at Philadelphia until Justice Cohalan had with
drawn from the r o o m . ^ ^
Three thousand Irish-Americans hissed the President's name at a
Boston meeting at which Thomas, Beveridge, and Borah were principal
speakers.

11 6

Further displays of alienation toward the League occurred

^•^New York Times, February 24, 1919, pp. 1, 2.
113Ibid., March 5, 1919, p. 2.
-^Chicago Daily Tribune, March 7, 1919, p. 1.
^•~*Ibid., March 6, 1919, p. 1.
•^••^Boston Post, March 9, 1919, p. 1.
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in B r o o k l y n , R o c h e s t e r , a n d

Chicago.

In Paris Wilson courteously but informally talked with the IrishAmerican delegation from the United States, although he refused to press
for Irish self-determination in the peace negotiations.^^
The United States had fought Germany, not Britain (though some
Irish-Americans would have preferred to fight Englishmen); and
self-determination was generally applied only to former enemy
territory. Wilson had enough insoluble and vexatious problems
worrying him at Paris without taking up the questions of selfdetermination for India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Ireland. Yet
the Irish-Americans never forgave him for not doing the impolitic
and the impossible .
Disappointed at the failure of the delegation, "President"
Eamon de Valera, of the so-called Irish "Republic," stumped the country
from March until December, 1919, to stir up greater resentment toward
Wilson and opposition toward the League.
Although John Sharp Williams had in earlier years encouraged
the Irish movement for home rule,

122

he had been the lone senator to

vote against the Senate resolution favoring Irish independence.

123

Irish-Americans, therefore, especially after June 6, 1919, were a
hostile segment of the audiences addressed by the Senator.
A final group in opposition to the League during this phase of

^ ^ New York Sun, March 10, 1919, p. 5.
118Ibid., March 17, 1919, p. 2.
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the debate was the New York Women's Republican Club which, on March 11,
adopted a resolution declaring the constitution of the League "a menace
to our republican form of Government
Individuals Opposed to the League.

Three prominent individuals

outside the government expressed opposition to the League Covenant
during this phase of the debate:

Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, and

Colonel George Harvey.
Having earlier declared himself thoroughly in favor of the
establishment of an international court,

12 S

J Charles Evans Hughes, in an

address before the Union League Club on March 26, analyzed the proposed
League Covenant article by article and suggested that it be amended:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

By explicit provision as to the requirement of unanimity
of decision.
By suitable limitation as to the field of the League's
inquiries and action, so as to leave no doubt that the
internal concerns of States, such as immigration and
tariff laws, are not embraced.
By providing that no foreign power shall hereafter acquire
by conquest, purchase, or in any other way any possession
on the American Continent or the islands adjacent thereto.
By providing that the settlement of purely American ques
tions shall be remitted primarily to the American nations,
and that European nations shall not intervene unless
requested to do so by the American nations.
By omitting the guarantee of Article X.
By providing that no member of the League shall be consti
tuted a mandatory without its consent, and no European or
Asiatic Power shall be constituted a mandatory of any
American people.
By providing that any member of the League may withdraw at
its pleasure on a specified notice.126
Former senator and Secretary of State, Elihu. Root, in a letter
124

New York Times, March 12, 1919, p. 3.

125Ibid., March 9, 1919, p. 3/
126Ibid., March 27, 1919, p. 1.
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to Will H. Hays expressing his views on the League, approved the idea
of the Covenant but suggested amendments which would provide:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

For limiting international arbitration to justifiable
questions, excluding political questions, and defining
justifiable disputes.
For the holding of general conferences from time to time
for the codification and development of international law.
For reserving purely American questions, such as the Monroe
Doctrine and immigration, from League control.
For the right of any nation to terminate at the end of five
years, by giving one year's notice, its obligation to help
maintain territorial and political integrity.
For verification of limitation of armaments.
For the revision of the League covenant within from five to
ten years after the signing of the treaty and for the right
of any nation, then or thereafter, on one year's notice, to
withdraw from the L e a g u e . 127
Colonel George Harvey, editor of the North American Review and

of Harvey's Weekly, had by this time become one of the League's most
outspoken, vitriolic, and influential enemies.

In a speech at the

Columbia Club in Indianapolis on March 17, Harvey cried that "there is
much confusion in the minds of our people.

They are just beginning to

awaken to the fact that they are being led into a quagmire.

The make

shift document now existing will be amended no doubt and the time of its
adoption may be postponed, but the menace will remain."

128

To a

gathering of Chicago bankers on March 15, 1919, Harvey labeled America a
"cat's paw."

He further declared that no foreign power cared for the

"welfare of the United States or was giving a thought to it except to
gain advantage and to obtain control of America's vast resources."

Addi

tionally, he said that the people were asked "to divest our nation of its
127

Ibid., March 31, 1919, p. 1.

128Ibid., March 18, 1919, p. 3.
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full independence and its most cherished tradition, and to sacrifice
in part at least our sovereignty.”129
Publications Opposed to the League.

Among the newspapers which

joined the opposition to the League during this phase were the Kansas
130
City Star, the Spokane Review, and the New York Tribune.

The Galleries
No response was recorded in the Congressional Record to anything
that John Sharp Williams said during this phase of the debate.

The

Irish-Americans who packed the galleries in phase three would be active
in their exchange of responses with the senior senator from Mississippi.

Summary of Williams1 Audience During the Unofficial Covenant Debate
The Round Robin list of senators and all the polls taken during
the unofficial covenant debate had indicated that there would not be
enough votes for ratification of the treaty.

Moreover, the Republicans

were confident that reservations to the treaty would receive fifty-two
votes, three more than the simple majority required to attach the reserva
tions.

Ratification of the treaty itself, however, required a two-thirds

majority, or sixty-four votes.

Since the Republicans were sure of fifty-

two votes, only forty-four senators could be expected to support the
no I

league.

Williams' "target group"

in his speeches during the unoffi

cial covenant debate, then, consisted of the twenty senators who could
combine their votes with the forty-four league supporters in order to

129Ibid., March 16, 1919, p. 11.
•^^Fleming, o£. c it., p. 193.
■^•^Gray and Braden, Public Speaking, o p . cit., pp. 146-47.
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ratify the treaty.

These are, at best, estimates of the numbers of

senators favoring the respective positions, and no two polls of the
senatorial preferences agreed.

Even though fifty-two senators may have

favored reservations, Williams could not be assured that the remaining
forty-four favored the treaty in its unaltered form.

Nevertheless,

Williams' objective was to concentrate upon influencing those senators
who were not already league supporters but who were not unalterably
opposed to its ratification.
Even though public opinion overwhelmingly favored ratification
of the treaty and American participation in the League of Nations during
the unofficial covenant debate, the senators themselves, jealous of their
constitutional prerogative in the ratification procedure and concerned
with victory for their own party, were.not responsive to the expressions
of public opinion.

The Representative Speech
Delivered on the eve of Wilson's official presentation of the
Treaty to the Senate, Williams' address of June 9, 1919, included all the
arguments advanced in his other two speeches made during the unofficial
covenant debate.

Williams himself identified this speech as his principal

address on the League of Nations.

1 QO

As in the preceding chapter, the analysis and evaluation of the
speech consists, first, of an investigation of Williams' speech

Letter of John Sharp Williams to Ben H. Irwin, July 28, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 46; and letter of John Sharp Williams to B. L.
French, July 26, 1919, Ibid.
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organization; second, his argumentative development; third, his emo
tional proof; fourth, ethical proof; fifth, style, and finally, effec
tiveness.

Organization
A detailed outline is the first requisite to understanding and
analysis of the organization of Williams' address of June 9, 1919.
The Outline of the Speech
Implied thesis:
I.

II.

III.

The discussion of the League has not been fair (for)

Partisanism has entered the debate (for)
A.

Lodge has admonished his followers to wait for word from
some indefinite source, supposed to be a Republican
caucus, before taking action.

B.

Borah contends that the Republican party ought to throw
itself as a party into the breach against the covenant of
peace.

C.

The attacks against Wilson are similar to those that were
leveled against George Washington by "discontented
characters" who
1.

sought to impede the measures of the government gen
erally

2.

sought to destroy the confidence which it is necessary
for the people to place, until they have unequivical
proof of demerit, in their public servants.

Senators are trying to usurp the power of treaty negotiation
from the President (for)
A.

They must realize that the Constitution gives them full
power to make or amend or to modify a treaty, but not the
power to negotiate one at all.

B.

They dare not accuse Wilson of havingbeen influenced
ambition or interested motives.

by

Reed's charge that the League of Nations will be dominated by
"black supremacy" is stupid (for)
A.

The appeal was designed to stir prejudice in the South.
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IV.

V.

B.

Reed knows that the white man is entitled to govern the
white man's country, the brown man the brown man's country,
and the black man the black man's country in international
affairs.

C.

Reed is guilty of inaccuracies (for)
1.

He included Cuba as a colored country, while it actually
has a majority population of whites.

2.

He knew that only in minor administrative matters could
any action be taken in the League contrary to American
interests without a unanimous vote.

3.

He knew that even without a veto, our military might
would constitute a veto.

Lodge has inconsistently opposed Wilson from the time of the
early negotiations of the Treaty (for)
A.

First he pressed for the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine
in the Treaty.

B.

When Wilson managed to include the Monroe Doctrine in the
Treaty, Lodge changed his mind and turned against it.

C.

Before he became leader of Wilson's Republican opposition,
Lodge used to say "politics stopped at the coast," and
"never went any further."

D.

Now Lodge is inconsistent in his policies (for)
1.

First he argues for inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in
the League Covenant

2.

Now that it is included, he says that the Monroe Doctrine
is not a regional question, but a question that no other
country is entitled to interpret but ourselves.

Borah's position is that of an American "junker," (for)
A.

His idea of State sovereignty is exactly the same as that of
Bismarck and as that of Kaiser Wilhelm and as that of the
Prussian junkers.
1.

He believes that a State has a right to do whatever it
chooses to do.

2.

He believes there should be no limitation upon the
sovereignty of a State except its inability to physically
execute its decrees.
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(Borah agrees with this analysis and points out that this was
also George Washington's view.)
B.

VI.

Borah fails to recognize the fact that no country ever entered
into a treaty with the smallest other country in the world
without surrendering or limiting part of its sovereignty (for)
1.

When we entered into an agreement with Mexico to pursue
bandits into each other's territory, we surrendered
part of our sovereignty.

2.

Any time we settle a dispute in court, we are surrender
ing sovereignty.

The opponents of the League lack imagination (for)
A.

B.

They want to return to 1913 (for)
1.

They want to be concerned at Versailles with quarrelling
over boundaries rather than "meeting there with common
accord to secure the peace of the world."

2.

They are narrow, provincial, and selfish.

They do not recognize the difference between civilized life
and animal life (for)
1.

Animals must always start where their forefathers
started.

2.

Man can accumulate and profit from past experience and
dream of the future.

Conclusion
VII.

The self-limitation of sovereignty in our entry into the League
of Nations would be desirable (for)
A.

A world treaty, or a league, is a self-limitation, not an
outside limitation.

B.

It is not the surrender of any essential right of sovereignty
on the part of any nation, because all nations agreed to it.

C.

The so-called limitation of sovereignty would be an assertion
of the highest degree of sovereignty.

Analysis of the Organization
An analysis of speech organization should consider the speaker's
craftsmanship and his organizational adjustment to his audience.
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Craftsmanship.

An evaluation of craftsmanship concerns thematic emer

gence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in
disposition.
1.

Thematic emergence.

The thesis of Williams' address of

June 9, 1919, was that the discussion of the Treaty and the Covenant of
the League of Nations by the members of the United States Senate had
been unfair.

Williams at no time in the speech overtly stated this

thesis, but the statement of his main ideas and their development make it
clear to the reader that this is what he intended to say.
2.

Method of division and arrangement.

As in all his other

addresses on the League issue, Williams organized his remarks in a
refutative pattern.

He argued against his opponents for their partisanship

in the debates, for their attempts to usurp the treaty-making power of
the President, for Reed's misrepresentations of "black supremacy," for
Lodge's partisan opposition to Wilson and the Senator's inconsistencies,
for Borah's ideas of dtate sovereignty, and for the League opponents'
lack of imagination.

After taking up each of these arguments, Williams

concluded that America's entry into the League of Nations was desirable.
3.

Rhetorical order in disposition.

Williams' introductory

remarks probably enlisted the audience's attention and interest immediately,
since he at once proclaimed that he, unlike Lodge and Borah, would be
above partisan politics.

A statement of this kind causes cynically

raised eyebrows, as well as sneers from many of the lawmakers.

Williams

directly asked his opponents to correct him if they did not consider the
League a party question.

This request was followed by "a pause."133

133U. S. Congressional Record, op. c i t ., 792.
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introduction probably rendered only a portion of the audience well
disposed toward the speaker.
enmity toward him.

His enemies, no doubt, retained their

The introduction did succeed, nevertheless, in pre

paring the way for ideas that were to come.
The body of the speech, as previously indicated, consisted of
the six main ideas and the development of each.

The organization of this

speech was considerably stronger than that of previous addresses by the
Mississippian.

He seemed less inclined to wander or digress.

The

speaker included transitional statements occasionally to indicate that
he was about to speak upon a new point.

By beginning a new thought with

the statement that "nothing was ever more stupid than that appeal of
the Senator from Missouri,"^34 Williams informed his listeners that he
was about to develop a new subject.

In addition to stating the topic

sentence first in developing new points, Williams was, at one point,
even more explicit.

"Now I come to the Senator from Idaho."135

Williams

elaborated on each of his main points with clarity and lack of digression
in this address.
His conclusion seemed to be an emotional peroration in the true
Aristotelian t r a d i t i o n . F i r s t , Williams implemented his own ethos by
rendering the audience well-disposed toward himself and ill-disposed
toward the opponents of the League.

At the same time, Williams put the

audience into the right state of emotion.

134Ibid.. 795.
135
x Ibid., 796.
■ ^ L a n e Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York:
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), pp. 240-241.

Appleton-

Mr. President, when you think of the men who have died upon
the battle fields with their eyes unclosed, glaring and
fleering at the sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and gone,
legs twisted and torn, gassed and yet living; when you think of
the women at home mourning for them, when you think of the
children left fatherless and without much of a mother's care,
because the mother is disheartened and can not give them the
old care, is there, anything in the world even promising some
relief from that sort of thing that you and I are not prepared
to embrace if we c a n ? 137
He also magnified those ideas which favored his own case.
There is nothing in the world more pathetic, there is nothing
more tragic, there is nothing more insane and idiotic--and I
use the words advisedly— than war. There never was a just war
on both sides since the world began.
Somebody was wrong some
where. All we ask is that there shall be some impartial
tribunal to determine who is wrong and to enforce the decent
opinion of the world upon the wrongdoer.
In addition, he minimized the views of his opponents.
The Senator steps in the arena and talks about "the sovereignty
of this Nation." Who gave this Government sovereignty?
The
people. Who decided to divide the sovereignty between our dual
sets of government? The people. How did they do it? Through
the voice of the Constitution. What was the voice of the Consti
tution? Self-limitation, not outside limitation. That is all a
treaty, or a world treaty, or a league is. ^
Finally, he refreshed the memories of his audience in his closing
comments.
And yet when the State of Mississippi has a suit with the State
of Idaho it becomes outside limitation in a certain sense by the
decision of the Supreme Court. But was it the surrender of any
essential right of sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why
not? Because each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other
words, because the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an
assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty. Mr. President, I
reckon I have talked enough.
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Enlisting the attention and interest, if not the sympathy, of
his immediate audience, Williams then proceeded in his introductory re
marks to prepare the way for the development of his ideas.

The body of

the speech was a lucid statement and development of six main ideas.

The

conclusion of the speech was virtually a model of Aristotelian rhetoric.
The speech, had it been delivered before an audience of typical Americans,
probably would have been considered a vigorous and moving refutation of
those views of the League opponents and a justification for American
entrance into the League.

Delivered as it was to the members of the

United States Senate with only the galleries representing the "average"
Americans present, the address probably fell upon partisan, and therefore
"deaf" ears.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment
As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams on June 9, 1919,
again faced a group of senators, the majority of whom were opposed to
his own position.

He chose, therefore, to direct his speech to those

senators who may have been on the margin of commitment, a group whom
Williams' hoped would constitute the number necessary for ratification
of the Versailles Treaty.
Williams
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Williams' arguments, or main divisions of the speech, were more
consistent logically than in his address of December 3, 1918.

Each of
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the six main arguments bore a specific causal relationship to the thesis
of the speech.
Unlike his previous speeches, the address of June 9, 191% con
tained a few organizational devices designed to implement the listeners'
immediate comprehension of the speech.

In this respect, however, Williams

fell far short of effective "oral" organization.

He did not present a

preview of the arguments he intended to discuss.

He failed clearly to

identify each new major section of the speech, and he failed to review
his arguments in his concluding remarks.
A justification for Williams' disregard of techniques of "oral"
organization may be presented in view of his decision to organize the
speech by implication.

If his intention was subtlety, however, the con

tent of the speech was inconsistent with the organization.

He boldly

named his opponents and discussed them in sarcastic terms.

He said that

Reed's argument had been "stupid," that Borah was a "junker," and that
Lodge was inconsistent.
tion:

The critic, therefore, may well raise the ques

Why should Williams have attempted

subtle, implicative fashion if he was, at
castigating opponents to their faces?

to arrange his material in a
the same time, intent

upon

These two purposes seem to have

been in conflict with each other.
Since all the members of the Senate were, by June 9, thoroughly
familiar with Williams1 purpose in the debate, there seems no valid
reason why he should not have stated his thesis overtly at the outset of
the address, previewed his arguments against the League opponents,
developed each argument concisely, and summarized the arguments along
with his emotional peroration.

Had he done this, the marginal opponents
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of the League would have been immediately and clearly aware of Williams'
objections to the conduct of the League opponents in the debate up to that
time.’

Invention:

Argumentative Development

The severity and strictness of the argumentative development and
the logical credibility of Williams' arguments in his address of June 9,
1919, are the concerns of this section.

Argumentative

Development

of

the

Thesis

In support of the thesis that the discussion in the Senate of
the League of Nations had been unfair, Williams argued, first, that
partisanship had entered the debate.

As a hypothetical syllogism, the

argument may be stated as follows:
Major Premise:

If partisanship has entered the
the discussion of the League of
been unfair.

debate, then
Nations has

Minor Premise:

Partisanship has entered the debate.

Conclusion:

The discussion of the League of
been unfair.

Nations has

In his attempt to impress the twenty senators who might conceivably
cast their votes with those already in favor of the League, Williams
attempted, by inductive argument, to prove that partisanship had entered
the debate.
First, he cited the past behavior of Lodge as a specific instance
of partisanship.

Lodge, he pointed out, had considered the League only as

a party question and had urged his Republican followers to take no action
"until they could hear further from some indefinite source, supposed to
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be a Republican caucus."141

jjot oniy was this an accurate reference to

partisanship on Lodge's part, but it was an instance with which the twenty
senators whom Williams hoped to influence were familiar.

On April 29,

Lodge had sent a telegram to all Republican senators in which he sug
gested " . . .

that Republican Senators reserve final expression of opinion

respecting the amended league covenant until there has been an opportunity
for

c o n f e r e n c e .

"142

Since the twenty senators with whom Williams prob

ably was most concerned were themselves Republicans, they had received
Lodge's telegram and Williams' accusation of partisanship was, to them,
logically credible.
As a second instance of partisanship in the Senate debates con
cerning the League, Williams observed that Borah had urged the Republican
party to throw itself into the breach against the League.
an accurate instance of partisanship toward the League.

This too was
Borah had, in

early May, 1919, participated in a nation-wide anti-League speaking
tour.

14-*

Additionally, the Lion of Idaho had, from the floor of the

Senate, openly referred to the League as a party issue and had praised
f

Republicans for wanting to stand aloof from Europe's b r o i l s . W i l l i a m s '
second instance of partisanship, then, was also logically credible to his
listeners, all of whom were familiar with Borah's views concerning the
League.
Williams' third means of supporting the premise that partisanship

14 l u . S . Congressional Record, op. cit., 792 .
142

Fleming, The United States and the League. o p . cit., p. 196.

143supra.. p. 142.
144u. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 680.
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had entered the debate was by analogy.

From Lodge's biography of George

Washington, *-4'* Williams quoted Washington himself complaining about "dis
contented characters" who sought to impede the measures of the government
generally and to destroy public confidence in the President.

146

Williams

then accused Wilson's opponents of having been "engaged for days and
weeks and months in trying to destroy the confidence the American people
T

ought to have in him [Wilson] as their representative."

t

"7

As Washington

observed, his enemies had not waited for unequivocal proof of demerit
before engaging in their destructive measures.

Neither, asserted Williams,

had Wilson's opponents waited for unequivocal proof of demerit.

Instead,

they had been "nagging,""bedeviling," and taking advantage of every
little uncrossed "t," undotted "i," or "q" not followed by a "u," in
order to discredit Wilson.

148

The analogy should have been logically

valid for Williams' listeners, since Lodge had not only telegraphed his
followers to withhold comment on the revised Covenant, but earlier he had
instigated the Round Robin and threatened to delay the treaty in commit
tee.*-^

Additionally, Lenroot had expressed a desire for modifications

of the covenant, and Borah and nine other irreconcilable senators had
advocated outright rejection of Wilson's work.*-"’** Wilson's opponents,

^ ^ H e n r y Cabot Lodge, George Washington (Boston:
Mifflin and Co., 1889).
146
H U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 792.
147Ibid.
148Ibid.
149Supra.. pp.139-142.
*-^^Supra., p. 141.
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Minor Premise:

Lodge has inconsistently opposed Wilson
from the time of the early negotiations
of the treaty.

Conclusion:

The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the minor premise, Williams observed that, first,
Lodge had pressed for the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the
Treaty.

Then, when Wilson had included the recognition of the Doctrine,

Lodge had abruptly declared himself opposed to its inclusion in the
Covenant.

This was a logically valid accusation of inconsistency with

which most of Williams' listeners should have been familiar.

On learn

ing that the Monroe Doctrine had received no attention in the first
draft of the Covenant, Lodge had complained, "Are we ready to abandon
the Monroe Doctrine and to leave it to other nations to say how
American questions should be settled and what steps we shall be permitted
to take in order to guard our own safety or to protect the Panama
Canal?"

157

After Wilson had succeeded in attaching the Monroe Doctrine

amendment to Article 10 of the Covenant,

158

Lodge had decided that the

Doctrine had not been an international understanding and should not have
been carried into the League of Nations.

159

Lodge's earlier statement

had clearly indicated that he had felt American entrance into the League
would have meant abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.

As Williams'

listeners could see, however, the Sage of Nahant had indeed reversed
himself when Wilson had been victorious in securing the Monroe Doctrine
amendment despite formidable French opposition.

Since adoption of the

157U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 724.
^-*®Fleming, o£. c i t ., p. 185.
159
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newly revised Covenant could not have meant abandoning the Monroe Doc
trine, Lodge was forced into an embarrassing reversal.
Also in support of the premise that Lodge had inconsistently
opposed Wilson from the time of early negotiations of the Treaty, Williams
contended that Lodge had once said that politics stopped at the coast and
never went any further.

John A. Garraty, Lodge's most recent biographer,

verifies the fact that Lodge had held and practiced this belief during
the period of American imperialism in the 1890's.
Venezuela boundary affair of 1895 " . . .

Garraty notes that the

enabled Lodge to practice his

theory that politics should stop at the water's edge."

During this

crisis, Lodge advocated bipartisan support of President Cleveland.
Garraty further observes of his. subject, however, that "in later years
he was not always able to maintain this high standard of patriotic nonpartisanship in foreign

a f fairs.

"^0

Since most of the senators were

familiar with Lodge's record in the Senate, this accusation of incon
sistency should have been logically credible to them.
Williams' fifth major contention in support of his thesis was
that Borah's position was that of an American "junker."

The logical

relationship of this contention to the thesis may be seen by stating the
argument in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.
Major Premise:

If Borah's position is that of an American
"junker," then the discussion of the League
has been unfair.•

Minor Premise:

Borah's position is that of an American "junker."

Conclusion:

The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the premise that Borah's position was that of an American

160john A. Garraty, o£. cit., p. 165.
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assured Reed that even without a veto in the League, our military
might would constitute a veto.

Since these last two conditions were

materially true and acceptable logically to his listeners, the conten
tion itself, that Borah failed to recognize the fact that no country had
ever entered into a treaty with another country without surrendering part
of its sovereignty, was probably logically credible to the listeners.
The statement of this contention, however, could have been more effec
tive as logical proof had it stressed the insignificance of the loss of
sovereignty.

A more pertinent statement might have been, "Borah fails

to recognize the insignificance of the loss of sovereignty as compared
with the gain of the preservation of world peace."

This statement

would have provided superior support for the premise that Borah's posi
tion was that of an American junker.
Williams' final major contention in support of his thesis was
that the opponents of the League lacked imagination.

The relationship

of this contention to the thesis becomes clear when the argument is
stated as a hypothetical syllogism.
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In support of the minor premise Williams contended, first, that
the League opponents wanted to return to the quarreling of 1913 and,
second, that they did not recognize the difference between civilized life
and animal life.
That the condition of world politics in 1913 was that of constant
boundary dispute and quarreling cannot be questioned.

Williams'
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argument that the rejection of the League would result in a reversion
to the state of international affairs as they were in 1913 was probably
logically valid to his listeners, the members of the Senate.

They were

in a better position than most other Americans to know precisely the
state of world affairs before and after the war.

To them, a reversion

to the status quo ante b e H u m would surely signify exactly what Williams
predicted, a renewed state of international dispute rather than inter
national peace.
A second reason Williams gave for his accusation that the oppo
nents of the League lacked imagination was that they did not recognize
the difference between civilized life and animal life.

Animals, he

maintained, must always start where their forefathers started, while
man can accumulate and profit from his past experiences and dream of
the future.

Williams contended, by implication, that by rejecting the

League, the Senate would be ignoring man's accumulated past experience
with war and repudiating man's dream of world peace.

Williams' argu

ment may be clarified by restatement as a disjunctive syllogism.
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Although this syllogism is invalid because of the probable nature of the
conclusion, it illustrates the reasoning Williams attempted to use to
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support the premise that the League opponents lacked imagination.

While

the senators may not have regarded the situation of 1913 as animalistic,
they probably recognized the inevitability of either of the two alterna
tives Williams suggested.

These alternatives were, essentially, that

the United States could return to the quarrels of 1913 or it could pro
gress to the civilized preservation of world peace.

Williams' argument,

therefore, that the League opponents lacked imagination was probably
logically credible to his listeners.
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Invention:

Emotional Proof

Audience Adaptation.
As in all his previous speeches in the League debates Williams
addressed primarily the audience he knew so well, the members of the United
States Senate.

The division of opinion in the Senate was clear.

Williams

knew that a majority of the senators opposed ratification of the Treaty,
and that there was a small militant group led by Borah and Lodge who,
with their insistence on the "crossing of every 1t 1 and dotting of every
'i,'" could prevent even the possibility of ratification.

Williams, then,

would exert every effort in this address and in subsequent addresses to
discredit these foes of the Treaty.
four basic motive appeals;

His emotional proof consisted of

appeals to patriotism, to security, to ethnic

pride, and to self-preservation.
In appealing to patriotism Williams, first, accused his opponents,
Lodge and Borah, of partisanism and selfish motives.■^

A second in

stance of Williams' appeal to patriotism was his observation that, like
those enemies of George Washington, the enemies of the League were united
in "trying to destroy the confidence the American people ought to have"
in Woodrow Wilson as their representative.

163

Not only were Borah and Lodge attempting to destroy public confi
dence in Wilson, but they sought also to "impede the measures of the
government generally."164

^ fourth appeal to patriotism was Williams'

reference to the similarities between Washington's description of

•^U,

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 792.
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his listeners.

In describing the consequences of failure to ratify the

Treaty, Williams vividly depicted

the horrors of war.

Mr. President, when you think of the men who have died upon the
fields with their eyes unclosed, glaring and fleering at the
sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and gone, legs twisted and
torn, gassed and yet living; when you think of the women at home
mourning for them, when you think of the children left father
less and without much of a mother's care, because the mother is
disheartened and cannot give them the old care, is there any
thing in the world even promising some relief from that sort of
thing that you and I are not prepared to embrace if we can?^°°
In his address of June 9,

1919, then, Williams

fluence his listeners by means of

four types of motive

attempted to in
appeals:

patriotism, security, ethnic pride, and self-preservation.

The degree

of susceptibility of the senators to such emotional appeals is impossible
to assess.

The senators would have been eager, however, to disassociate

themselves with partisanism and impeding the government.

The appeal to

security was couched in the most immediate terms, a hypothetical illus
tration involving the Senator from Utah.

Finally, the senators could

have been expected to be proud of the accomplishments

of the English-

speaking peoples and horrified at the terrors of war.

Williams, then,

probably exercised the best available means of persuasion in terms of
emotional proof, although it seemed less significant than his use of
ethical proof.

Invention:

Ethical Proof

Character
Williams attempted to implement the audience's impression of his
personal integrity by linking his opponents with what was not virtuous,

168Ibid., 799.
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security and world peace.

"You have not yet introduced any resolution

against Japan providing for the independence of Korea, lately conquered
and very much oppressed.

Why?

Because you know Great Britain will be

good humored with you and Japan will not be, and because there are a lot
of Irish-American votes in America, and there are no Korean votes in
America that is the honest G o d ’s truth about you.11
A seventh instance of Williams' attempt to discredit his oppo
nents was his accusation that Senator Reed had been guilty of distorting
facts relative to racial supremacy in the League and relative to the
United States’ veto power in the League.

173

An eighth instance of this

kind of ethos was Williams’ representation of Lodge as a man of partisan
inconsistency.

He accused the Massachusetts Senator of, first, wanting

the Monroe Doctrine included in the League Covenant.

Then, Williams

pointed out that Lodge had changed his mind when Wilson had succeeded
in including the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant.

The obvious conclusion

which Williams advanced was that Lodge would oppose Wilson regardless of
the policies of the latter.^74
A ninth example of this kind of ethos was Williams' assertion
that Lodge lacked imagination.

-The Mississippian maintained that the Sage

of Nahant
. . . has only a reasoning capacity, and a very highly respectable
reasoning capacity, and a very highly respectable historical in
formation, which enables him to make a very clear statement of some
thing, but he can not put any heart and soul into it, because he
has no Celtic imagination. He has pure Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic,
exhaustive, and exhausting methods. 73
172Ibid.
173Ibid., 795.
174Ibid., 796.
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Tenth, Williams labeled Borah an American "junker."

He pointed out that

Borah would take the position that there must be no limitation upon the
sovereignty of the United States.

This, he said, was the same position

as that of Bismarck, and of Kaiser Wilhelm, and of the Prussian junkers.
Borah's position lacked virtue because he failed to recognize the neces
sity of limiting national sovereignty in order to accomplish international
peace among nations .^78
Finally, Williams again indicted Lodge and Borah as "narrow
legalists," "who can see nothing in the present and hope for nothing in
the future except as based upon a precedent in the past."

177

These are the eleven instances of Williams1 attempt to establish
his own integrity by linking his opponents with that which his listeners
would not consider virtuous.
Williams' second means of establishing his integrity was by be
stowing praise upon his own cause.

Specifically, he pointed out, first,

that Wilson, unlike his partisan opponents, did not talk about his
assailants.^-78

A second instance of Williams' attempt to associate him

self with virtue was his insistence that he was a spokesman of "race
supremacy, race integrity, race purity, and to making this country a
white man's country all over."^79
A third instance of self-praise was the Mississippian's comparison
of himself with his opponents.

176Ibid., 797.
177Ibid., 798.
178Ibid., 793.
179Ibid., 795.

He labeled Lodge and Borah "narrow
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legalists," while referring to himself as a member of that class of men
"who dream of a better world."'*-®®
A final instance of self-praise, or self-association with virtue,
was Williams' identification of himself with "right" as opposed to
"might."

"All

I

can say is that

I

spew out, as far as

I

am concerned,

the idea that this government representing the United States desires to
reserve to itself any power whatsoever to execute the cause of might
against the cause of right."181
The third means Williams used to implement ethos in terms of high
personal integrity was by creating the impression of complete sincerity.
In criticizing Borah, he expressed his personal fondness of his opponent
and added that
I do not want to put myself in the attitude of a preacher and
of reading him a lecture. God knows I have no right to take
that attitude toward any human being on the face of the earth;
but I would in a friendly way counsel him to consider most the
atmosphere of the world and the atmosphere of the United States
and a little bit less that atmosphere of the Washington Post and
Washington Republican bosses of the Senate Chamber.182

Additionally, Williams enhanced his sincerity with further praise
for his opponent, although in praising Borah he inpugned the motives and
integrity of Lodge.
Now I come to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Borah], He is of a
different type. He does not pretend to be a Brahmin. He would
acknowledge himself not quite a paragon but an ordinary, common
citizen. He would not base his right to express public opinion
upon his scholarship or upon his pedigree.

180Ibid., 798.
181Ibid.
182Ibid., 793.
183Ibid.. 796.

204
By questioning the virtue of his opponents, by praising his own
cause, and by giving the impression of complete sincerity, then, Williams
attempted to establish with his listeners an impression of high personal
integrity.

Intelligence
Williams employed two methods of creating a self-image of a man
of intelligence.

First, he pointed out the lack of wisdom on the part

of his opponents, and second, he emphasized his own intelligence in
practical affairs.

In short, he presented himself as a man of common

sense.
First, he reflected upon the lack of good sense of Lodge and
Borah.

He said that the question of presidential authority to negotiate

a treaty had been so clearly established that it could only be disputed
by a man with "the intelligence of a Bronx Hill goat, who recognizes no
higher ambition in life than eating a tin can."^84

This indictment of

Lodge and Borah, however, was more subtle than his attack upon Senator
Reed.

Williams directly accused Reed of having distorted information

regarding racial supremacy and asserted that "nothing was ever more
stupid than that appeal of the Senator from Missouri.
In a final attack upon the wisdom of his opponents, Williams
recognized their integrity and their sincerity in their efforts to dis
credit the League of Nations.

"Their honesty I can fully recognize, their

intellectual integrity I rather admire, but their wisdom I can not

184Ibid., 792.
185Ibid., 795.
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perceive, because if they be right with regard to nations in interna
tional affairs the same principle would be right as regards individual
affairs and as regards affairs between states in the American Union."186
In presenting himself as a man of common sense, Williams, first,
made use of the argument from analogy to demonstrate the similarities
between the local government of individuals and the international govern
ment of nations.

He argued that in entering an agreement with Mexico

mutually to pursue and capture bandits across Federal boundaries, each
nation had surrendered a degree of its sovereignty.

He argued, addi

tionally, that when individual disputes are settled in court, this too
is a surrender of some individual sovereignty.

He concluded that indi

viduals could cut one another's throats with little harm to other
individuals.

He added, however, that "when two nations go in to cut

one another's throats it cuts the throats of all, everybody--the people
that would not want it as well as the people that did want it--the
women and the children and the nuns and the priests and the preachers
and the lawyers and the beggars upon the streets, and everybody in the
world."187
A second instance of Williams' presentation of himself as a man
of common sense was that of his penetrating analysis of civilization.
What is civilization?
It is the massing together at a given
time of the accumulations of the past. How does a man differ
from the brutes of the field? Simply by the fact that from one
generation to another he can accumulate. The cat and the dog
and the tiger and the lion start where their forefathers started.
We started upon the shoulders of our forefathers; and all that
accumulation, from generation to generation, spells civilization.

186Ibid., 798.
187Ibid., 797.
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Man is the only monument building creature, because he is the
only one that considers the past. He is the only creature that
dreams of the future and "has visions," because he is the only
one that thinks of the future to any great extent. And here
step in the Prussian and American junkers, including my good,
dear friend from Idaho, and they tell us, "Do not, above all
things in the world, let there be even a suspicion of the limita
tion of your sovereignty," as if a voluntary limitation were any
less an act of sovereignty than the failure to make a limitation.
In a third attempt to enhance his ethos as a man of common sense,
Williams presented a simplified explanation of the nature of sovereignty.
What is the difference between a savage and civilized man? One
puts limitations upon his individual sovereignty, and the other
does not. What is the difference between a civilized nation
and a savage or barbarous nation like Turkey? One puts limita
tions— whether by unwritten law, as in Great Britain, or by
written law, as here— upon its free action and the other does
not; and of all the men who have stood in this Chamber, in
eloquent words and in eloquent thought approving and applauding
the idea of putting a self-limit upon the operation of National
Government, the Senator from Idaho stands at the front. The'
Constitution of the United States is nothing but the people's
self-limitation upon their dual agencies of Government.1°“
A fourth instance of a common sense explanation was Williams 1
observation that the United States would never be overpowered by the
force of world opinion should it join the League of Nations.
Oh, you tell me, now, then, if this peace goes into effect the
United States might be forced to do something it does not want
to do. It has, in the first place, a veto powerj and if the
public opinion of the world became so powerful that that veto
power did not count, then the United States ought to be made to
do what common humanity and common sense and the interests of
the world demand. That time will never come. There is no fear
of it. I have no fear at all of the world running up against
the United States.
Finally, Williams seems to have intended leaving his listeners

188Ibid., 797-98.
189Ibid., 798.
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with the impression that he was a man of common sense by declaring that
citizens of the United States were already accustomed to self-limitation
of sovereignty.

He compared the United States Constitution, an agreement

among the states to limit their sovereignty, with an international agree
ment among nations to limit their sovereignty.
What was the voice of the Constitution?
Self-limitation upon
the sovereignty of the States and the sovereignty of individuals.
Self-limitation, not outside limitation. That is all a treaty,
or a world treaty, or league is. And yet when the State of
Mississippi has a suit with the State of Idaho it becomes outside
limitations in a certain sense by the decision of the Supreme
Court. But was it the surrender of any essential right of
sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why not? Because
each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other words, because
the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an assertion in the
highest degree of sovereignty.
Williams' methods of enhancing his intelligence consisted of
emphasizing his opponents' lack of wisdom and of presenting himself as
a man of common sense.

Good Will
Williams generally presented himself as a man with his country's
best interests at heart.

He criticized as harmful to the country the

partisanship shown by Lodge, Borah, and Reed.

He decried their attempts

to usurp the constitutional prerogative of the President in negotiating
treaties, and he rebuked narrow provincialism, urging, as the best policy
for the country, the self-limitation of some degree of national sovereignty.
Throughout this address, as in all his addresses, Williams was a
spokesman for world peace.

On some occasions he demonstrated good will

toward some of his opponents who were among his listeners.

191Ibid., 799.

Specifically,
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he expressed personal good will toward Borah and urged him to reconsider
his position.

. . 1 would in a friendly way counsel him to consider

most the atmosphere of the world and the atmosphere of the United States
and a little bit less the atmosphere of the Washington Post and
Washington Republican bosses and of the Senate Chamber."

Summary

of

Ethical

192

Proof

As in previous addresses, Williams again relied most heavily
upon ethos as his primary mode of proof.

He sought to discredit his

opponents by linking them with causes not in the best interests of the
United States.

He presented himself, on the other hand, as a spokesman

for United States interests, as a man of intelligent common sense, and
as a man of good will.

Style
Clearness
As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams spoke in an
impromptu fashion.

This type of delivery probably contributed to a lack

of clearness in the address of June 9.

Factors which compensated for

the resulting lack of organization, however, included the speaker's
thorough understanding and knowledge of the ideas involved in the debate.
Additionally, his word choice was that of the cultured planter class he
represented.

The appropriateness of his Words may again be questioned

on the basis of his severely critical expressions toward his colleagues.
From the standpoint of clearness, however, Williams could not have been
misunderstood by any adult who heard him or who may have read the text of
192

Ibid., 793.
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his speech.

Further, there are no words in the text of the June 9

address which have lost either their currency, reputability, or intelli
gibility today.
This speech, however, lacked the variety in word choice which
Williams had displayed in his address of December 3.

There were few of

the forceful monosyllabic verbs that had appeared in the previous text,
although in his emotionally loaded conclusion, Williams employed such
simple, yet descriptive, adjectives as "torn," "gone," "twisted," and
"gassed."193
In addition to a thorough understanding of the ideas in the debates
and discerning word selection, a third means for evaluating clarity of
style was the complexity of sentence structure.

Again, Williams made

frequent use of compound and complex sentences, but, unlike the previous
address,

he

also

frequently

paragraphs from the speech,

used
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simple

sentences.

In

a

sampling

of

ten

Williams used twenty-nine simple sentences,

seven compound, fourteen complex, and ten compound-complex sentences.
This indicates that Williams was probably clearer in his presentation of
June 9 than he had been on December 3, 1918.
A fourth element contributing to clarity was the use of defini
tions, examples, and illustrations to clarify ideas.

Williams was

especially concerned with defining the term "sovereignty" and showing that
in any organized society, some degree of sovereignty must be sacrificed.
In this connection, he attempted to convince his listeners that the

193Ibid., 799.
l ^ I counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph for
my representative sampling.
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self-limitation of sovereignty required by any treaty between nations
was "an assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty."

195

Williams

provided examples of self-limitation of sovereignty by pointing out in
stances of the settlement of individual disputes in a court of justice
rather than upon a public highway,

196

ment of men and communities of men.

197

and instances of the self-governHis most striking illustration

was his description of the tragedy and' horror of the men who had died in
battle and the sorrow of their dependents. ^ 8
Williams was less successful in terms of the fifth element of
clearness, control over the details in the speech.

As in the speech of

December 3, he seemed unable to avoid involved elaborations.

He grew

especially involved in devoting fifteen paragraphs to the abuses suffered by George Washington at the hands of his political foes.

199

He

used seventeen paragraphs to develop the idea of sovereignty
Although he seemed to elaborate at some length on the political
enmity existing in the Senate toward the President and on the concept of
sovereignty,Williams thereby did discriminate between the essential and
the less essential materials.

These two ideas were vital to the support

of his thesis that the discussion of the League had been unfair.
With respect to the sixth element of clarity, organizational

195Ibid. , 799.
196Ibid., 797.
197t.
.,
Ibid.,
798.
198.,.,
Ibid., 799.
199Ibid., 792-3.
20°Ibid., 796-98.
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integrity, Williams seemed somewhat more orderly in this presentation
than in the speech of December 3, 1918.

201

Also, as previously pointed

out, he included transitional statements which bridged the gaps between
parts of the speech and which suggested the direction in which subsequent
material would move.

As previously indicated, however, Williams had no

justification for failure to make more frequent use of transitional
material to clarify the organization of the address.
A seventh consideration is the adequacy of the speaker's logical
materials.

As indicated previously, Williams' evidence and arguments

generally lent credibility to his address.
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With respect to clearness, then, Williams' thorough understanding
of his material, his word choice, his more frequent use of simple sen
tences than in previous speeches, his attention to definition of the key
term, "sovereignty," his use of striking illustration, and the general
logical credibility of his arguments to his listeners contributed to the
clarity of his presentation.
Unfortunately,
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George Washington.

Of his colleagues from Idaho and from Massachusetts,

the Mississippian asked
Are there any two men in the Senate that are more capable of
better "barbing and well pointing an arrow" than the leader of
the majority of the Republican side and the leader of the minor
ity upon that side--both probably candidates for the presidency?2®-*
A third instance of visual imagery was Williams' emotional reference to
the men who had died upon the battlefields "with their eyes unclosed,
glaring and fleering in the sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and
gone, legs twisted and torn, gassed and yet living."
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A fourth instance

of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Wilson's "stiff, long lower
jaw."2®7

A sixth use of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Borah's

accusation that ex-President Taft was a "walking corpse."2®®
Williams1 single instance of tactile imagery was his insistence
that
it is better to run the risk of the court's making a mistake than
it is to leave men to cut one another's throats, and the settle
ment of individual controversies is of less importance than the
2 no
solution of national and international questions by arbitration. ^
Williams' sentence structure did not contribute to his impres
siveness.

In a sampling of the first 100 words of every third paragraph,

Williams' average sentence length proved to be forty-two words.

In a

sampling of every fifth paragraph of the speech, however, there were
twenty-nine simple sentences, seven compound sentences, fourteen complex

205r.4A
Ibid., 793.
206Ibid., 799.
207Ibid., 793.
208Ibid.
2®^Ibid., 797.
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sentences, and ten compound-complex sentences.

In terms of sentence

form, a sampling of every fifth paragraph revealed six questions, two
periodic sentences, twenty-two loose sentences, and six balanced sen
tences.

Williams' sentences, therefore were generally too long and too

loose to contribute effectively to impressiveness of style.
A final stylistic device which contributed to Williams' impres
siveness was his use of tropes.

First, he employed an allegory to illus

trate that a peace-loving country could promote world peace.
If you sow the seeds of might and power and empire and unlimited
sovereignty, the chances are that you will reap a harvest of that
sort raised on some other people's field, not on your own; and
if you sow seeds of accord, harmony, peace, self-limitation, then
of those seeds some day you will reap the harvest that you planted,
and it is the only destiny that I know of that is both good and
manifest.210
Second, Williams made use of a synechdoche to depict the unjust
treatment Wilson's enemies had accorded him.
Without waiting until they have "unequivocal proof of demerit,"
to quote the language of George Washington, they and their
foolish followers have been nagging, have been bedeviling, have
been on the outside taking advantage of every little uncrossed
"t" or undotted "i," or a "q" not followed by a "u," in order
to arouse distrust of our representative in Europe— our representa
tive, whether we are Republicans or not.211
Williams' third use of trope took the form of- irony.
Oh, they come from Massachusetts--these infallible guides— they
come from Idaho; they come from Missouri; they come from all
around the country, as you know. They are such "infallible guides"
that "one is at no loss.for a director at every turn." One may be
at a bit of a loss about following the directions if he is a good
American, an unhyphenated patriot, and devoted to his own country,
without any regard to a "fatherland" in Europe--if he is just an
American and nothing more, and spews out hyphens.
210Ibid., 798.
211Ibid., 792.
212Ibid., 793.
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A fourth instance of the use of trope was Williams' two hyper
boles.

In castigating the opponents of Wilson who would argue the right

of the President to make treaties, Williams diminished the matter by
observing that it was "too clearly settled for dispute by any man with
the intelligence of a Bronx Hill goat, who recognizes no higher ambition
in life than eating a tin can."

213

Williams additionally diminished

things below the truth by remarking that Lodge had come into the Senate
chamber a few days earlier and had "literally made the air blue with
apprehension as to what was going to happen to us when Europe got hold
of the Monroe Doctrine, on the ground that it was not mentioned in the
treaty."214

Summary

of

Style

In his address of June 9, 1919, Williams' stylistic strengths
in terms of clearness were his thorough understanding and knowledge of
the ideas involved in the debate and the clarity of his choice of words.
He used more simple sentences than in previous addresses, but still relied
heavily upon compound, complex, and compound-complex sentences.

He was

especially clear in his definition of the term, "sovereignty," and in
his illustration concerning the men who had died in battle.

His greatest

shortcoming, in terms of clarity, was his lack of good speech organiza
tion.

His listeners probably had difficulty in following the development

of his discourse.

This along with his excessive elaborations probably out

weighed the positive aspects which contributed to his clarity.
213

Ibid., 792.

214Ibid., 796.
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In terms of impressiveness, Williams’ greatest strength lay in
his use of ethical proof.

He portrayed himself as a disciple of peace,

while depicting Wilson's opponents as proponents of war.

Williams' use

of imagery and tropes probably implemented the impressiveness of his
style.
The complexity of his sentences, however, detracted from his
impressiveness.

His sentences were generally too long and too loose, a

shortcoming arising from the impromptu nature of the address.
Williams 1 style would have been more effective in influencing
his "target group" had he organized the material more carefully and had
he used obvious transitional material to keep the organization before
his listeners.

Additionally, he talked too long and in too much detail,

and he again failed to recognize the virtue of brevity.

Effectiveness

John Sharp Williams rose in the Senate on June 9, 1919 to
deliver his principal speech on the League of Nations at approximately
2:30 p.m.

The Washington Post reports that the Mississippian spoke for

an hour and a half "in what opposition leaders charged was a filibuster."215
91 A
Concluding shortly before 4 o'clock, 10 Williams had "lambasted the
Republicans,"217 an(j

"shouted" that "the Senator from Idaho wants no

limitations put on our government."
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^ - fyashington Post. June 10, 1919, p. 11. The Chicago Tribune
reported that Williams spoke for an hour, rather than an hour and a half.
Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 1919, p. 2.
^^Washington
^^•^C h i c a g o

Post,

Daily

21%as h i n g t o n

o p . ci t .

Tribune,

Post,

o£.

o p . ci t .

cit.
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Immediate

Surface

Response

Very little mention of Williams is made in the major newspapers
of the United States on this occasion, other than to summarize the content
of the speech.

The newspapers in Williams' home state of Mississippi,

while reporting routine Associated Press accounts of Williams' speeches
on their front pages, generally limited their editorial comments to items
of local interest.

On occasion, the Mississippi newspapers editorialized

on the League and on Wilson, but they infrequently judged the activities
of their own elected representatives.
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There were three overt responses to Williams' speaking on June 9,
1919.

First, Williams observed that Borah had referred to former Presi

dent Taft as a "walking corpse," but that Borah, if he really wanted to
become President himself, should study the opinions of the entire people
of the United States rather than that only of the Republican majority of
the Senate.

Borah replied, "The Senator from Mississippi would not want

me to take the advice of ex-President Taft as to how to become President,
would he?"

To this Williams retorted, "Well, the advice of the ex-

President as to how to become President would be very bad advice; but the
advice or the example of the Senator from Idaho as to how to be the next
President would be infinitely worse advice."

220
u

A second overt and immediate surface response to Williams' speak
ing was the interchange of remarks with Senator Reed.

Williams argued

that Reed had "had to fudge like all the world" to make it appear that
the majority of nations represented in the League of Nations were colored.
219

For example, see the editorial comment from the Jackson Daily
Clarion-Ledger, June 10, 1919, p. 4., Supra., p. 162.
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Delayed Response
The Williams Papers are filled with letters of congratulation
from the citizens of Mississippi and various other states.

The letters

represent the opinions of individuals in all walks of life and occupations.
A few of the letters are critical, but these are exceptions rather than

i 223
the rule.
More significant are the two responses during this period of the
debate from Woodrow Wilson.

On July 25, the President wrote to Williams

that he thought the latter had been "holding up the cause in the Senate"
in an admirable way.

226.

^

On August 1, Wilson responded to the replies

that Williams had made in the Senate to the enemies of the League.

"I

am reassured whenever I find my judgment running on all fours with yours,
and you may be sure I approve of these replies and rejoice in the spirit
of them."225
There were significant newspaper responses to the idea of the
League itself during this period, although, in most of them, Williams was
not specifically mentioned.

For instance, the San Francisco Chronicle

observed that "we could get on very nicely with a league.
keep the world's peace we shall never disturb

22 f\

If it can

Other newspapers

which editorially supported the League during the Unofficial Covenant

2 2 3 ^ ese letters are found in the General Correspondence of the
Williams Papers, Boxes 45 and 46.
^ ^ L e t t e r of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, July 25,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.
^ ^ L e t t e r of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, August 1,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.
226'The League of Nations," (editorial), San Francisco Chronicle,
June 13, 1919, p. 22.
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Debate were the Sit. Louis Post-Dispatch.
the Atlanta Constitution.
the Memphis Commercial Appeal. t h e Baltimore Sun. ^ 0 the Chicago Daily
9 31
News.
and, of course, the New York Times continued its support of the
League, Wilson, and of Williams, the

latter of whom it had editorialized

We say that Senator Williams sees . . . ineptitude and vascillation in the Senate . . . because his keen and vigorous intellect
cannot miss them.
It is not Mr. Williams alone, among these
110,000,000 people, who is "disgusted with the whole political
situation." At any rate, his conscience is clear; he has kept
unswervingly to one course, and his voice has always been strong
and clear for sturdy and straightforward dealing with these
problems
The previously anti-League New York Tribune modified its stand
on the League with the publication in the nation's newspapers of the u n 
official version of the Covenant.
The Tribune notes that "a basis for solid judgment seems maturing.
This judgment promises to be, first, that there is enough good
in the Covenant to warrant its general acceptance, and second,
enough weight in the criticisms lodged against it to require its
qualification when accepted. The conclusion naturally follows
that there should be ratification, but ratification with reserva
tions . ^
227

"The Knox Farce," (editorial), S_t. Louis Post-Dispatch. June
11, 1919, p. 26.
228uTainted by Politics," (editorial), Atlanta Constitution,
June 10, 1919, p. 8, and "The Senate Vendetta," (editorial), ibid.,
June 11, 1919, p. 8,
229"Our silly Senate," (editorial), Memphis Commercial Appeal,
June 10, 1919, p. 6.
230

"A Resolution in Favor of Chaos," (editorial), Baltimore
Sun, June 12, 1919, p. 8.
231

"World Demands a League," (editorial), Chicago Daily News,
June 14, 1919, p. 6.
^■^"What Senator Williams Sees," (editorial), New York Times,
December 16, 1918, p. 12.
233"£atification With Reservations," (editorial), New York
Tribune, June 10, 1919, p. 10.
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The Washington Post, however, remained a steadfast opponent
of the League, contending that the League would be stronger than the
United States and thereby force the United States to give up sovereignty
The Christian Science Monitor summarized press reaction to the
League of Nations during the Senate's debate on the unofficial covenant.
So far, then, as American press comment is any indication, public
sentiment on the western side of the ocean looks upon the recent
Senate performance somewhat as a parent looks upon a child play
ing with fire, tolerating while deprecating thes rash experimenta
tion, but on the watch all the while lest anything of real value
be damaged. 5
The delayed responses to Williams' address of June 9, 1919, then
came in the form of letters from his constituents and from the general
public, most of which were complimentary.

Secondly, and more signifi

cantly, Woodrow Wilson expressed his approval of Williams' efforts to
uphold the League's cause in the Senate.

Finally, while there were no

specific newspaper responses to Williams as such, the majority of
American newspapers supported the ideas he espoused in his addresses.

Readability

As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams again labored
his points unnecessarily and, with an average sentence length of fortytwo words, probably did not appeal to the general readers of the Con
gressional Record.

Technical

Perfection

Although clearer organizationally than the speech of December 3,
234"The Fundamental Question," (editorial), Washington Post.
June 13, 1919, p. 6.
235"Editorial Estimates of the Senate," (editorial), Christian
Science Monitor, July 3, 1919, p. 22.
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the address of June 9 was not a model of technical perfection in any
respect.
Again,

Williams' greatest strength was his use of ethical proof.
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CHAPTER V

THE FIRST COVENANT DEBATE, JULY 10-NOVEMBER 19, 1919
The occasions during the first covenant debate on which Williams
spoke, the audiences he faced on these occasions, and a detailed analy
sis of his address of August 12, 1919, are topics of concern to the
student of Williams' speaking during this period.

The Occasion
Having sailed from Paris on July 1, 1919, Wilson laid the Treaty
before the Senate on July 10.

In his accompanying address, as he pre

sented the Treaty to the Senate, .he reviewed our basis for entry into
the war, the difficulties of the peace conference, and the part which he
felt the United States should play.

The President concluded that:

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed.
It has come about
by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us
into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with
lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision.
It was of
this that we dreamed at our birth. Armenia shall in truth show
the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.*
Senatorial responses to this address ranged from Brandegee's
caustic description, "soap bubbles of oratory and souffle of phrases."^
to John Sharp Williams' observation that

*Ray Stannard Baker and Wm. E. Dodd, editors, The Public Papers
of Woodrow Wilson. I (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1927),
pp. 551-552.
o
^Fleming, o£. cit., p. 237.
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I think that in breadth of vision, in height of humanitarianism,
in fundamental world statesmanship and delicacy of dove-tailed
English the address is the greatest thing that the President
has ever uttered, and when I say that, that means the greatest
thing ever uttered by any President of the United States since
Lincoln died. His words are a fitting close to his magnificent,
unselfish, and, upon the whole, effective work at Paris as a
member of the Peace Conference.^
With the official version of the Treaty finally in their hands,
the Senators could now earnestly begin their discussion and diversionary
4
tactics.
Williams spoke on ten occasions during this phase of the debate:
July 15, 24, and 28; August 12, September 11, 26, and 29; October 2, and
16, and November 10.

Speech of July 1 5 .
The treaty at last in his hands on July 10, Lodge dared not risk
an immediate vote.

As chairman of the all-powerful Committee on Foreign

Relations, he could delay the vote as long as necessary to kill the
Treaty.

First among his stable of stratagems was an oral reading of the

Treaty, line by line, in the meetings of the Committee.
While Lodge was engaged in reading the Treaty, a task which
usually found him alone or with a clefk in the committee room,"* Senator
Swanson, on July 14, gave the opening speech on the official Treaty.^

A

League advocate, Swanson stressed the deterrent power of Article 10 and

% e w York Times, July 11, 1919, p. 1.
^Fleming, The United States and the League, op. cit., p. 237.
5Ibid., pp. 294-295.

£

°This would normally have been the opening speech, but the Senate,
of course, had been debating the Treaty since the preceding December.
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its defensive value.

The authority of Article 10, however, was moral

rather than legal.^
On July 15 Senator Norris stated his principal objection to the
O
Treaty, the Shantung settlement.

Lodge introduced a resolution inquirg

ing whether Japan and Germany had signed a treaty during the war.
Hitchcock resented Lodge's assertion that the Treaty contained a gift
to Japan of 36,000,000 Chinese.

Norris, Lodge, and Fall quickly attacked

the Democratic leader in r e t u r n . ^
John Sharp Williams rose to speak in defense of the Treaty, in
cluding the Shantung provision.

He argued, first, that Shantung had

been a necessary compromise on Wilson's part.

"I do not approve of the

Shantung proviso in the treaty, and I will venture to say that the Presi
dent of the United States did n o t . " H

Williams further contended that

anyone in the Senate, had he been a member of the commission, would have
regarded the Shantung proviso as a "rock wall too high to climb and too
thick to butt through,"

12

and would have acted as Wilson had acted.

could not have everything our own way," maintained the Mississippian.
A friend wrote me the other day about this question. I told him
he reminded me a little of one of my daughters once. She had
straight hair, -and another of the little girls had curly hair.
The little straight-haired one was a little envious of the curlyhaired one. One day the curly-haired girl was complaining of

^U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 2532-42.
8Ibid., 2591.
9Ibid., 2597.
10Ibid., 2603-8.
11Ibid., 2609.

12Ibid.

"We
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some hardship of some sort, fancied, of course, and the other
one turned to her and said, "Well, you can't have everything
and curly hair."^
Williams argued that Japan would not give up Shantung except by
war.

"Do we want our boys sent to Asia to whip Japan out of Shantung,

when there are 400,000,000 of Chinamen who ought to do their own fighting
in their own cause?

He believed that Japan intended to keep her agree

ment under the Treaty,
I believe Japan is going to keep faith. If I had any suspicion
to the contrary, I would not utter it now. If I had an agree
ment with the Senator from North Carolina, or if there were an
agreement between him and the Senator from Colorado, a sacred
agreement, and I even suspected that one or the other might not
keep it, I would keep my mouth shut until I found out whether he
was going to do it or not, unless I wanted to be insulting. The
Senate does not want to insult friendly p o w e r s . ^
To Williams' expression of confidence in Japan, Borah replied
that
We do not anticipate war with Japan; but one thing the American
people will never submit to when the facts are known--they will
never remain a party to a treaty which has the effect of
oppressing millions upon millions of people. We may not draw
out now; but when the facts are revealed from time to time, as
the debate and consideration goes on, as it will go on for
weeks and months, when the true import of this transaction is
known, the American people will refuse to break up and dis
member the Chinese nation. I say, therefore, Hr. President,
while I do not anticipate and certainly do not want trouble
with Japan, we will still have the courage to do the honorable
thing.
An exchange between Williams and Borah followed in which the two Senators
attempted to define the means of withdrawal from the League once it had

13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15

Ibid.

16Ibid., 2612.
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been joined.

Williams became sarcastic in response to Borah's question

ing and read in full an account by Clark McAdams of the St^. Louis Post
Dispatch of what would happen if the Senate were to debate "Now I Lay Me
Down to Sleep."

A brief interchange of remarks between Williams and Fall

followed in which the senator from Utah attempted to improve upon the
former's sarcasm.

Borah, however, dismissed the entire interchange with

the observation that "I am very fond of the Senator from Mississippi, but
I think his taste for poetry is perfectly rotten.

Speech of July 24
On July 24 the subject of the treaty between the United States
and France, which guaranteed the temporary protection of the latter by
the former in case of unprovoked aggression by Germany came before the
Senate.

Brandegee criticized Wilson for not laying this treaty before

the Senate along with the Treaty of Versailles.

Brandegee argued that

the President could present the French treaty to the Senate either in
person or by sending a representative either of whom
will always be polite and courteously and gladly received; but
having tried his case before the jury, before the Senate, as
his equal copartner in the treaty-making power, now he sends
for the individual jurymen and wants to argue with each one of
them separately
In replying to this, Williams rebuked Brandegee for comparing
the Senate to a jury hearing a case.
Of course, he knows that the Senate is no jury. What was his
object in using that phrase, and then saying that the Presi
dent was talking to "the individual members of the jury" after
the case had been heard ? He knew that the assumption that the

•^Ibid., 2616.
18Ibid., 3077.
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Senate is a jury is unfounded in fact. His object was simply
to leave an impression or to insinuate an impression that the
President had been guilty of doing something highly improper
and sinister, as would have been the case with a lawyer who
argued a case before a jury and then had gone into the jury
room or somewhere else and talked to individual jurors about
the case. A lawyer who would have done that ought to have been
disbarred.^
Williams noted that Brandegee had been careful to make no outright asser
tions, but had implied the analogy for the specific purpose of casting
doubt upon Wilson's constitutional prerogative of seeking the advice and
consent of the Senate in making treaties.

In support of his contention

that the President was acting within his rights to consult with indivi
dual senators, Williams cited the examples of Jefferson's having con
sulted Randolph and others about the treaty with France for the
acquisition of Louisiana and of McKinley's having consulted with senators
concerning the ratification of the Spanish-American treaty annexing the
Philippines.
Employing another analogy, the Mississippian contended that, just
as there was nothing the lamb of Aesop's fable could have said that
would have satisfied the wolf whose real purpose was to eat the lamb,
there was similarly nothing that Wilson could say or do to satisfy sena
tors who were intent upon "eating him up" politically.
Finally, Williams argued that it had been expedient for Wilson to
submit, first, the Treaty of Versailles and at some later time the treaty
with France.

This procedure, said Williams, would allow the Senate to

concentrate upon the more important of the two treaties and would avoid
boring the Senate in a speech so long that the country would not have

19Ibid., 3080.
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read it.

Regardless of whether the President laid both treaties before

the Senate within the same day, the same week, or the same month, both
would be before the Senate at the same time.

This procedure would then

have met the "common sense" requirements of Article 4 of the FrenchAmerican Treaty.
The present treaty will be before ratification submitted to the
French Chambers for approval.
It will be submitted to the
Senate of the United States at the same time the treaty of
Versailles will be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and
on
consent to ratification. u

Speech of July 28
On July 28, Williams again responded to the criticism that had
been leveled against Wilson by Brandegee, Lodge, and Borah.

First, he

accused Brandegee of having pretended to deliver an impromptu attack
upon Wilson's failure to lay before the plan the "impromptu" rebuke.

21

Brandegee and Lodge had both said that the Franco-American Treaty,
to the best of their knowledge, had not been published in the United
States until it appeared in Harvey1s Weekly, the publication from which
Brandegee had read the Treaty into the Congressional Record on July 24,
continued Williams.
Wonder of wondersi
This great editor of a great weekly is
quoted to the effect that to "the best of their knowledge"
this treaty had not been published in the United States at the
date of his editorial.
Yet it was carried in full by the Associated Press on July 3,
and publication of an agreement thought to have been negotiated
between us and France was published as Paris news prior to
that,22

20Ibid., 3077.
2-^Ibid.
22Ibid., 3231.
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The New York evening newspapers, continued Williams, had printed the
treaty on July 3 and the morning newspapers had printed it on July 4.

The

conclusion which must be drawn from all this, he said, was simply that
the Republicans were attempting to make a partisan issue of the FrancoAmerican Treaty.
Williams' second contention was that the League of Nations would
not destroy the sovereignty of the United States as its critics claimed.
In its support he cited several analogies, which included the Senate
itself as ninety-six men who had not lost their sovereignty, the thirteen
colonies which did not lose their sovereignty, and a definition of civi
lized society itself, which imposes limitations without loss of sovereignty.
The only instance in which the other nations would unanimously turn against
the United States, Williams continued, would be when it was "plainly and
palpably and obviously wrong,"

oo

Finally, Williams stated another objection which had been advanced
against United States' participation in a league of nations:
cannot change human nature.

that you

He began his refutation of this objection by
o/

exclaiming, "What a stupid, barbarous utterance that is!"

In developing

this thought, Williams stated his most powerful analogy contained in the
speech.

He quoted the opposition as having maintained that war and fight

ing were an essential part of human nature and that difficulties could not
be settled in any other way.
Can you not? The Senator from Montana described today how they
quit settling difficulties that way and began to settle them in
other ways out in the mining camps in Montana. They proceeded

23Ibid., 3234,
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to settle them first by self-appointed vigilance committees
and then by regularly organized courts. What had happened?
They had changed the human nature of the camp, and the human
nature that was not willing to be changed was kicked out of the
camp; and every nation upon this globe that is not willing to
change its human nature far enough to leave questions in con
troversy to fair arbitral determination, instead of going
around and cutting one another's throats by way of settlement,
will be kicked out of the civilized arena, and ought to be
kicked to death. What will happen to them will be what
happened in the mining camps'. The persistent criminals who
did not want to "surrender their sovereignty" were lynched,
The fellow that did not accept the new order and was not
willing to change his nature that far was just simply carried
out and hung to the limb of a tree.2^
Williams concluded by saying that he hoped the day would never
come when God would curse him for failing to help humanity because he had
seen specks on the sun.

Speech of August 12
On August 12 Senator Lodge delivered his first prepared attack
after Wilson's formal submission of the Treaty.

Lodge introduced his two

hour presentation with the preamble of the covenant itself, after which
he added, "Brave words, indeed.'"

They do not differ essentially from

the preamble of the Treaty of Paris, from which sprang the Holy
Alliance."2®
Article 3, Lodge contended actually gave the League the right to
interfere in the internal conflicts of its members.

By the terms of

Article 3, which allowed the Assembly of the League to "deal with" any
matter affecting the peace of the world, the League could conceivably
order American troops anywhere in the world, to intercede in revolutionary
movements or internal conflicts of any magnitude.

25Ibid.
26Ibid., 3778.
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Lodge further denied the existence of a difference between a
legal and a moral obligation in connection with Article 10.

As a signa

tory, the United States might well be obligated to help Japan defeat
China in Shantung or send American troops to Arabia to assist King Hussein
of Hedjaz in his struggle with the Bedouins.

In short, we would fulfill

both the letter and the spirit of the Covenant or face international
dishonor.
Lodge contended that American troops and ships might be ordered
to any part of the world by nations other than the United States.

He

urged that it be made perfectly clear that not even a corporal's guard
could ever be ordered anywhere except by constitutional authorities of
the United States.
Fervently asserting his plea for America first, Lodge concluded
the address with the observations that
We would not have our politics distracted and embittered by the
dissentions of other lands. We would not have our country's
vigor exhausted, or her moral force abated, by everlasting
meddling and muddling in every quarrel great and small, which
afflicts the world. Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and
better and finer, because in this way alone, as we believe, can
she be of the greatest service to the world's peace and to the
welfare of mankind. ^
Lodge had arranged for Senate adjournment until 2 p.m., the hour
when his speech began.

Although it is impossible to determine the number

of senators present on the floor at any given time following roll call,
it is likely that more than the usual number of colleagues were present.
The galleries were filled with women's organizations and veteran
marines from Chateau Thierry who had paraded in Washington at noon.
New York Times reports that

27Ibid., 3784.
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As Mr. Lodge ended his speech, Senators on the Republican side
went forward to shake his hand, while the galleries rang with
applause. The cheers that went up from the Marines could be
heard throughout the corridors of the Capitol.
It sounded very
much like the roar that breaks loose at a ball park when the
home team wins the game in the ninth inning. Nothing like it
has been heard in all the debate on the League, or, for that
matter, in any debate running back for years. 8
As the uproar subsided, John Sharp Williams arose and caustically
declared
Mr. President, I hesitate very much to undertake to reply extem
poraneously and in a few minutes to the greatest possible
prepared presentation of the selfishness of American policy ever
made even by the Senator from Massachusetts. I would have to
have more egotism than even I have if I thought I could answer
fully "off the bat" the things the Senator.from Massachusetts
has been cogitating and laboriously studying to express for three
weeks, more or less, with a view to capturing the Senate and the
galleries whose occupants have come by announcement to hear him
today. It is not a new presentation of the personality of the
Senator from Massachusetts. He has always attempted to make a
show of himself
The New York Times notes that at this point the occupants of the galler
ies "hissed."

Vice-president Marshall warned the audience to observe

the rules of the Senate against such outbursts and added that "they
ought to be ashamed of themselves."^
Following Marshall's rebuke, Williams accused Lodge of having
named himself as "about the only man devoted to Americanism and devoted
to the United States."

To Lodge's contention that we must render service

to the world of our own free will, Williams replied that "we are too
indissolubly connected with one another for that."
The Mississippian protested further that no nation could render

^ New York Times, August 13, 1919, p. 3.
S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3784-85.
30Ibid., 3785.
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service of its own free will, because each nation is bound and respon
sible to every other nation through traditions, history, religion, law,
literature, and commerce.
Williams maintained, second, that Lodge, in his "crossing of 't's
and dotting of'i's," had neglected one of the "weightier matters of the
law," that of peace among the nations of the world.
A third Lodge contention which Williams attacked was that all the
brave attempts at world peace in the past had failed and that the League
would be no exception.

To this Williams replied that past attempts had

failed because "the world had not then reached the state of civilization
where the receptiveness of the world could meet the initiative of the
OI

dreamer."

Williams pointed out the fallacy in Lodge's analogy that,

since the Holy Alliance had failed, the League of Nations would fail.
The important difference which outweighed the similarities of the two
organizations, according to Williams, was that the Holy Alliance, unlike
the League of Nations, was an organization of autocrats seeking to
perpetuate autocratic power.
Williams' fourth reply was to Lodge's contention that the United
States' entrance into the League would mean a surrender of nationalism.
"Where does this narrow chauvinism come from?" inquired the Mississippian.
"It comes from original tribal relations, and the world is past that."
He declared that the real question before the American people was not the
amendment of specific articles of the Covenant, which he equated with
more crossing "t's" and dotting "i's."
was:

The real question, in his words,

"Take it all in all, as a measure for the advancement of civilization

-^Ibid.
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and peace and humanity and justice, does it meet with your approval or
does it not?"-^
A fifth objection raised by Williams was that Lodge had not
really touched on the question of the peace of the world.
Even more objectionable than this to Williams was Lodge's narrow
partisanship in coming before the Senate
. . . with a typewritten presentation, carefully prepared for
three weeks or more, with the idea of appealing to the galler
ies --beforehand invited to come--even more than to the Senate,
an appeal to the galleries thus invited not in the interest of
peace, not in the interest of humanity, not in the interest of
the mothers of children, not in the interests of the sweet
hearts of young men, but in the interest of narrow chauvinistic
policy, which shall be mainly tortured here at home for the
purpose of securing Republican partisan success.^
To Lodge's contention that the United States might be controlled
by the League, Williams retorted that the only possibility of our being
controlled by the League would be in the event that we were unanimously
opposed by its members on an issue.

In this event, the other nations

would be right and we should be "palpably and plainly and obviously
wrong."
Lodge had further contended that the phrase of the covenant which
had cited any war or threat of war as a matter of universal concern would
involve us in unnecessary conflicts.

Williams pointed out that such

matters would be brought before the League for investigation and recom
mendations.

These recommendations, Williams' maintained, would not be

"orders" or "mandates" as Lodge had claimed.

Contrary to Lodge's state

ments, the League simply did not specify that all the powers had a "right"

33Ibid., 3786.

to "call out" American armed forces.

This had been a false accusation

on the part of the Massachusetts senator and had been made only to
"tickle the ears of the groundlings, although it made the judicious to
grieve."34

Not only was the League incapable of involving any of its

signatories in conflict, but the organization would be weaker than the
original confederacy of the thirteen American colonies, an organization
similarly powerless to "summon a single soldier," or "levy a single
dollar of taxes,"
Far from making "slaves" of us, as Lodge had contended, the
League could operate in important matters only with the unanimous vote
of the council, an organization which would include the ambassador from
the United States.

Williams posed his refutatory question, "in ordinary,

plain, Mississippi planter's common sense, leaving out finesse, leaving
out 'possibilities,1 and all that.

Can you imagine a case with which we

could be confronted where the whole world except ourselves would be
O C

against us unless we were wrong?" J
Lodge had argued that the League would force the United States to
admit immigrants of all nationalities.

Williams replied that

There is not a word in all this treaty that undertakes to decide
what men shall enter into the United States or what goods shall
enter in. On the contrary, by omission in the first place and
by direct expression to the contrary in the second place, all
consideration of questions of that sort is excluded from the
jurisdiction of the League.3^
Lodge had also argued that the League would not advance the cause
of world peace.

Williams replied that, although the threat of force was

34Ibid.
35Ibid., 3787.
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behind the League, that it, like the Monroe Doctrine, was intended pri
marily as an instrument to keep the peace.

Only in the event that a law

less nation, after submission to arbitration, had refused to abide by the
arbitual decision could there be the use of force.
Lodge had suggested that "misery and suffering" would follow
economic pressure upon nations to make them keep the peace.

Williams

maintained that embargos would be enforced only to make nations "keep
their plighted word."

The misery and suffering which such nations might

experience, could not compare with our own misery and suffering just ex
perienced in the World War.
the avoidance of war.

The purpose of threatened embargos would be

Lodge, Williams observed, seemed to have no indig-

nation against war because "he has never felt it."

37

Williams dismissed Lodge's objection to the League's "unconstitu
tionality" with the observation that the Supreme Court would pass judg
ment on the League just as on any other law.

Williams additionally

maintained that we could no longer afford to be "disinterested" as Lodge
urged, and that "Americanism" meant not merely defense of isolationism,
but "now and then of indignation and offense against the powers of unrightOQ

eousness and wrong. . ."JO
In asking us "not to forget the millions of people of foreign
birth and derivation in the United States" that perhaps we cannot tie to
ourselves nor to the American Republic, Lodge had really be concerned with
avoiding offense to the "hyphenates."
political and party appeal.

37Ibid.
38Ibid.

This appeal Williams labeled a
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Lodge had said that we were under no obligation to anyone except
France in our Revolution.

Williams retorted that we were under obligation

"to every man who went in and came out without an arm or a leg, whether a
Belgian, a Frenchman, or a Briton."39
isolation of 1914, because " . . .

We could not go back to the original

isolation as a fact has ceased to exist,

as you must admit that it has."
The Monroe Doctrine, Williams concluded, had become an "interna
tional understanding," just as the proposed League would be.

Nobody could

be the sole judge of his own case under the proposed League.

Williams

ended his. impromptu statement with the assurance, however, that " . . .

they

can not decide against us except by unanimous vote."4®

Speech of September 11
On September 11, Williams again attacked the Lodge amendments to
the Covenant.

His attack was aimed directly at the report from the

Committee on Foreign Relations, which Lodge had authored.

Williams

accused Lodge of dishonesty in attempting to kill the Treaty indirectly
through amendments which would render it innocuous.
Indirectly Williams denounced Lodge's nationalistic pride and
desire for isolation.
Patriotism! Yes, the grandest feeling in the world, pride in
the Government and pride in the flag for all that it emblemises.
But when you begin to make a thing to worship of that flag in
itself as a representative merely of our force and will, regard
less of right and justice, then you have not only disgraced
yourself but you have disgraced the flag; you have hauled it
down from its high place in the world and you have dragged it in
the slime of chauvinism.
39Ibid., 3788.
40Ibid., 3789.
41Ibid., 5232.
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After reasserting his own patriotism and declaring that his view
went beyond the country's borders, Williams had inserted into the Con
gressional Record an editorial from the New York World entitled "Lodge's
Prussian Report."42

Following this, Williams accused Lodge of attempting

indirectly to defeat the League by attaching amendments which would be
unacceptable to the other signatories.
Williams stated his thesis in the form of a disjunct.

"Adopt this

league of nations for peace or go back to the condition before this world
tragedy."

If the latter condition were fulfilled, Williams prophesied,

then all succeeding generations would live under a "cloud of interna
tional suspicion, fear, and hate, while every nation went armed, not
because it wanted to fight, but because of abject fear that some other
/Q
nation did want to fight and might at any moment call upon her to do so."

Speech of September 26
On September 26, Williams accused Senator Johnson of returning
to his home state of California "to mend political fences."44

Johnson

replied that he was going to many states to speak against the Covenant.
Williams and Johnson also debated the relative strength of Great
Britain as a member of the League.

Johnson maintained that Great Britain

would have six times the representation of the United States because of
the commonwealth countries.

Williams replied that the commonwealth coun-

tries would vote independently of the mother country.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., 5235.
44Ibid., 5970.
43Ibid., 5973.
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Pursuing still a third thesis, Williams defended Wilson from a
charge of " 'misrepresentation* or of something else" made "the other day"
by a senator whom Williams failed to identify,

Williams contended that

Wilson "stands high in the estimation of the American people because of
his honesty of soul and of intellect, because of his high idealism,
because of his lofty thought, because of his capacity for clear expression,
because of his patriotism, and above all because of his Americanism."4*’
Finally, Williams argued that the League Covenant would be easier
to amend than the United States Constitution, which had been adopted
with its defects.

The League Covenant could similarly be adopted and

later corrected as the United States Constitution had been by the first
ten amendments.

The Treaty, then,would not have to be sent back to the

Paris Conference and resubmitted to Germany.
Williams closed his impromptu remarks with a plea for idealism.
Idealism, in the long run, wins, because behind it is "the
divinity that shapes our ends, roughhew them as we may." In
the long run God's purpose is accomplished, and that is always
idealism and the thing which prophets have foretold and which
poets have sung and which Christ, the Prince of Peace, preached,
will come some time or other, whether practical politicians in
their miserable littleness and vanity cynically grin at it or
not.47

Speech of September 29
On September 29 Borah, in a lengthy speech, warned against the
forces seeking to undermine the honored traditions of Americanism as
enunciated by Washington and Lincoln.

46Ibid., 5974.
47Ibid., 5975.

Among the evil forces whom Borah
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listed were men who sent bombs through the mails and the League to E n 
force Peace, which sought to destroy traditions by ridiculing them.
Williams eventually interrupted Borah and ridiculed his speech
as far-fetched and irrelevant.
Mr. President, it would be strange, indeed, if I had not
enjoyed and appreciated some of the oratorical flights of the
Senator from Idaho. It would be much stranger if, possessing
ordinary common sense, I did not desire to bring him down
from those empyrean heights to some consideration of facts.
Williams further remarked that anyone other than Borah, attempting to
connect the League with "Negro lynchings, capitalistic insolent utter
ances, and with the proletariat tyranny of labor in America,1,49 would
have met with laughter from both the floor and the galleries.
Williams' first contention in refutation of Borah's arguments
was that America cannot stand alone as Borah had suggested.

He observed

that while the German Junkers had sung a song similar to "America Over
All," they had never sung anything like "America

Standing Alone."

Second, Williams contended that Borah had misinterpreted the
beliefs of Washington and Jefferson.

The essential goal of men in the

present century, as well as of men in Washington's time, is that of "a
just and enduring peace."

Washington's and Jefferson's policies of

isolation had been the best means at the time for securing this goal.

In

view of changed world conditions, however, this means could no longer be
effective.
Third, Williams argued that Wilson was working for the same goal
as that of Washington and Jefferson, but with a means in keeping with the
times--the League of Nations.
48Ibid., 6080.
49Ibid.
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Williams concluded with an appeal to his colleagues to take
decisive action on the League issue.
If you want to kill the league and the treaty, kill it; if you
want to bludgeon it, bludgeon it. Come to the issue as quickly
as you can and be done with it, only do not poison the life out
of it. If you are not willing to make this attempt for a just
and enduring peace for the entire world, just say s o . ^

Speech of October 2
On October 2 the Fall amendments were voted upon and rejected.
The speeches on these amendments were limited to five minutes for each
senator.
Williams spoke following Lodge and briefly replied to Lodge's
arguments.

The Mississippian maintained that Lodge's position had been

inconsistent.

Williams said that Lodge had first urged that an announce

ment be made "if the world wants America at any time in the cause of
independence and peace of small nations or the liberty of the world, she
can have her."-^

Williams further accused Lodge of announcing, "in the

next breath," that when he now has the opportunity to make good that
statement, he declines.
A second inconsistency in Lodge's position was his declaration
that we do not want to fix boundaries in Europe.

To this Williams

replied
Well, we have already fixed them. Everybody in America wants
to recognize the independence from Turkey of Palestine and
Armenia and Thrace, and from Austria-Hungary of Czechoslovakia
and Jugoslavia, and the independence from all three of the
great autocratic powers of Poland. Then the Senator [Lodge]

5°Ibid., 6083.
51Ibid., 6266.

tells us that after we have already done all that, we must have
nothing to do with these boundaries I
Williams pointed out that none of the proposed amendments would change
the treaty's establishment of the boundaries.

"They simply say that we,

having helped fix them, shall have nothing to do with securing t h e m . " ^
In addition to pointing out these inconsistencies in Lodge's
speech, Williams attacked Brandegee's statement that we ought "to stand
out from under" the Treaty to avoid being kept in Europe a few years to
insure the terms and boundaries set by the Treaty.

To this Williams

replied that it would be inconsistent for the United States not to finish
what it had started.

"Standing out from under" Williams implied, would

amount to not keeping our word.
Williams concluded his five minute speech with a biblical allu
sion.

"Am I my brothers keeper?"

Cain Inquired; and God replied

substantially, "Yes; to some extent you are."
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Speech of October 16
The most interesting of all of Williams 1 appearances in the
Senate was that of October 16, 1919, when he spoke against the IrishAmericans.

The Chicago Daily Tribune reports that

Senator Williams began by moving over to the Republican side
of the chamber and flourishing a copy of the resolution recently
adopted by the confederate veterans indorsing the league of
nations. He then delivered a glowing eulogy upon the confederate
veterans, assailed the Johnson amendment, giving the United
States as many votes in the league as the British empire, as "a
Sinn Fein proposition."

52Ibid., 6267.
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Then he recalled that some one had recently given the Irish
credit for defeating the south in the civil war.
"As a matter of fact," he said, "the Irish never whipped the
south at all. They could not whip the south in one country.
It is a part of the braggart nature of the Irish.
I am tired
of this vanity and nonsense. I do not care how many Irish vote
the Democratic ticket."
At this juncture Senator Hitchcock, in alarm, moved over to the
Republican side also, and taking a seat beside the Mississippi
senator, tried to persuade him to desist. His efforts were
futile. Mr. Williams continued:
"I am tired of this whole
Irish pretense. They never won the war of the revolution and
they contend they did. I am tired of this eternal lie. I am
tired of the intimidation that I have received at m y office for
three or four months, most of the letters signed anonymously. A
great number of them are signed with a 'Mac' or an '0.' Among
other things I have received threats of assassination.
"If they think I am afraid of one of them, or a hundred of them,
they are mistaken. I understand their game.
It is that the
Democratic party dares not defy the Irish vote. As I understand
the situation, the Democratic party is not defying anybody.
"We have finally reached the point where no man can be a real
American unless he is an Irish-American or a German-American,
or some other sort of a hyphenated American."
Senator Phelan, himself of Irish blood, was on his feet in an
instant, fairly boiling with rage at Senator Williams' remarks.
Senator Brandegee of Connecticut had the floor, however, and
Senator Phelan had to reply to Senator Williams in the form of an
interrogatory.
"I would like to ask the senator if he thinks it perfectly fair
for a senator to leave this sideof the chamber and, taking his
place on the other side, make a speech which, in the eyes of
strangers looking down upon this body, might be attributed to a
member of the Republican party?" Senator Phelan asked.
Loud laughter broke out in the senate and in the galleries, and
the vice-president ordered the doorkeepers to eject those who
laughed.
No ejections took place, however, and Senator Phelan continued.
"I desire further to ask this question, if the senator would
consider it opprobrious for the managers of the Dublin horse
show, to post upon the gates of the inclosure, during the inter
mission between the races, that 'these gates are closed in order
to prevent the escape of welshers?'
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"Or would the senator think that in making a comparison between
the Irish in battle and the Irish in peace, that the south,
having accepted the situation and yielded to superior forces,
should also record such conduct on the part of the Irish who
fight, but never surrender?
"The fact is that the south, after a valiant struggle, gave way
because there was no moral force behind their cause. They were
fighting for slavery, whereas the Irish always fight for
freedom.
"I recommend to the senator from Mississippi that he go and live
in Ireland, because as was said by a Chinese mandarin who had
observed that he would rather live in Ireland than in any other
land, explain that 'it is the only country in which the Irish
have nothing to say.'"
Senator Gerry also praised the patriotism of the Irish.^
The New York Times, on the other hand, observed only parenthetically that
Williams had spoken from the wrong side of the Senate.
Senator Williams, who spoke from the Republican side of the
Chamber, asserted that the Sinn Feiners might take a lesson
from the veterans of the Confederacy who, when the war was over,
did not keep it up by shooting at the Yankees "from behind
trees ."56
The Times, however, included more of the content of the harangue.
The New York Tribune referred to Williams' speech as the "sensa
tion

of the

day."-^

Only the anti-League Chicago Daily Tribune featured

the story on its front page, appropriately headlined, "Williams Rips
Irish From 'I' to 'H' in Senate."
The New York Times and the New York Tribune corroborate all the
details

presented by

the Chicago Daily Tribune.

Williams did speak from

the Republican side of the Senate Chamber, Hitchcock did attempt to

•^Chicago Daily Tribune, October 17, 1919, p. 1.
~*^New York Times. October 17, 1919, p. 10.
~^New York Tribune. October 17, 1919, p. 2.
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restrain him, and Phelan and Gerry, both League advocates, did angrily
reply to the Mississippian.

Williams deleted from the Congressional

Record his harshest remarks, including the reference to the threats of
assassination which had come to him in the mail from Irish-Americans.
The following day Williams sent a note of apology to Senator
Phelan.
I am afraid I said some things in my speech yesterday calculated
to hurt your feelings and the feelings of some other good
friends of mine of Irish derivation. I am awfully sorry for
it. I kept my speech out of the Record with a view of revising
it, and shall revise out of it what C QI think could be offensive
to anybody, personally or racially.°
A week later Williams clarified his revision of his remarks in
a letter to his friend, W. D. Vandiver, a U. S. Subtreasury official in
St. Louis.

It is evident that the newspapers had been correct in

quoting Williams' reference to threats upon his life.

Williams himself

corroborates the thesis that this was part of the speech which he struck
from the Congressional Record.
I was not drunk when I made the speech but I did have a drink
or two and there were some things I said that I thought I
ought not to have said and I struck them out of the Record,-that part about threatening letters.
I was in a bad humor when
I made the speech or I would have confined the speech to the Sinn
Feiners and I would have given the fgjjts about the Irish pretense
in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.
Aside from his attack upon the Irish-Americans, Williams argued
on October 16, that the Shantung amendment would be defeated by the
common sense of the Senate.

He reasoned that this was true because the

■^Letter of John Sharp Williams to James D. Phelan, October 17,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
-^Letter of John Sharp Williams to W. D. Vandiver, October 25,
1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
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"average American citizen that says that he cares whether Shantung is
under Japanese or Chinese sovereignty is more or less talking through his

60
hat."ow

compare(i the excitement being aroused by the proponents of

the amendment with the agitation for American control of the Philipines
which had resulted from Dewey's conquest of Manila.

Williams thus in

directly accused the proponents of the Shantung amendment of partisanism.
Williams' prediction proved accurate when, at 5 p.m. on October
16, the amendment designed to restore the economic privileges on the
Shantung Peninsula to China was rejected by a vote of 35 to 55.
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Speech of November 10
Williams' wrath against the Irish-Americans was again aroused on
November 10, when Senator Walsh of Massachusetts discussed Article 11 of
the Covenant which provided for hearings for subject races.
If I believed, as I do believe, that the subject races of Europe
are debarred from a hearing under Article 11 of this covenant,
because it is a domestic question, I ask you what your opinion
would be of me, honestly believing that, if I sat here, an off
spring from people of a subject race, and did not cry out in
protest against the declaration made all over this country that
under article 11 there was provision made for hearings of the
differences between subject races and their oppressors?"
Williams replied that instead of an offspring from people of a
subject race, Walsh "ought to stand here as a Senator of the United
States."

The Mississippian argued further that no man could be loyal to

two countries.
Americans.
60

Only the American Indians could claim to be 100 per cent

"Every man who can take an oath of allegiance to the United

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 7006.

61Ibid., 7013.
62Ijbid., 8207.
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States 'without mental reservation,' must mean what he says."
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Williams

pointed out that he had no particular grievance toward the Irish.

On

the contrary, he had long held great admiration for Edmund Burke, Tom
Moore, and Oliver Goldsmith.

He defended his previous speech, noting

that he had not attacked the Irish race, but rather the pro-German Irish
in Ireland and the Irish in the United States who had not lived up to
their responsibilities as American citizens.
Williams concluded that he too was proud of his European ances
tors, but he demanded that American foreign relations be conducted in
terms of 100 per cent American interests.
The American Indian was the real American, you know, at the
beginning, and is yet. But when we came here and undertook this
Government, this greatest experiment of human liberty upon the
surface of the earth, we made an implicit agreement with one
another that we would consecrate and dedicate ourselves to that
purpose. We left Europe behind us when we did.®^
Lodge replied caustically in his colleague's defense that " . . .
I do not wonder that the Senator from Mississippi recoils from the words
'subject races.’ He is familiar with a subject race; he lives among
them."®-*
Williams made no further speeches during the first Covenant
debate.

The Senate attached fourteen reservations to the Treaty exactly

matching Wilson's fourteen points.

The Treaty with reservations, however,

failed to pass by a vote of 39 to 55 on November 19, 1919.

63Ibid., 8208.
®4Ibid., 8211.
65Ibid.

The Audience
The audience Williams faced in the first Covenant debate had much
in common with the audiences he had confronted previously.
opposition to the League became stronger during this period.

However, the
As in the

previous chapters, the audience section will be divided into three seg
ments, the members of the Senate, the American public, and the audience
seated in the galleries.

The Senate
Newspaper polls of senatorial preferences published subsequent
to the presentation of the treaty to the Senate indicated that the vote
in the Senate would fall short of the necessary two-thirds for approval.^
During July, therefore, Wilson interviewed Republicans whom he felt might
be most favorable to the League.

Calder, Capper, Colt, Cummins, Edge,

Kellogg, Kenyon, Keyes, Lenroot, McCumber, McLean, McNary, Nelson, New,
Newberry, Page, Spenser, Sterling, and Watson were among the group , ^
but many of these announced their determination not to concede following
the Presidential interviews.

Philander Knox, Republican of Pennsylvania,

became an Irreconcilable on July 19,^® and on July 28, Charles S. Thomas,
Democrat of Colorado, gave notice of his opposition to the treaty without
reservationsColt,

Cummins, Kellogg, Lenroot, McNary, and Spenser

^ Washington Post, July 14, 1919, pp. 1, 5 and New York Times,
July 14, 1919, p. 1.
^ New York Times, July 18, 1919, p. 1; July 19, p. 1; July 23,
p. 1; July 24, p. 1; July 26, p. 1; July 29, p. 1; July 31, p. 1; August
1, p. 1; August 2, p. 1.
^fyteshington Post, July 20, 1919, pp. 1, 9.
^ % e w York Times, July 29, 1919, p. 1.
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declared themselves in the Mild Reservationists group during the first
weeks of

August,

^

while in late August, Irreconcilables Brandegee,

Borah, Fall, Johnson, Knox, Moses, Poindexter, and Reed insisted that
eight other senators would include themselves in their g r o u p . ^
By September 15, Republican leaders could rejoice at Lodge's
estimate that forty-nine Republicans plus six Democrats supported the
Lodge reservations.

72

On the other hand, Hitchcock observed that, with

the exception of the Shantung Amendment, forty Democrats and twenty
Republicans would oppose any of the Lodge amendments
By November, 1919, the battle lines in the Senate were clearly
divided into four groups:

Irreconcilables, Strict Reservationists, Mild

Reservationists, and League supporters.

Prominent among the Irrecon

cilables, who desired outright defeat of the treaty, were Brandegee,
Borah, Johnson, Poindexter, and Reed.

This group consisted of three

Democratic and fourteen Republican senators.

The second group, the

Strict Reservationists, wanted to weaken the Treaty by attaching amend
ments and reservations.
and Knox.

These twenty-eight senators were led by Lodge

The third group, the Mild Reservationists, advocated only

interpretative reservations to the Treaty.

Prominent among this group

of ten Republican senators were Colt, Kellogg, McCumber, and McNary.
The fourth group, the League supporters, were led by Hitchcock, Williams,
Pittman, and Swanson.
70

Other strong League advocates among this group of

Ibid., August 1, 1919, p. 1; August 14, 1919, p. 1.

^ Ibid., August 27, 1919, p. 1.
72

Ibid., September 15, 1919, p. 1.

^ A c c o r d i n g to Hitchcock, only twelve Republicans would oppose
the Shantung Amendment.
Ibid., August 26, 1919, p. 1.
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thirty-eight senators were McKellar, Owen, Robinson, and Walsh of Montana.
Braden notes that "six to eight other Democrats, however, were in the
doubtful column."^

Thus, even though four-fifths of the senators

favored the treaty in one form or another, no single group alone commanded
the two-thirds of the votes necessary for ratification.

The Public
Groups Favoring the League
A.

The League to Enforce Peace.

During the months of August, September,

and October, the League to Enforce Peace continued officially to work,
largely through its newly established branch in Washington, D. C., for
ratification of the Covenant without reservations.

Under the direction

of Harry N. Rickey, the Washington branch expanded its personnel and
operations to include distribution to senators of publications of the
League, resolutions adopted at public meetings, petitions for the Treaty,
and the solicitation of money and support for the treaty in the form of
letters to senators.

7 *1

Wilson's speaking tour precluded the necessity

for further congresses and speaking campaigns on the part of the League.
Such plans were not made because League officials felt the President's
tour would be effective.
During this phase of the controversy, divisions of opinion regard
ing ratification of the treaty with or without reservations arose among
the leaders of the League.

While officially continuing to advocate rati

fication without reservations as late as September, 1919, the League was

^Braden, "The Senate Debate:
^Bartlett, op_. cit., p. 148.

An Overview,"

0 £.

cit., p. 275.
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by this time unofficially split into factions by Taft's advocacy of
ratification with reservations.76
Despite Taft's attempts to unite the Mild Reservationists in a
program, the League remained officially against compromise until November
18, when the executive committee officially declared the League in favor
of the Lodge

reservations.

77

Partly out of Taft's partisan'affiliations

and partly because the former President felt that only with Lodge reserva
tions could the treaty be ratified at all, the opponents of compromise on
the executive committee capitulated.

In Bartlett's view, this capitula

tion rendered the only major source of leadership for the American
public, aside from Wilson, ineffectual.
B.

Women's Organizations.

78

The largest of the women's organizations to

endorse the League was the National American Women's Suffrage Associa
tion.^
C.

Several other women's organizations followed suit.®^

Labor Organization.

Prominent labor leaders were included on the

programs of the two great speaking tours of the League to Enforce Peace
during 1919.

That organization listed more than 3,100 pro-league speakers

^^Ibid., p . 149
77u. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 8873-8874.
^Bartlett, o£. cit., pp. 206-208.
7%.

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 7481.

QA

uAmong the other national women's organizations to endorse a
league of nations: National Society of Daughters of the American Revo
lution; General Federation of Women's Clubs; National Council of Women,
Council of Jewish Women; Dames of Malta; Woman's Auxiliary Southern
Commercial Congress.
Ibid., 7481.
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from labor groups.

81

Labor officials accounted for a substantial number

of endorsements for the League Covenant.
D.

82

Business and Professional Organizations.

On August 25, 1919, the

National Economic League announced that its members had voted 519 to 166
in favor of ratifying the Treaty "without complicating, delaying, or
0 9

invalidating reservations."

Numerous business organizations, both

national and state level, endorsed the League Treaty during this phase
of the debate.8^81Ibid.
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Sarah A. Conboy, secretary of the United Textile Workers of
America; John Golden, International President, United Textile Workers of
America; Samuel Gompers, president of the A.F. of L.; William H. Johnson,
president of International Association of Machinists; Frank Morrison,
secretary of A.F. of L.; John R. Alpine, vice-president of A.F. of L.;
T. A. Rickett, president of International Garment Workers of America;
John H. Walker, former president of Illinois State Federation of Labor;
Matthew Woll, president of International Photo Engravers Union; Frank
Duffy, secretary of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners; Jacob
Fischer, secretary of Journeymen Baker Union; Daniel F. Tobin, treasurer
of A.F. of L.; W. D. Mahon, president of Amalgamated Association of Street
and Electrical Railway Employees of America; Andrew Steel, International
Executive Board of United Mine Workers; William Green, secretary-treasurer
of United Mine Workers of America; W. G. Lee, president of Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen; Timothy Shea, acting president of Brotherhood of Locomo
tive, Firemen, and Enginemen; L. E. Sheppard, president of Order of
Railway Conductors; Warren Stone, Grand Chief Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers; Joseph F. Valentine, president of International Molder Union
of North America; Richard Gilbert, secretary-treasurer, Miners State
Union of Pennsylvania; Harry W. Fox, president, Wyoming State Federation
of Labor; Duncan McLeod, International Executive Board, United Mine
Workers of America; James Morgan, secretary, Wyoming Miners Organization.
New York Times. September 15, 1919, p. 3.
88New York Times, August 26, 1919, p. 2.
8a
^Business organizations that endorsed the League of Nations.
National Organizations: American Manufacturers Export Associa
tion; Associated Advertizing Clubs of the World; National Association of
Brass Manufacturers; National Association of Builders Exchange; National
Association of Merchant Tailors of America; National Federation of
Implement and Vehicle Dealers' Association; National Retail Dry Goods
Association; New England Hardware Dealers Association.
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Endorsements of the League during this period also came from the
American Bar Association,®"* a large number of college presidents, who
were among the 250 prominent men petitioning immediate and unqualified
support on September 14;

and the more than fifty leading college pro

fessors and university presidents who were among state committeemen of
the League to Enforce Peace.®^

Of the ninety faculty members at Mount

Holyoke College participating in a League opinion poll conducted on
October 12, fifty voted for the League as it stood, twenty-seven for
interpretative reservations, eleven for amendments and two against the
League.®®
E.

College Students.

Three hundred votes were cast in a poll of the

summer student body and faculty of Columbia University on July 24, 1919.
Since the -group consisted largely of women teachers drawn'from practi
cally every state in the Union, the balloting was looked upon as "an
interesting experiment tending to show how women are thinking on public
question."

For adoption of the League without qualification were 124

State Organizations: Illinois Lumber and Builders Supply
Dealers Association; Kansas Live Stock Association; Maine State Board
of Trade; Nebraska Retail Hardware Association; New Hampshire
Manufacturers Association; Retail Lumber Dealers of New York; Master
House Painters and Decorators Association of Ohio; Wisconsin Retail
Hardware Association; Wisconsin Sheet Metal Contractors Association;
and Wisconsin State Bottlers Association. U. S. Congressional Record,
op . cit., 7482-7487.
®5Ibid., 7486-7487.
®®New York Times, September 15, 1919, p. 3.
®7u. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 7482-7486.
®®New York Times, October 12, 1919, p. 10.
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votes, for outright rejection, 30; and for adoption of the Covenant with
reservations, 146.89
On October 1, in a poll of opinion among students of Harvard,
1686 ballots were cast.

Favoring adoption of the League as it stood were

690; 380 favored reservations which would not recommit the Treaty to the
Peace Conference; 319 advocated amendment; and 289 rejected the League
altogether.

90

a similar poll on October 11 at Mount Holyoke College,

585 votes were cast.

The majority of votes favored a League of Nations,

although only 148 favored the Covenant as it stood.

Voting for interpre

tative reservations were 187, for amendments, 231; and against the League,
19.
F.

91
Religious Organizations.

At the Methodist Centenary Exposition in

Columbus, Ohio on July 5, 1919, resolutions approving the League were
adopted at the close of the meeting.

no

Receiving President Wilson on his arrival to speak in Salt Lake
City on September 23, a delegation from the Mormon Church assured the
Chief Executive of the support of a "large Majority" of the members of
the Church.

President Grant of the Church had declared his organization

to be officially in favor of the adoption of the treaty without changes.
The News, the official Church organ, also urged the Treaty's support.
On September 28, the Indiana Conference of the Methodist

89Ibid., July 25, 1919, p. 2.
90Ibid., October 1, 1919, p. 3.
9^Ibid., October 12, 1919, p. 10.
92Ibid., July 6, 1919, p. 6.
93

Ibid., September 24, 1919, p. 1.
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Episcopal Churches, meeting in Indianapolis, adopted a resolution
endorsing the L e a g u e . ^
The House of Bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church in
America, meeting in a triennial general convention in Detroit on October
10, adopted a similar resolution.

Leading members of the House of

Deputies of the same organization expressed the opinion that the same
resolution would be passed there.
In a meeting at Baltimore on October 15 addressed by its Presi
dent, William H. Taft, the Unitarian Church's General Conference adopted
a resolution favoring the League of Nations.

The resolution expressed

the hope for the "ratification of the Peace Treaty now before the Senate
of

the

United

States,

with

such

reservations

or

interpretations

shall not endanger or unduly delay its passage."

only

as

95

The National Council of the Congregational Church adopted reso
lutions urging ratification of the Covenant on October 23, 1919.

The

resolutions called for, ratification "without amendments and with only
such reservations as shall strengthen the moral influence of the United
States."96
On October 23, the Baptist missionary convention of the state of
New

York

adopted

resolutions

favoring

the

League

final business session at Gloversville, New York.
The

three

thousand

citizens

of

the

94.

Ibid., September 29, 1919, p. 3.

95Ibid.,

96

October

18, 1919,

p.

13.

Ibid., October 24, 1919, p. 3.

New

in

the

convention's

97

York

section

of

Jewish
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Women meeting on October 23, adopted unanimously a resolution endorsing
the Covenant.
As a final note regarding the support of organized religion dur
ing this phase, 3,000 of 13,000 speakers who had pledged to give addresses for the League of Nations were clergymen,

99

and collective

endorsements of the League from church organizations represented the
views of millions of church members.
G.

Soldiers.

In response to an inquiry by Senator Kenyon regarding the

opinion of soldiers returning from the front, Senator Hitchcock, citing
an editorial from The Stars and Stripes, maintained that the American
soldier "overwhelmingly favored" the League Covenant.

The senator also

stated that The Stars and Stripes "was not subject to censorship except
that it could not exercise military management of the war."*®'*'

Individuals Favoring the League.

One prominent individual ex

pressed his endorsement of the Covenant during this phase of the debate.
In an address to the students of Stanford University on October 2,
Herbert C. Hoover, formerly the Economic Director for the Supreme War
Council, exclaimed that "if the League of Nations is to break down, we
must at once prepare to fight.1"

He emphatically warned that "the peace

treaties cannot be carried out without the League.

If the League fails

^ Ibid., p . 12.
QQ

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 7481.

100Ibid., 7481, 7486, and 7487.
^•'•New York Times, July 2, 1919, p. 12.

258
the treaties also fail.

In that event, civilization will be taken back

to the Middle A g e s."^^

Publications Favoring the League.

The editorial views of publi

cations during this phase of the debate remained much the same as ex
pressed in previous phases.

Williams continued to receive editorial

support from Mississippi newspapers.

One notable example of this was the

editorial praising his digression to the race problem during his proLeague speech of September 29.

103

More to the point was another note of praise for the senator
which seems to apply to his pronouncements on domestic affairs as well as
on foreign policy.
Senator John Sharp Williams never fails to speak right in meeting
when he has anything to say. He is not afraid of his political
future and caters to no man or sets of men, political party, or
business interests. He treats all alike and says what he thinks,
not only concerning matters of politics, but equally as plain in
his statements concerning differences between capital and labor.
Although Williams was not mentioned specifically, an editorial on
November 18 accused Republicans of "playing politics all along" during
the debate on the League.

105

Groups Opposed to the League.

League opposition during this phase of

the debate shows no increase in quantity of new opposition expressed.
Although there are no new individuals reported in opposition to the

•'•^Ibid., October 3, 1919, p. 17.
Supra.
C l a r i o n -L e d g e r ,

, p. 241.

September

"Omaha

Has

It,"

30, 1919, p. 4.

IQ^Ibid.. October 22, 1919, p. 4.
^~*Ibid., November 18, 1919, p. 4.

(editorial),

Jackson

Daily
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League during this phase, this section will treat groups and publica
tions opposed.
A.

The League

for the Preservation of American Independence.

20,

the League

forthe Preservation of American Independence made public

an open letter to members of the Senate.

On August

Expressing strong opposition

to the existing draft of the Covenant, the letter would be "sent out
broadcast" to the people of the United States.

First, the letter

affirmed:
1.

2.

3.

That no treaty obligations should be assumed which impair
(a) the right of self-defense and of friendly succor.
(b) the right to manage our own domestic affairs and to
maintain our traditional policies.
The right of self-defense and of friendly succor is destroyed
by Article XV of the covenant; that the right to refuse to go
to war is destroyed by Article X of the covenant; and that the
right to manage our own domestic affairs and to maintain our
traditional policies is imperiled by Articles XVI, XXI, and
XXIII.
That if these provisions of the covenant were good but obscure
they would require interpretation, but they are vidious and
clear, what they need is amendment. °

Secondly, the letter specifically recommended:
1.

2.

3.

That the Senate should refuse to advise and consent to the
making of the treaty with Germany unless its advice and
consent is expressly made subject to such reservations as
the Senate shall specify.
That when consent has thus been given to the treaty the Senate
should maintain its reservations even if other powers hesitate
or decline to approve them, and should not under any circum
stances yield to pressure exerted from abroad.
That the reservations to be made by the Senate in giving
consent to the treaty should include the following:
(a) The United States should reserve the right to fight in
self-defense or otherwise as it pleases.
(b) The United States should reserve the right to ignore a
call to arms from the Council or the Assembly.
(c) The United States should reserve the right to control its
own domestic policies and immigration practices.

- ^ New York Times, August 21, 1919, p. 2.
107Ibid.
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B.

The American Defense Society.

A second group expressing its opposi

tion to the League during this phase in the form of a letter to senators
was the American Defense Society.

Signed by a list of prominent men,

including Charles Steward Davidson, John R. Rathom, George G. Agnew,
Richard Washburn Child, Dr. William Harnaday, Newton W. Gilbert, Lee de
Forest, William Guggenheim, Robert Appleton, Dr. L, L. Seaman, C. S.
Thompson, Raymond L. Tiffany, J. P. Harris, and Charles Larned Robinson,
the letter raised ten objections.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

The United States would surrender sovereignty.
Other nations would have a voice in interpreting the Monroe
Doctrine and the size of our defenses.
The United States would be committed to a blind, general
upholding of possibly secret treaties.
The Covenant contains several deliberate traps in phraseology.
Past attempts at reservations "in connection with partial
surrenders of sovereignty have been heretofore declared to
be void and of no effect by the Supreme Court . . . and are
idle and ineffective except as they may be deemed to morally
justify a subsequent refusal in a given case to comply with
requirements."
The evils are becoming more apparent in the Covenant's
attempt to insure self-determination for various countries.
The United States will be involved in numerous racial and
social wars of Europe.
"The foundation of several hundred wars within the next
century or two has been securely laid by the nominal adoption,
the partial application of, and the partial refusal to apply
the impossible doctrines of the self-determination of races
which is contrary to our fundamental doctrines as a nation."
"To adopt the covenant and to simultaneously advocate raceconsciousness, the self-determination of peoples, and the
multiplication of nations is not the part of wisdom."
Two "splinter" political parties expressed opposition to the

League during this phase.

On August 30, 1919, the People's Independent

1OR

Party declared its opposition, uo and on September 4, the National

108Ibid., August 30, 1919, p. 18.
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Socialist Party, in a declaration of principles adopted at its Chicago
meeting, endorsed without qualification the Soviet Republic of Russia and
condemned the League of Nations.

Publications Opposed to the League.

In a poll taken both by street inter

view and by mail, with no provisions to avoid duplicate voting, the
Washington Post revealed that 2,204 of its readers were opposed to any
league at all.

Favoring joining with reservations were 1,466; and favor

ing joining the League without qualification were only 1,380.

The votes

returned by mail reflected greater opposition to the League than did the

110

votes of the street interviews.

The Vicksburg (Miss.) Herald appeared mildly opposed to the
League in July, but by September it had become antagonistic.

On July 17,

the Herald noted that "as John Sharp Williams says, Wilson was wise in
accepting the Shantung settlement.

But how much wiser would he have been

had he not raised the issue of the 'secret treaties' from which he has
emerged with sad loss of American dignity and prestige."

111

By September

28, the Herald editorially protested that
. . . the United States is . . . congentially unfitted for m e m 
bership in any such association as the League of Nations.
The
Herald took this view in the beginning of the contest for the
League of Nations, and it is being proved in the inflexibility of
senate resistance to attacks and appeals which have finally
broken down the League champions. 1

•*~^ I b i d ., September 5, 1919, p. 15.
•^%ashington Post, August 27, 1919, p. 3.
m " A Bluff that Failed," (editorial), Vicksburg Daily Herald,
July 17, 1919, p. 4.
ll2"The President's Breakdown," (editorial), Ibid., September
28, 1919, p. 4.
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Finally, the Herald on October 22 accused Wilson of attempting to coerce
senators into ratification of the Covenant.

The Galleries.

The occupants of the galleries were particularly vocal

in their responses to Williams on two occasions during the first Covenant
debate.

As already described, overt manifestations occurred on August 12,

1919,

Summary

and on October 16, 1919.

of

Williams1 Audience

During

the

First

Covenant

Debate

The various estimates of senatorial preferences again indicated,
as in the unofficial covenant debate, that the League advocates would be
unable to muster the required sixty-four votes for ratification of the
treaty.

Wilson had failed in his attempt, by personal interview, to con

vert a significant number of Republican League opponents.
Seventy-six of the senators had declared themselves in favor of
the treaty, although ten of these favored mild reservations while twentyeight favored strict reservations.

The seventeen Irreconcilables,

comprising the remainder of the ninety-three senators who had committed
themselves, could be ignored for purposes of ratification.
Like his Chief in his unwillingness to compromise by attaching
reservations to the treaty, Williams could depend only upon the votes
of the thirty-eight League supporters.

His strategy, then, was to dis

credit Lodge, the leader of the Strict Reservationist group.
113

By exposing

"Will the United States Share the Burden of Civilization?"
(editorial), Ibid., October 22, 1919, p. 4.
1 1 4 S u p r a .,

pp. 232-33.

H 5 supra., pp. 243-45
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Lodge’s selfish motives and the fallacies of his opposition to the League,
Williams hoped to attract many of the Mild Reservationists as well as the
Strict Reservationists.

If he could convert the ten Mild Reservationists

along with only sixteen of the twenty-eight Strict Reservationists,
these twenty-six votes, combined with the thirty-eight votes of the
League supporters, could ratify the treaty.
Williams' attack, therefore, was against Lodge, who had defied
the bulk of public opinion by delaying the treaty in committee and by
raising objections to the basic idea of a league of peace.

The Representative Speech
This section consists of a detailed analysis and evaluation of
Williams' address of August 12, 1919.

This' address included Williams'

rebuttal to all the arguments raised against the League and was issued
against the League's most significant opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge.
The analysis and evaluation includes treatment of Williams'
speech organization, argumentative development, emotional proof, ethical
proof, style, and effectiveness.

Organization

A detailed outline necessarily precludes the analysis and evalua
tion of the speech.
The

Outline

of

the

Speech.

Introduction: Williams hesitated to reply extemporaneously to Lodge's
address, but he replied at length despite his hesitation.
Implied

Thesis:

I.

No nation can render service to the world of its own free will,
(for)
A.

Lodge's

assertions

about

the

League

are

in

error,

(for)

We are too indissolubly connected with one another for that.

B.

The man of the twentieth century who says that any country
can direct its own course to please itself has not sense
enough to be a member of a town council.

Lodge has neglected one of the "weightier matters of the law"-the peace of the world.
(for)
A.

He has ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace.

B.

He is more concerned with Republican policies in the Senate.

C.

He says that past attempts at peace have failed.
1.

The world was not civilized enough for peace.

2.

The Holy Alliance failed.

(for)

D.

He says the League will rob us of our nationalism.

E.

He never recognized peace of the world as the primary
question.
(restatement)

F.

He says the League will attempt to make us make war.
1.

The League's real weakness is that it does not go far
enough.

2.

Its orders should be followed by physical force if
necessary.

The League will not make slaves of us as Lodge charges.

(for)

A.

Everything of any importance must be done by the council
by unanimous vote.

B.

The League will not force the United States to admit all
nationalities.

C.

We will be able to withdraw from the League after two years
notice if we have complied with our international obliga
tions .

Lodge's other objections are not true.

(for)

A.

The League is not an organization that must be carried out
by w a r .

B.

Embargos, or economic pressure, will be enforced against
nations only to make them "keep their plighted word."

C.

The United States Supreme Court will pass judgment upon the
League if it is unconstitutional.
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D.

Lodge's appeal to "Americanism" is really an appeal to
isolationism.

E.

We are under obligation not only to France, as Lodge argues,
but also to all countries that helped us win the war against
the Central Powers.

F.

Questions coming under the Monroe Doctrine are excluded
from the consideration of the League.
1.

Other members have as much right as we to determine
whether a question comes under the Monroe Doctrine.

2.

Other members cannot decide against us except by a
unanimous vote.

Conclusion
I.

Apology for Lodge's speech.

II.

Promise to reply to it in detail.

Analysis of the Organization
This section presents an analysis in terms of craftsmanship and
in terms of audience adjustment.
Craftsmanship.

Craftsmanship of the organization refers to thematic

emergence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in
disposition.
1.

Thematic emergence.

Williams again did not overtly state

his thesis, that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error.
The statement and development of his main arguments, nevertheless, made
clear his general criticism of the speech just completed by the Sage of
Nahant.
2.

Method of division and arrangement.

ized the speech in a refutative pattern.

Williams again organ

Each argument corresponded to

an argument presented in Lodge's speech.
■^®U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3778-84.

3.

Rhetorical order in disposition.

Williams' opening remarks

probably enlisted the attention and interest of the senators to the same
extent that it did the listeners in the galleries.

The occupants of the

galleries "hissed" and became so indignant at Williams1 opening remarks
that Vice-president Marshall was forced to rebuke them for their behavior.
The senators apparently were able to restrain their own reactions to the
Mississippian's introductory comments, since no senatorial outbursts or
responses of any kind were recorded.

The bluntness of Williams' words

probably failed to contribute to rendering the listeners well disposed
toward the speaker.

His friends probably retained their respect for him,

while his enemies undoubtedly were unchanged by his bitter attack upon
Lodge.

The introduction, nevertheless, clearly prepared the way for the

ideas that were to come.
The body of the speech consisted of the statement and development
of the four arguments:

that no nation can render service to the world

of its own free will; that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world;
that the League would not make slaves of us, and that Lodge's other ob
jections to the League were not true.

The organization of the speech

was clearer than the past efforts of the Mississippian, because he intro
duced each new argument with the same transitional statement:
President, the Senator from Massachusetts says . . . ."

"Mr.

Williams

developed each argument with greater clarity and fewer digressions than
in any of his previous speeches.
Unlike his address of June 9, 1919, Williams made no attempt at
an Aristotelian emotional peroration.

His sole purpose in his conclusion
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seemed to be that o£ discrediting Lodge.

First, however, he apologized

for his own extemporaneous reply.
Mr. President, I want to apologize to the Senate for this socalled speech. I think it is a species of almost unutterable
egotism for any human being to rise in his place in the Senate
and attempt to answer extemporaneously a carefully, long-time
prepared--lamplight-prepared--and written speech by the Senator
from Massachusetts, in which he has probably weighed every word,
weighed every comma and every period, with the view of avoiding
criticism as far as could be, and with the view of helping the
Republican Party all that he could with a careful, wise, taught,
trained intellect, and with a great deal of information.
I
would not have undertaken to answer him at all to-day but for
the fact that I did not want what he said to go into the Record,
even for to-morrow, without something to show that somebody
differed with him about the carefully drawn and midnight-lightfinished periods of his speech. Later, on some day, I shall
make a considered and careful reply, weighing words and phrases.
That I could not do to-day, of course.
Williams' concluding sentences were, obviously, pure sarcasm, since he
made no prepared addresses during the entire debate and continued to
criticise those who read from their prepared manuscripts.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment
Williams again addressed a majority of opponents to his basic
idea of acceptance of the League, since both groups of reservationists
could be considered members of the opposition.

He chose to discredit

the leader of the Strict Reservationists with the hope of converting some
of them, along with the Mild Reservationists, to his position;
tion of the treaty without reservation.
hostile group, therefore, by implication.

ratifica

He presented his thesis to the
Implicative order, however,

was not essential to effectiveness, since all members of the group, by
this time, knew Williams' purpose in the debate.

118

The order of arguments

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . eft., 3789.
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seemed neither climactic nor anti-climactic, since all the arguments
dealt with Lodge’s objections to the League, and since all received
approximately equal space and emphasis in the speech.
The major divisions of the speech were consistent logically with
the thesis.

Unlike his previous addresses, however, the speech of

August 9 was more "oral" in organization.

The reader of the text may

readily determine the points at which Williams began each new argument
by the identifying statement:
Massachusetts says . . . .”

"Mr. President, the Senator from
Williams' listeners were probably more cap

able of following the speaker's thought because of these obvious transi
tional statements.
The major criticism of Williams' organization in the two previous
representative speeches is equally applicable to the speech of August 9.
There seems to have been no justification for implicative organization
in view of the speaker's bluntness in criticizing Lodge.

Since all of--

Williams' arguments were straightforward presentations of refutation,
then, the speaker should have been more consistent in his organization.
That is, he should have made it equally blunt.

Obvious organization not

only would have been more consistent with the content of the address,
but it also would have been more in keeping with his listeners' ability
to ferret out his arguments as well as their patience in doing so.
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Invention:

Argumentative Development

This section treats the severity and strictness of the argumenta
tive development and the logical credibility of Williams1 arguments to
his listeners in his address of August 12, 1919.

Argumentative

Development

of

the

Thesis

In support of his thesis that Lodge's assertions about the
League had been in error, Williams argued, first, that no nation can
render service to the world of its own free will.

The relationship of

the argument to the thesis becomes clear when restated as a hypothetical
syllogism.
Major Premise:

If no nation can render service to the world
of its own free will, then Lodge's assertions
about the League are in error.

Minor Premise;

No nation can render service to the world of
its own free will.

Conclusion:

Lodge's assertions about the League are in
error.

In his effort to influence the followers of Lodge and the Mild Reservationists, Williams strengthened the minor premise by contending that all
nations were too indissolubly connected with one another for any one
nation to render service to the world of its own free will and that any
man of the twentieth century who maintained that a country could direct
its own course to please itself did not have the sense to- serve on a
town council.
In support of the first of these contentions, Williams argued by
analogy that one must always consult his neighbors.
I cannot render service in Yazoo County, Mississippi of my own
free will. I must consult the other people who are my neighbors.
Yazoo County can not render service of its own free will.
It
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Premise:

Ibid., 3785.

Lodge

has

neglected

the

peace

the
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Conclusion:

His assertions about the League are in error.

First, in support of the minor premise, Williams accused Lodge of having
ridiculed, "with an absolute, cold, New England, Brahmin cynicism,"
Wilson's plea for world peace.^2®
question:

Williams probably referred to Lodge's

"Are ideals confined to this deformed experiment upon a noble

purpose, tainted, as it is, with bargains and tied to a peace treaty
which might have been disposed of long ago to the great benefit of the
world if it had not been compelled to carry this rider on its back?"^2-^
Williams' contention that Lodge had ridiculed Wilson's version of world
peace, then, was true.

But Lodge had obviously not, as Williams argued

in his minor premise, neglected world peace.

The Massachusetts senator

simply believed that a league of peace would not work.

The argument,

therefore, that Lodge had ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace could
not have been construed to support the premise t.hat Lodge had "neglected"
world peace.
Second, in support of the minor premise, Williams contended that
Lodge was more concerned with Republican policies in the Senate than
with world peace.

Williams made no attempt to develop this assertion.

His listeners probably recognized it as a partisan attack designed to
discredit Lodge.

As such, it was intended to be ethical, rather than

logical, proof.
Third, Williams took issue with Lodge's argument that, since all
past attempts at world peace had failed, the League would also fail.-*-22
120lbid.
121Ibid., 3784.
122

A^ I b i d ., 3778. Lodge had begun his speech with a history of past
efforts at peace which had failed. He had concluded that the League
would also fail.
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Williams attacked Lodge's analogy, pointing out differences which, he
maintained, outweighed similarities.
The Senator after a while concludes his historical recitation
of all the attempts that have been made for the peace of the
world by bringing
in the Holy Alliance, and he attempts to
identify the Holy
Alliance with this league of peace. Why,you
might as well attempt to identify the son of one father and
mother with the son of another father and mother, forgetting
the birth source of each altogether. The Holy Alliance came
from autocrats seeking the perpetuation of autocratic power.
It failed. Does it follow necessarily, therefore, that an
agreement between the peoples of the earth seeking peace in the
hame and interest of popular power shall fail?
Here Williams used the same technique of questioning the position of his
opponent that Lodge had used against Wilson's plea for world peace.

The

senators probably realized that the differences were more pronounced
than the similarities

in Lodge's analogy, although Williams

againfailed

to prove that Lodge had "neglected" world peace.
Fourth, Williams took issue with Lodge's assertion that the
League would rob Americans of their nationalism.
Do you imagine, Mr. President, that I surrender my nationalism
whenever I confess myself an inhabitant of the earth, subject
to international influence and international ethics and inter
national ideals and international traditions, any more than I
surrender my identity as my father's son because I meet your
daughter or your son in just intercourse?^-^
The question probably uppermost in most senators'minds at this time was,
which would take greater precedence, the national law of the United
States or the international law of the League of Nations.
implied that the two would never conflict.

Williams

Most senators probably dis

agreed with this, although the followers of Wilson were willing to

123Ibid., 3785.
12*Ibid.
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subordinate the law that they, as senators, made to the international
law of the League if this subordination would result in world peace.
Williams failed to argue that the end result of world peace would justify
the sacrifice of national law to international law under certain circum
stances.

Williams, therefore, avoided the real issue and, as a result,

probably failed to influence his listeners with this instance of logical
proof.
Finally, in support of the minor premise that Lodge had neglected
the peace of the world, Williams took issue with Lodge's assertion that
the League would attempt to make us make war.

Lodge had made this inter

pretation from the phrase of the Covenant which said that "any war or
threat of war is a matter of universal concern.”125

williams argued

that the League would not attempt to make us make war or even apply
economic pressure.

He pointed out that any menace to world peace would

be brought before the Council for recommendation, a measure requiring
unanimous vote.

The League itself, maintained Williams, could force no

nation to make war.

Williams' correction of Lodge was an accurate reflec

tion of Articles 11 and 5 of the Covenant, which stipulated that in the
event of a war or threat of war a meeting of the Council could be called.
Decisions of the Council, according to Article 5 however, required the
unanimous consent of all members of the League.

Since the senators were

familiar with the Covenant itself, Williams' challenge probably consti
tuted effective logical proof of Lodge's error.

It seemed logically

related to the premise that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world,
since he had argued, erroneously, that the League would promote war.

■^•*From Article 11 of the Covenant.
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Williams expressed his own view, however, that the League should be em
powered to make war if necessary.
Williams' second argument in support of his thesis, the argument
that

Lodge had neglected

marginally

acceptable to

thepeace of the world, was probably only
thesenatorial listeners.

A more effective state

ment of the argument and, probably a more accurate reflection of Williams'
thought, would have been the statement:
League will be practicable."

"Lodge does not believe the

Had this been the statement of the second

main argument of the speech, the supporting materials would have been
more relevant and effective.

The argument and its supporting contentions

would have been stated as follows;
II. Lodge does not believe the League will be practicable.

(for)

A.

He has ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace.

B.

He is more concerned with Republican policies in the
Senate.

C.

He says that past attempts at peace have failed.

D.

He says the

E.

He never recognized peace of the world as the primary
quest ion.

F.

He says the League will attempt to make us make war.

League will rob us of our nationalism.

In the writer's opinion, then, Williams failed to make the most effective
use of logical proof in this case as an available means of persuasion.
Williams' third major argument in support of the thesis that
Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error was that the League
would not make slaves of us as Lodge had charged.

The argument's rela

tionship to the thesis may best be seen when restated as a hypothetical
syllogism.

126

This would not have been merely a restatement of the main
argument had the main argument itself been restated as I have recommended.
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Major Premise:

If the League will not make slaves of us as
Lodge charges, then his assertions about the
League are in error.

Minor Premise:

The League will not make slaves of us as Lodge
charges.

Conclusion:

His assertions about the League are in error.

First, in support of the minor premise, Williams reminded his
listeners that, as a member of the League, the United States could
hardly be considered a slave to the League in view of the necessity for
a unanimous vote of the Council for any important recommendation.

Again,

the senators' familiarity with Article 5 of the Covenant probably
enhanced the logical effectiveness of this contention.
Second, Williams maintained that the League would not make
slaves of us because it would not force the United States to admit all
nationalities as Lodge had said it would.

To Lodge's charge, Williams

queried, "Where does he find that in the treaty?"

127

Williams again

resorted to his strongest argument against Lodge's attacks.

"Everything

of any importance must be done by the council by unanimous vote, and our
representative must vote for it."

198

Familiarity with Article 5 probably

made this argument logically credible to the senators.
Third, Williams supported the premise that the League would not
make slaves of us by insisting that, contrary to Lodge's assertion that
we could not get out of the League unless all the other powers of the
world let us

out,

^ 9 we would be able to withdraw from the League after

127u . S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3786.
128Ibid.
129

Ibid.. 3782.
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J-JUFrom Article 1 of the Covenant, quoted in Fleming, The United
States and the League, op. cit., p. 535.
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First, Williams contended that the League was not an organiza
tion that must be carried out by war as Lodge had charged.
refutation of this charge was threefold.

Williams1

He first compared the League

with the Monroe Doctrine which could have been construed as a war measure
since the threat of force was behind it.

It had, on the contrary, been

a peace measure and had been successful for one hundred years, he urged.
Second, he argued that only lawless nations would be punished and that
the first punishment would not be war.

Further, he maintained that the

United States would never be the victim of such punishment because she
would always abide by arbitral decisions.
The senators probably believed that the threat of force behind
the Monroe Doctrine had kept the peace in the Western hemisphere for one
hundred years.

Therefore, Williams' first counter-attack upon Lodge

should have been logically credible to his listeners.

Article 16 of the

Covenant supported his second argument, that lawless nations would be
punished, but not at first by force.

The article outlines arbitration

as the first measure, economic boycott as the second, and war as the
third measure to be taken against nations refusing to abide by League
recommendations.

This attack, in view of the senators' familiarity with

the Covenant, was probably logically credible.

The third attack, an

appeal to American honor, was probably logically credible to a group of
men who had recently sent their sons into battle largely because of
American honor.
Second,
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upon nations to make them keep the p e a c e . W i l l i a m s effectively
answered this argument by pointing out that the effects of embargos were
much less terrible than the effects of war.

His emotional description of

the misery and suffering of the boys in the trenches and the mothers at
home was probably effective in influencing the senators so recently
affected by those terrors.

Williams, therefore, effectively implemented

logical proof by means of emotional coloration.
Third, Williams answered Lodge's charge that United States' entry
into the League might be unconstitutional.
Suppose it was; the Supreme Court would declare it to be uncon
stitutional just like it might declare any other law to be
unconstitutional. Of course it is my duty not to vote for a
treaty that I think is unconstitutional; but suppose I thought
it was constitutional, and suppose the Supreme Court of the
United States thought it was not, the treaty would not be
valid. -*-32
This reply probably constituted effective logical proof for the senato
rial listeners because of their high regard for the American Constitu
tion and their knowledge that the Supreme Court could indeed exercise
jurisdiction over a treaty following its negotiation by the President
and ratification by the Senate.-*-33
Fourth, Williams' contended that Lodge's appeal to '.'Americanism"
had, in reality, been an appeal to isolationism.

Lodge had said

You may call me selfish, if you will, conservative or re
actionary, or use any other harsh adjective you see fit to
apply, but an American I was born, an American I have re
mained all my life. I can never be anything else but an
1^1
132

U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3783.
Ibid., 3787.

1^
•'■•-’•■’Treaties were declared subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
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American, and I must think of the United States first, and when
I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this
I am thinking of what is best for the world, for if the United
States fails the best hopes of mankind fail with it. I have
never had but one allegiance--! cannot divide it now. I have
never loved but one flag and I cannot share that devotion and
give affection to the mongrel
banner invented for a league.
Internationalism, illustrated
by the Bolshevik and by themen
to whom all countries are alike provided they can make money out
of them, is to me repulsive. National I must remain, and in
that way I, like all other Americans, can render the amplest serv
ice to the world.^-34
Williams replied, "My Americanism is not merely defensive; it is not
merely a question of isolation; it is a question now and then of indig
nation and offense against the powers of unrighteousness and wrong, and
I am willing to take up the cudgels against them."

135

Williams failed

to point out the faulty generalization of which Lodge had been guilty in
his attempt to identify internationalism
Lodge had implied that the United
League.

with the Bolshevik. Further,

States would fail should it enter the

Williams' reply, therefore, was probably not logically credible

to his senatorial listeners, since he made little attempt at anything
other than an emotional response.
Fifth, Williams attacked Lodge's contention that we owed no debt
to any country other than France in our Revolution.

Again, Williams'

reply was primarily of an emotional rather than a logical nature.
We are under obligations to every man who served in the war
with Germany and came out unschthed; we are under double obliga
tions to every man who went in and came out without an arm or a
leg, whether a Belgian, a Frenchman, or a Briton. We are under
everlasting obligations to the shades and the ghosts of the
dead of all three of those armies. It all marks one thing: We
are under obligations to them and they are under obligations to

134Ibid., 3784.
135Ibid., 3787-88.
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us, and neither of us can do away with the obligations, and
none of us can go back to the original isolation.-^6
Lodge had spoken in terms of legal, treaty obligations of the United
States to other powers.

Williams failed to present effective refutation

of Lodge's point because he argued in terms of moral obligations.

The

senators, not often given to legislative action prompted by emotional
stimuli, probably failed to respond to this instance of the substitution
of emotional proof for what should have been logical proof.
Finally, Williams took issue with Lodge's contention that, since
questions coming under the Monroe Doctrine are excluded from the consid
eration of the League, who would decide whether the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine apply to a particular case?

Williams granted that when

questions of that nature presented themselves, the other members of the
League could sit in judgment upon them.
however, on Article 5:

He again based his refutation,

the provision that recommendations of the

Council required unanimous vote.

Williams' reference to Article 5

probably constituted effective logical proof that such questions involv
ing the Monroe Doctrine would not be decided against the United States.
Williams' support for his fourth argument, that Lodge's other
objections to the League were not true, was in part logically credible
to his senatorial listeners.
upon the Covenant itself.

His logical strength lay in his reliance

Because of the senators' familiarity with the

Covenant, Williams was probably most credible logically when refuting
Lodge's contentions by means of reference to various articles of the
Covenant.

He was probably weakest logically when substituting emotional

136Ibid., 3788.
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proof, vivid illustration, and unsupported generalization for specific
evidence.

Thus, four of Williams' six counter-contentions probably

seemed logically valid to his listeners:

that the League need not be

carried out by war; that economic pressures were not as terrible in their
effects as war; that the United States Supreme Court would judge the con
stitutionality of the League if necessary; and that questions involving
the Monroe Doctrine would not be decided against the United States.
Less valid logically to his listeners were Williams' contentions that
Lodge's appeal to "Americanism" had really been an appeal to isolationism
and that we were under obligation, not only to France, but to every
other nation which had participated in the World War as well.
.

Summary of Argumentative Development
In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams failed to make
effective use of logical proof as a means of persuasion.

He failed to

validate logically his first major argument against Lodge (that no
nation could render service to the world of its own free will), because
he relied upon a single, weak analogy for support.
state his second major argument effectively.

He failed even to

Williams attempted to

argue that Lodge had neglected to consider the peace of the world, while
Lodge had obviously taken the matter into consideration.
ered world peace unattainable and clearly said so.
it.

He had consid

He had not "neglected"

A more accurate statement of Lodge's position would have been that

he had considered the League itself impracticable.
Williams also failed to substantiate logically two of his final
six objections to Lodge's contentions.

Only Williams' argument that the

League would not make slaves of us as Lodge had charged was logically
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credible to his listeners, because only in support of that argument had
Williams used the Covenant itself as evidence against his opponent.
Admittedly, the critic should not expect polished perfection in
any respect from an impromptu presentation such as Williams' speech of
August 12.

His long legislative experience, nevertheless, would warrant

greater attention to the wording of his contentions and their support
with specific, tangible evidence, rather than with shallow analogy and
the substitution of emotional for logical proof.

Invention:

Emotional Proof

In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams appealed to four
motives:

self-preservation, social responsibility, patriotism, and

preservation of tastes.
The.first instance of Williams' appeal to self-preservation was
his accusation that Lodge had not been concerned with world peace, with
which the Mississippian equated the saving of American lives.
Has he [Lodge] shown the slightest heart sympathy with the desire
of the world to have peace? Has he shown any sympathy with the
desire of the mother that her son shall not uselessly die upon
the battle field? Has he shown the slightest degree of sympathy
with the wish of the father that his son should die only a noble
death, in defense of his country, and without regard to any other
quarrel that the world might have originating in Serbia or China?
Williams' second appeal to self-preservation was his observation
that the machinery of the League would avoid fighting and therefore save
lives.
Are we, individual against individual, to fight our quarrels out?
Are we, county against county, to fight our quarrels out? Are
we, nation against nation, to fight our quarrels out, when we can
of our own free will construct some machinery that will come to a

137Ibid., 3785.
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fairer and a more just conclusion of our quarrels?

138

A third instance of Williams' appeal to self-preservation was
his argument that the treaty at no point gave any right to the League to
call out American soldiers or sailors.-*-39

Fourth, he argued that declar

ing an embargo against a country would result in far less suffering than
would a declaration of war.
The misery and suffering that would follow blockading somebody
to make them keep the peace, to keep them, rather, from violat
ing the covenants of peace, because it only applies to those
who have taken the covenant upon their souls! How does that com
pare with the misery and suffering of the boys in the trenches
and the mothers at home and the fathers seeking careers for the
boys while they were suffering the hardships of the trenches and
the horrors of gas attacks and the shattering of limb from limb
by shrapnel and shell? Why should the Senator grow so pathetic
about the suffering of nations visited with embargoes to make
them keep their plighted word--that is all there is to it--and
say so little about the horrors of war otherwise inescapable?^®
Fifth, Williams appealed to self-preservation by implying that
the United States could have saved lives by entering the war earlier
than she did.
The Senator pays a high tribute to the idea that we "ought to
remain disinterested." We remained disinterested in this war
over a year longer than we ought to have remained disinterested.
From the day that the Lusitania went to the bottom with its
precious cargo of women and children we ought to have ceased to
be disinterested.-*-^-*Finally, he appealed to self-preservation by asserting that
failure to ratify the League would result in a return to barbarism,
while ratification of the League would result in more civilized world
conditions.

139Ibid., 3786.
140Ibid., 3787.
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Are you going back to the conditions of 1914 and leave it to
accident and incident and murder and mid-sea assassination to
bring us in or are you going to say beforehand upon what grounds
we are going in and upon what grounds we are going to stay out? 42
Williams appealed to the motive of social responsibility four
times in his address of August 12.

First, he urged the senators to

ratify the Treaty because it would result in the advancement of civiliza
tion, an obligation to be fulfilled by the members of the Senate.
Take it all in all, as a measure for the advancement of civili
zation and peace and humanity and justice, does it meet with
your approval or does it not? If as a whole it does not, cast it
aside; but if as a whole it does, although, in your opinion, some
things in it ought to be amended, then you are a narrow-minded,
selfish ass if you cast it aside. You are not only a narrow-minded
ass, but you are a narrow-minded barbarian, because you throw aside
justice and humanity and civilization and peace for a clause, the
crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i."143
Second, Williams employed a negative appeal to the motive of
social responsibility.
tions to his countrymen.

He observed that Lodge had neglected his obliga
He pointed out that Lodge had invited the

listeners in the galleries to attend
not in the interests of peace, not in the interest of humanity,
not in the interests of the mothers of children, not in the
interests of the sweethearts of young men, but in the interest
of a narrow Chauvinistic policy, which shall be mainly tortured
here at home for the purpose of securing Republican partisan
success.1^'4
Williams' third appeal to the motive of social responsibility
concerned the United States' obligations to be honest in its dealings
with other members of the League should it become a member.

142Ibid., 3788.
143Ibid., 3785.
144Ibid., 3786.
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dictate the immigration policy of the United States.

Williams replied

that "if there is a question well settled in international law, it is
that a nation has the right to say who shall be welcome in its house, just
as I have the right to say who shall be guest in my house."

148

Williams

pointed out that action on the part of the League required unanimous con
sent of the Council.

The Council, he maintained, would never unite

against the United States in forcing upon it an immigration policy.

Summary

of

Emotional

Proof

In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams attempted to influ
ence his listeners by means of appeals to four motives:

Self-preservation,

social responsibility, patriotism, and preservation of tastes.

Although

the listeners in the galleries had displayed their emotions in response
to the address of Lodge and in response to the remarks of Williams until
upbraided by the Vice-president, the senators were probably much less
demonstrative in their responses to their colleagues.

Since no estimate

of the emotional state of the senators can be made, the critic must
merely assume that they were far less subject to such appeals than were
the lay listeners of the galleries.

Rather than seeking extensive

emotional response from his listeners, then, Williams concentrated his
efforts upon discrediting the character and motives of his chief antag
onist:

Lodge.

148Ibid., 3787.
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terrors engendered by w a r . ^

He contended that, rather than showing

sympathy with "breaking the heart of the world," Lodge had, with "an
absolute, cold, New England, Brahmin cynicism that invites the scorn of
every honest, human-loving man," merely made fun of the phrase.

153

Addi

tionally, Lodge, Williams maintained, was more concerned with the success
of Republican policies than with the peace of the w o r l d ; w a s

guilty of

"narrow chauvinism; "155 jja(j j-ea^ not; spoken his "carefully prepared
sentences with the view of controlling politics in America as well as he
can."^38

Moreover,

Williams asserted that Lodge had

never consented to be naturalized under the world's terms. He
has never consented to record himself as a child of God and an
inhabitant of the globe and a citizen of the world or, if so,
he failed to let any knowledge of the fact slip his lips this
morning.157
Lodge had also been a "narrow-minded, selfish ass and barbarian" to
aside the Covenant,

said W i l l i a m s . H e

cast

further accused Lodge ofhaving
ICQ

"no indignation in his breast against war" because he had never felt' it;
and, finally, that Lodge had sought the votes of "hyphenated classes who
confess their patriotism to be 50-50; at any rate, not 100 per cent
American."160

152Ibid., 3785.
. 153Ibid.
154Ibid.
155Ibid.
156Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158Ibid.
159Ibid., 3787.
160Ibid., 3788.
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In addition to attempting to discredit the integrity of Lodge,
Williams attempted to strengthen his own integrity by portraying himself
as a patriotic American deeply concerned with maintaining the peace of
the world.

In his introductory remarks, Williams emphasized his own

humility in replying with an impromptu speech to Lodge's carefully pre
pared oration.
Mr. President, I hesitate very much to undertake to reply extem
poraneously and in a few minutes to the greatest possible prepared
presentation of the selfishness of American policy ever made even
by the Senator from Massachusetts.
I would have to have more
egotism than even I have if I thought I could answer fully "off
the bat" the things the Senator from Massachusetts has been cogi
tating and laboriously studying to express for three weeks, more
or less, with a view to capturing the Senate and the galleries,
whose occupants have come by announcement to hear him today.
Williams carefully defined his own Americanism so that it would contrast
with the accusations which he had made against Lodge.
My Americanism is not merely defensive; it is not merely a ques
tion of isolation; it is a question now and then of indignation
and offense against the powers of unrighteousness and wrong, and
I am willing to take up the cudgels against them.162
In his final instance of ethos designed to implement his own integrity,
Williams again emphasized the contrast between his purpose and that of
his opponent.

"I am going to favor the government of this country

regardless of men with 50-50 patriotism."163

Intelligence
Williams did not attack Lodge's intelligence.

On the contrary,

he emphasized the deliberateness with which he believed his opponent to

16 k b i d ., 3784-85.
162Ibid., 3787-88.
163Ibid., 3788.
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Style

Clearness

The first aspect of Williams ' style which contributed to the
clearness of his address of August 12 was his thorough knowledge and
understanding of the ideas involved in the debate.

He clearly demon

strated his familiarity with the Covenant and his ability to point out
errors in Lodge's interpretations of that document.
A second aspect of style which contributed to clearness was
Williams' discerning world selection.

The appropriateness of his words

may be criticized, however, on the basis of their harshness.

As indi

cated earlier in the section concerned with ethical proof, Williams
exerted little restraint in his attempt to discredit Lodge's integrity.
His choice of words were current, nevertheless, since they are in current
usage even today.

His words were reputable, but may not have been

intelligible at all times to all senators.

Some of the senators may not

have been familiar'with the words, "inchoately" and "termagant."

Variety

characterized Williams' word choice, since he often chose forceful
monosyllabic verbs such as "blot," "fight," "break," "slip," "cast,"
"run," "threat," "lose," and "shout."

Additionally, he frequently used

vivid monosyllabic nouns, such as "ass," "slaves," and "fools."
trast to such words as these were polysyllabic words:

In con

"inveigh," "deriva

tion," "cognizance," "chauvinistic," "problematical," "scholasticism,"
"diabolical," and "contemptuously."
Simplicity

164supra.,

of

sentence

structure

was

a

third

aspect

of

style

which
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contributed to Williams' clarity.

In a representative sampling of

sentences, the Senator used a total of thirty-five simple sentences, six
compound sentences, thirteen complex, and sixteen compound-complex sen
tences.^^
A fourth element of style contributing to Williams' clarity was
his use of definitions, examples, and illustrations.

He was concerned

throughout the speech with defining and clearly explaining the terms of
the Covenant, particularly the stipulation that the League could not, as
Lodge had charged, override the United States.

He pointed out several

times that action or recommendations on the part of the Council required
unanimous consent.
Williams frequently employed examples to disprove arguments which
had been advanced by Lodge.

Typical of his use of example was his hypo

thetical example in which he extended Lodge's reasoning to expose its
fallacy.
If there is a question well settled in international law, it is
that a nation has the right to say who shall be welcome in its
house, just as I have the right to say who shall be a guest in my
house. But suppose that were not true; suppose that you can
imagine half of the world combining against the United States to
make us admit Japanese immigrants.
I started to say negro immi
grants from the West Indies, but we are already admitting them by
our own will and power, and they are infinitely less desirable
citizens than the Japanese; but that is because you boys up North
do not want to lose any votes when you go before the negroes in
your States. But suppose that combination to make us admit
Japanese were sought, how many nations could you get to combine
against us? Could you get Great Britain? Why, if she undertook
to force Japanese immigration upon Canada, or Chinese or Japanese
immigration upon Australia, or either one or the other upon South
Africa or New Zealand tomorrow, she would break up the British
Empire by internal revolt. Do you imagine any of the great wise

iOJI counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph of
the speech for my representative sampling.
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statesmen of Great Britain, who, whatever else they have been
in the past have never been fools, do not know that?-*-®”
Williams additionally used vivid illustrations, as in his previous
addresses, to describe the horrors of war, which would result, he pre
dicted, from our failure to ratify the treaty.
Williams was unable in his address of August 12, 1919, to avoid
unnecessary elaboration and excessive detail.
far more succinct and directly to the point.

The speech could have been
The senators, like this

reader, would probably have been relieved at a short presentation on
Williams'part for a pleasant change.
Williams used transitional material to a greater extent in this
address than in his past speeches.

As previously noted, he introduced

each new point with a statement of Lodge's argument that he intended to
refute.

Williams failed, however, to summarize his arguments at any

point in the speech.

He seemed totally indifferent to his listeners

from the standpoint of refreshing their memories.
While the speaker's knowledge of his subject, his discerning word
selection, his simplicity of sentence structure, his use of definitions,
examples, and illustrations, and his use of transitional statements may
have implemented his clarity of style, Williams could have made his pre
sentation far clearer.

He could probably have curbed his tendency to

elaborate at such excessive length and he could have made the structure
of the speech more obvious by summarizing his arguments at strategic
points in the speech, particularly in his concluding remarks.

166Ibid., 3787.

Impressiveness
Although too harsh for the occasion, Williams' use of ethical
proof to discredit Lodge probably impressed his listeners.

Primarily

through detracting from the character of his opponent, Williams imple
mented the force of his own personal character.
A second aspect which contributed to his impressiveness was his
use of imagery.

He employed visual imagery by describing the suffering

of soldiers in the trenches as well as the suffering of their loved ones,
a circumstance which would result from failure to ratify the Covenant.
Additionally, he provided vrdid description of the individuals to whom
we were indebted, those who had lost arms or legs or even their lives.
Further, he referred to the sinking of the Lusitania with its loss of
precious cargo, and he asked the senators if they intended to drift
until they were shot at.
As in his previous speeches, Williams' sentence length failed to
contribute to his clarity or to his impressiveness.

His average sentence

length in the address of August 12, 1919 was thirty-two words.

16 7

More

over, in a representative sampling of paragraphs, Williams used loose
sentences to such an extent that his impressiveness was impaired.

168

As

previously indicated, however, Williams employed primarily simple sen
tences rather than more complex forms.

Shorter sentences and more compact

sentence construction would doubtless have contributed significantly to
the speaker's impressiveness.
167

- 'This was determined by sampling the first 100 words of every
third paragraph in the speech.
168

i00In sampling every fifth paragraph, I found that Williams used
22 questions, 6 periodic sentences, 42 loose sentences, and 7 balanced
sentences.

Repetition as a device for emphasis was an aspect which fre
quently characterized Williams' style in his address of August 12.

First,

Williams' asked, "Mr. President, how can any nation, how can any people,
how can man render service of their own free w i l l ? " ^ 9

Second, he

observed that "I cannot render service in Yazoo County, Mississippi of
my own free will . . .,
free will.

. . .

free will."^7®

Yazoo County cannot render service of its own

The United States cannot render service of its own

Third, he raised a series of questions concerning Lodge's

sympathy with the desire of the world for peace.
Has he shown the slightest sympathy with the desire to have it?
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Fourth, Williams praised the brave words of the past expressing the desire
for

world

peace.

"Mr.

President,

they

were

brave

words;

they

were

true

words; they were honest words; and they were words worthy of the worship
of mankind.
some of them.

Jesus Christ uttered some of them.

Immanuel Kant uttered some of them.

uttered some of them."'*'7^
series

of

Alfred Tennyson uttered

questions

Henry IV of France

Williams' fifth instance of repetition was a

designed

to

raise

sympathy

for

the

League.

Are we, individual against individual, to fight our quarrels
out? Are we, county against county, to fight our quarrels out?
Are. we, nation against nation, to fight our quarrels out, when
we can of our own free will construct some machinery that will
come to a fairer and a more just conclusion of our quarrels?^7^
169Ibid.. 3785.
170Ibid.
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Sixth, Williams described his own interpretation of Senator Borah's
position.
Now, I understand some men in connection with this question.
I understand the man that frankly comes forward and says, "I
am an American, and I am nothing else, and I do not want to be
anything else.
I do not acknowledge that I do inhabit the
earth. I do not acknowledge that I have any duty to Frenchmen
or British or Italians or Germans or anybody else. ^4Seventh, Williams castigated Lodge, who had, according to the Mississipian, made an appeal to the galleries, "not in the interest of peace, not
in the interest of humanity, not in the interests
children, not in the interests of the

of the mothers of

sweethearts of young men, but in

the interests of a narrow Chauvinistic policy.

. . ."175

Finally, in

reply to Lodge's claim that we were under obligation only to France,
Williams observed that
We are under obligations to every man who served in the war with
Germany and came out unscathed; we are under double obligations
to every man who went in and came
out without an arm or a leg
. . . .
We are under everlasting
obligations to the shades and
ghosts of the dead of all three of those armies.
A final aspect of style which contributed to Williams' impres
siveness was his use of tropes.

First, he employed a synechdoche by

accusing Lodge of opposing the Covenant by means of the "crossing of
't 's ' and dotting of 'i's.'"^77
Irony was a second type of trope Williams used to some extent
in his address of August 12.

At several points in the speech, he accused

Lodge of having "tickled the ears of the groundlings, although it made

174Ibid.
175Ibid., 3786.
176t
u -a
Ibid.,
3788.
177Ibid., 3785.
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the judicious to grieve."^78
Borah's position.
steamships

and

williams.also used irony in describing

"I plant myself on George Washington notwithstanding

wireless

and

everything

else."'*'7 9

The

Mississippian

made

further use of irony in accusing Lodge of using a "velvet glove in an
iron
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Americans.

If there be any men in America whom, because of their "foreign
derivation," as the Senator from Massachusetts calls it, we
have got to nurse and hug and kiss in order to'make them say
that they are genuine Americans, I decline to hug or nurse or
kiss them.
So far as I am concerned they can go to the uttermost
boundaries of Sheol and Sahara.
Factors which probably contributed to Williams' stylistic impres
siveness, then, were his use of ethical proof, his use of visual imagery,
his predominantly simple sentence structure, his use of repetition in his
choice of words and their arrangement, and his use of synechdoche and
irony.

He probably could further have enhanced his impressiveness, how

ever, by using shorter and more compact sentences.

Summary

of

Style

Three important stylistic liabilities hampered Williams' stylis
tic clearness and impressiveness in his address of August 12, 1919, to

178Ibid., 3786, 3787.
179Ibid., 3786.
180lbid., 3787. This usually is stated as an iron hand in a
velvet glove, but Williams, under the pressure of an impromptu presenta
tion, seems to have slipped.
l81Ibid.
182Ibid., 3788.
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When Lodge had finished, the gallery spectators "arose as one person"
and rewarded the Sage of Nahant with a greater manifestation of applause
than anyone in the Senate could r e c a l l . " N o t h i n g like it has ever
1 88

before been seen in the Senate," observed one reporter. 00

The audience

in the galleries "stood and cheered for fully five minutes, the women
waving their handkerchiefs and the men their hats."
"...

189

The marines

waved their steel helmets and shouted their approval of Senator

Lodge's attack upon the league covenant."190

vice-president Marshall

"was wholly unable to control the visitors in the galleries, and he gave
up his efforts to restore order when the first spontaneous outburst
occurred."191

when the first outburst subsided, Marshall began to admon

ish the galleries, and the cheering "broke out anew in a second demonstra
tion that lasted for two minutes."^92
"...

when order was finally restored

one of the few men in the galleries who had not taken part in the

demonstration shouted:

'Why don't some of you Democrats answer?'"193

^he

man's cry was greeted with a wave of laughter, and, at that moment, John
Sharp Williams arose to reply to Lodge.

^•^New York Tribune, o p . cit.

188

Robert T. Small in the Atlanta Constitution, o p . ci t .

189Ibid.
190Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192Ibid.
193Ibid.
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Immediate surface response
Following Williams' introductory declaration that Lodge's address
had been "the greatest possible prepared presentation of the selfishness
of American policy ever made even by the Senator from Massachusetts,"^9"*
the Congressional Record described the immediate response from the lis
teners as merely "manifestation in the galleries."196
however, described this response as "hissing."197

New York Times,
New York Tribune,

reporting the magnitude of the applause for Lodge, observed that "even
more striking were the hisses and catcalls from all parts of the galler
ies . . . "

for Williams .198

Corroborating the reports of hisses, the

Atlanta Constitution observed that " . . .

the galleries broke all

restraint . . . and hissed Senator Williams so loudly that he could not
proceed. " 1 "
So forceful was the response from the galleries to Williams'
opening remarks that the Vice-president was forced to pound his gavel
". . . with all his strength and finally brought about sufficient calm
to deliver a lecture on senate rules."200
Although there were no further overt responses to Williams dur
ing the remainder of his speech, the spectators again expressed their
disapproval with the "same vigorous hisses and catcalls" when, an hour

1Q5
A7JU. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit.. 3784.
196Ibid,
~*~9^New York Times, August 13, 1919, p. 3.
l9% e w York Tribune, o p . cit.
^" A t lanta Constitution, op. cit.
^Q^Chicago Daily Tribune. August 13, 1919, p. 1.
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2 0 % e w York Tribune, oj>. cit.
^O^U. s. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 3788.
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mentioned in the editorials of major metropolitan newspapers nor in the
newspapers of his home state.
The delayed responses to Williams' address of August 12 came
from letters from the public, from his constituents, and, indirectly,
from the newspaper editorial support of the league idea, for which
Williams was one of the three principal spokesmen.

Readability.
As in previous addresses, Williams' lengthy impromptu presenta
tion of August 12, with its average sentence length of thirty-two words,
probably overwhelmed the average reader of the Congressional Record, as
indeed, it may have overwhelmed the senators themselves.

Technical perfection
Williams' address fell short of technical perfection in all
rhetorical respects.

Organizationally, it should have been deductively

arranged and more obvious to the listeners.

Logically, the speaker

failed to state his contentions accurately at times and failed to support
some contentions with specific evidence.

Emotional proof was not employed

extensively, but the speaker concentrated on negative ethos, discrediting
Lodge while portraying himself as a Senate spokesman for peace.

Stylis

tically, the address failed to be impressive or clear because of its
verbosity and lack of obvious organizational material.
2 06
^ uoThe major metropolitan newspapers that I searched during the
entire debates were the New York Times, New York Tribune, San Francisco
Chronicle, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Atlanta Constitution, Memphis
Commercial Appeal, Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, Washington Evening Star,
Chicago Daily News, Chicago Daily Tribune, and Christian Science Monitor.
The Mississippi newspapers were the Jackson Daily News, the Jackson Daily
Clarion-Ledger, the Vicksburg Herald, and the Natchez Democrat.
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trends

of

the

future

Essentially the same evaluation of previous addresses applies to
Williams' speech of August 12, 1919.

While he was not, of course, the

primary spokesman for the League, his views reflect the tenets adopted
twenty years later by the United Nations Organization.

Long-range

effects

upon

the

social

group

The impossibility of establishing a causal relationship between
Williams1 speaking and the subsequent establishment of a league of peace
in the form of the United Nations Organization forces the critic to con
sider Williams a supporting voice for Woodrow Wilson and, possibly, a
significant obstruction to Lodge and Borah.
During the first covenant debate, Williams failed in his objective
of discrediting Lodge to the extent that enough of his followers would
defect to permit ratification of the treaty.

The fact that Williams, at

this time, was virtually ignored by metropolitan newspapers may indicate
that his strength as a League proponent had diminished bj' August, 1919.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND COVENANT DEBATE
November 20, 1919-March 19, 1920

The

Following

the

first

Occasion

defeat

of

the

Treaty

on

November

19, 1919,

the force of public opinion, overwhelmingly in favor of the adoption of
a league of nations, prompted some senators to further consideration of
the

Lodge

reservations.

Fleming

comments

that:

The failure of the Senate to approve the Treaty struck the multi
tudes who resented or regreted the reservation campaign as a
world tragedy such as had seldom happened. To still larger
numbers, who did not feel the sense of epochal decision, it seemed
simply incredible that the dispute should not be compromised in
such a way as to allow the United States to participate in the
liquidation of the war and the establishment of peace, on a some
what more stable basis at least.-*Even Lodge himself by December, 1919, had recognized the comproA

mise spirit.*

Failing to convince Wilson to withdraw the Treaty and

resubmit it to the Senate, however,^ Lodge had reverted to his "stand
pat" position by December 18.

On that date he called a meeting of the

Foreign Relations Committee to consider Knox’s separate peace resolution.

^•Fleming, oj>. cit., p. 402.
^Lodge, o£. cit., pp. 192-93.
O
JThis would have again placed the Treaty in the hands of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
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The committee, acting despite protests of its pro-Administration members,
favorably reported the resolution on December 20.
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The Irreconcilables were not directly represented in the confer
ence, but on January 23, just as the conference seemed near agreement on
a reservation to Article 10, a group of Irreconcilables summoned Lodge to
its own meeting in Senator Johnson's office.

When the Irreconcilables

^Albert Shaw, Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II (New York:
George H. Doran Co., 1924), 1163.

1920,

^Letter of John Sharp Williams
W i l l i a m s P a p e r s , B o x 50.

^Fleming,

^John

Boston:

M.

ojd. c i t . ,

Blum,

p.

Woodrow

to

Gilbert

Hitchcock,

January

404.
Wilson

and

the

Little, Brown and Co., 1956), p. 194.

Politics

of

Morality,

9,
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pointed out to Lodge that any compromise reservations would probably be
known as the Hitchcock reservations and would deliver credit for saving
the Treaty into the hands of the Democrats, progress in the effort at
compromise ceased.

O

On January 26,

Lodge announced that there could be no compromise

of principle and that,in his view, it would be impossible to

secure

ratification of the Treaty if any changes were attempted in reservations
concerning Article X or the Monroe Doctrine.^
Also on January 26, Wilson announced for the second time his
willingness to accept reservations so long as they were only interpreta
tive.

He had earlier made this concession in his second conference with

the Committee on Foreign Relations on August 19, 19l9.

The interpreta

tive reservations which Wilson proclaimed acceptable in January, 1920,
however, were the "Hitchcock Reservations," which the President himself
had written before starting his Western tour the previous autumn.
Despite the gestures of compromise on both sides, the combatants
realized by this time that no reservations of other than Republican
authorship could be accepted, especially with Wilson confined to his
sickroom.
The Democrats'

notice of January 30 that they would call the

Treaty up in the Senate on February 9 ended

all hopes for the success

of

a bi-partisan conference.-^
Last-minute attempts at conciliation by Viscount Grey, the British
O

Fleming, og_. cit., pp. 406-10.

^Ibid., p. 410.
~^Ibid ., p . 414.

308
Ambassador,

9.
back

the

failed.

Referred

to

the

Treaty

again

to

Senate

was

The

the

the

covenant

During

this

on

debate

month,

objectionable

to

determination

for

day

reconsidered

however,

the

and

on

with

Foreign

the

16

February

actually

Wilson

was

Committee

next

resumed

second

Treaty

continued

only

this

senators

made

the

included

Senate

it

reservations.

includes

finally

the

Relations,

Lodge

and

in

a

until

was

of

February

reported

Debate

March

period

Lodge

on

on

19.

one

The

month.

reservations

declaration

favoring

more

self-

Ireland.

The occasions on which Williams spoke during the second covenant
debate were March 4, March 17, and March 18, 1920.

Speech of March 4, 1920
On March 4, the Senate adopted two reservations to the Treaty:
those covering Shantung and the selection of American representatives
upon organizations created by the Treaty, such as the League of Nations
and other commissions.

The discussion of Shantung began with Senator

Lodge's amendment striking out the names of China and Japan from the
Shantung reservation which had formerly read:

"The United States with

holds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty
of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said
articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of J a p a n . ^

Of

this deletion, Fleming comments:
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U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3848.
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Following the passage of the Lodge amendment by a vote of 69 to
2, Hitchcock proposed a substitute for the Shantung reservation to the
effect that the United States understood that Japan would return German
rights and interests to China at the official end of the war by the
adoption of the Treaty.1^

In support of his substitute reservation,

Hitchcock argued that Lodge and his followers had not really been con
cerned for the interests of China, but rather had sought a means for
attacking Wilson.1^
In response to Hitchcock, Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin inquired
as to why Wilson had not taken the same action in the Shantung situation
that he had taken in the Fuime situation.

Wilson had issued a statement

to the Italian people on April 23, 1919, indicating that they had no
claim to Fuime, the Austria-Hungarian port on theAdriatic coast.
now argued that the Fuime

and Shantung situations

Williams

were not analogous.The

conditions which had existed when Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan
entered into the Shantung agreement had never changed, while the secret
treaty of London concerning the Adriatic coast and the town of Fuime had
been made with Austria-Hungary, an autocratic power which had been de
feated in the World

War. Since the government of Austria-Hungary no

longer existed, the Fuime agreement could not be compared with the
12
x Fleming, o£. cit., p. 426.
1% .

S. Congressional Record, o p . cit.., 3848.

14Ibid., 3849.
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Shantung agreement, an arrangement among the still stable governments of
Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy.

If the circumstances were

analogous, Williams continued, Fuime would be turned over to Italy.
Wilson had had the right to point out that the war had completely changed
conditions in the Adriatic.

He had no right, Williams maintained, to

ask four sovereign powers to set aside a treaty.
Williams additionally argued that Japan's demands in the Shantung
arrangement were not unreasonable.
of her four demands:

The Senate was in accord with three

an open door to foreign trade; a place for foreign

ers; a free port for all foreigners.

Japan had fourthly demanded an

entre-port in the harbor of the bay at Shantung.

Although this fourth

objective was distasteful to many Senators, Williams inquired of it
Is that more than England has in Hongkong? Is it more than
France has in Indo-China? Is that more than we have at Shanghai?
Is that less than we want? I thought we were all seeking an
"open door" in China for the trade of the white race with the
oriental population.
If that has not been our chief object, then
I have been deceived about what our chief object has been. ^

Speech of March 17, 1920
On March 17 Williams attacked a resolution that had been proposed
by Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin.

He objected, first, that the resolution

would have seemed harmless to Germany during the war.

Second, he added

that "its uncontrolled power" sounded like the German Kaiser talking,
and that "grave concern" implied that an action must be taken.

A third

objection raised by Williams was that the resolution obligated the United
States to do nothing.
After citing his three objections to the proposed resolution,

15Ibid., 3850.
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The January 23 conference of Lodge with the Irreconcilables in
Senator Johnson's office had ended all hope of compromise and from the
resumption of debate on the Covenant for the second time until its second
defeat on March 19, the League opponents succeeded only in making the
Treaty more objectionable to Wilson.
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19
i:7For a detailed discussion of the reservations, see Fleming,
U. S_. and the League, op. cit., pp. 417-50.
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with public opinion urgently demanding some solution of the impasse,
it did seem unthinkable that none could be found. Even Senator
Lodge appeared hopeful when visited by a massed body of official
representatives from twenty-six great national organizations whose
combined membership totaled 20,000,000 voters. This delegation,
calling in turn upon Lodge and Hitchcock, urged immediate ratifi
cation of the treaty on a basis "that will not require its re
negotiation."^

20

Fleming, U.

and the League, o p . cit., p. 416.

^ The Vicksburg Herald, March 27, 1920, p. 1.
^ New York Times, January 14, 1920, p. 1.

314
A.

The League to Enforce Peace
Following the first defeat of the Treaty in November, 1919, the

League to Enforce Peace launched its drive for a compromise ratification
in January, 1920.

Sponsored jointly by the League and the American Fed

eration of Labor, a conference was held at Washington on January 13, 1920.
It was attended by representatives of thirty-three organizations includ
ing the International Association, and the National Women's Christian
Temperance Union.

The conference declared itself in favor of immediate

ratification of the treaty "on a basis that will not require re-negotiation," and "with such reservations as may secure in the Senate the
necessary two-thirds v o t e . " ^
The compromise efforts, like the League itself, ultimately failed
because it could not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Henry Cabot
Lodge to propose a set of reservations agreeable to Wilson.

William

Harrison Short, secretary of the executive committee of the League to
Enforce Peace, analyzed the failure of his organization.
. . . the facts are that the action taken at our Executive
Committee Meeting on November the 13th, when we decided to issue
a statement that we gave out from Washington on November the
18th, knocked us to pieces pretty badly. The Republican members
of our organization throughout the country had already deserted
us to a considerable degree because of the partisan opposition of
the Republican machine. We had, therefore, rebuilt our organiza
tion largely out of Democrats.
This alienated a great many of
those. As an illustration of the results, I had a meeting here
in my office with the Executive Committee of the New York State
Branch and, in spite of my utmost efforts--and I never fought
more desperately in my life--they absolutely refused to do a
blessed thing, directly and avowedly because of that vote. ^
9^
JMinutes of the Conference.

Cited in Bartlett,

0 £.

cit., p.

172.
^ S h o r t to Lowell, December 29, 1919, Lowell M S S . Cited in
Bartlett, ojo. cit., p. 174.

315
B.
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The New York Times reported that
resolutions calling upon the Senate to ratify the treaty of
Versailles "with only such reservations as will not send it back
to the Allies or require a' separate treaty with Germany" were
passed unanimously by 200 persons at a dinner by Women's Non
partisan Committee for the League of Nations.^
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On December 11, 1919, the Federal Council of the Churches of
Christ in America adopted resolutions endorsing the League of Nations
and calling upon the ministers and churches of the nation to exert every
possible influence upon the President and the Senate to secure immediate
ratification "with such reservations only as are necessary to safeguard
the Constitution of the United States."^®
Hamilton Holt presented an excellent summary of the public en
dorsement of the League of Nations in his letter to the editor of the
New York World, appearing in the January 20 issue.
Last w e e k ’s overwhelming vote of the faculties and students of
the American colleges and universities in favor of ratifying
the covenant without reservations, or only with such reserva
tions as will honorably compromise the differences between the
factions in the Senate favoring some kind of a League of Nations,
must have given Senator Lodge and his drastic reservationists and
Senator Borah and his Battalion of Death a severe jolt.
Of the 158,078 votes taken in 410 institutions, 61,494 favored
a compromise to permit immediate ratification, 48,232 favored
the treaty without change, 27,970 expressed themselves in
accord with the Lodge programme, 13,943 favored killing the
treaty and the League, and 6,449 would negotiate a new treaty
with Germany.
In other words, less than one-tenth of the vote
favored Borah and less than one-fifth favored Lodge. President
Wilson's uncompromising stand evoked more support than the Lodge
and Borah proposals combined.
In fine, nine-tenths of the voters
are in favor of ratification in some form and seven-tenths are for
a League more virile than the Foreign Relations Committee would
have i t .
This vote, in which the mature judgment of the faculties corres
ponds with the idealism of the students, has been confirmed by
every other test so far taken in the country. The result of a
postal-card poll of returned soldiers and sailors from Southern
Massachusetts made by Mr. Frank L. Andrews of Fall River showed
that 554 voted for the League unamended, 5 for reservations and
12 were opposed.
The American Federation of Labor at its annual meeting in July
voted 29,000 in favor of the covenant and 400 against it. At a

•^New York Times, December 12, 1919, p. 3.
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meeting of the national and State officers at Washington on
December 13, 1919, the vote was 240 to 3 in favor of ratifica
tion, two of the three dissenters being unredeemed Irishmen.
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Fourteen daily newspapers from ten States have just taken a very
significant poll of their readers. The total vote was 48 per
cent for no reservations, 35 per cent for a compromise, 10 per
cent for the Lodge reservations, 7 per cent for no League. Most
of the papers were in Republican Congressional districts. The
poll of the Portland Oregonian, which is not included in these
percentages, was 11,096 for unamended ratification, 665 for com
promise, 112 for the Lodge reservations and 228 for no treaty.
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Typical of pro-League editorial response to the second defeat of
the Covenant was the New York Times reference to the "Senate's prolonged
and disgraceful exhibition of mean-spirited partisanship and incompe
tence."^

The New Orleans Times-Picayune bitterly observed that

It is well that the shameful and humiliating chapter of the
"treaty debate" in the Senate is finished. It is better to have
no treaty than a treaty which carries with it reservations and
expressions insulting to our former allies, a hodge-podge of
pander to alien-minded vote-groups in America and an affront to
the comrades in arms of a brief sixteen months a g o . ^

Groups Opposed to the League.

Late in November, 1919, following

the Treaty's first defeat, the National Labor Party passed a resolution
condemning the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations covenant ". . . o n
the ground that they do not conform to President Wilson's Fourteen Points
42
U.

S.

^ Oregon

Congressional

Record,

Journal, January

o p . cit

., 1604.

18, 1920, p. 1.

^ " T h e Senate Kills the Treaty," (editorial), New York Times,
March 20, 1920, p. 10.
^ " F i n i s h e d — Or Just Begun," (editorial), New Orleans TimesPicayune, March 20, 1919, p. 8.
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and is not in the interest of the working classes
In January, the Committee on Political Reforms of the Union League
Club of New York reported that the League in its present form
should not be accepted, nor should the Republican Party permit
itself to be driven into a false attitude. Its leaders have
for many years been in favor of a safe, sound, practical and
conservative League of Nations or League to Enforce Peace.
The
issue at the present time is not as to the fundamental and vital
principle of a League of Nations, but solely whether this
particular draft in its present form, avowedly tentative and
subject to amendment and revision and clearly imperfect and
dangerous as its wording now stands, shall or shall not be
adopted and ratified. That the Senate may wisely and patriotically
advise.
The American Protective Tariff League, at its annual meeting in
New York on January 22, 1920 unanimously adopted resolutions urging the
immediate declaration of peace with Germany and that the League was
"unalterably opposed to the covenant of the League of Nations as presented
and opposed to any league of nations which endangers the sovereignty,
entity and independence of the United States of America."

48

Two other anti-league organizations active during the final phase
of the debate were the American Women Opposed to the League of Nations
and the Committee of American Business Men.
formed

The latter organization was

after the first defeat of the treaty to organize opposition

among business men of the East to the League.

The most notable function

of this organization was its banquet in New York on January 19, 1920,
attended by 1,000, to honor senators who had voted for reservations.
46

New York Times, November 26, 1919, p. 12.

^ Ibid., January 9, 1920, p. 4.
48Ibid., January 23, 1920, p. 32.
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Strict Reservations for a total of forty-five votes to defeat the treaty
with the Hitchcock reservations, while the Irreconcilables shifted their
allegiance to the twenty loyal Wilson supporters, including Williams, to
defeat the treaty with the Lodge reservations.
Williams' only hope for adoption of the treaty in the form ap
proved by Wilson was to persuade enough Strict Reservationists, or proLodge senators, to combine their votes with the League supporters and the
Mild Reservationists for ratification of the treaty with the Hitchcock
reservations.
When Williams presented his last plea for the "Wilson" League on
March 17, 1920, therefore, his "target group" included sixteen Strict
Reservationists.

The Representative Speech
This section consists of a detailed analysis and evaluation of
Williams' address of March 17, 1920.

The address was representative of

Williams' speaking in the second covenant debate because in it he made
his final plea for ratification of the covenant with the Hitchcock re
servations.

In his other two addresses of the second covenant debate,

Williams limited himself to criticism of specific amendments.
The analysis and evaluation includes treatment of Williams'
organization, argumentative development, emotional proof, ethical proof,
style, and effectiveness.

Organization

The following is a detailed outline of the speech.
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Introduction

I.

Williams dismissed the Lenroot amendment as a "little foolish
amendment, which, of course, does not cut much f i g u r e . "53

II.

Williams proposed that " . . . the best thought and the highest
thought of every man might be well directed to the question of
keeping the peace and settling disputes, whether they were
individual, industrial, or international, by some fair, arbitral,
common board."54

III.

"This whole question came back to this:
Will you or will you
not voluntarily limit your own sovereignty Co the extent neces
sary to bring about 'peace on earth and good will among men? "'55

Thesis:

The United States should enter the League without the Lodge
reservations.
(for)

Body

I.

The League is in operation and
A.

B.

II.

III.

is going to work.

(for)

It is stronger than the concert of Europe ever was,
1.

It includes Japan.

2.

It includes several
countries.

(for)

of the strongest South American

The United States Senate is powerless to prevent its operation.

The United States cannot be
(for)

an independent and uncontrolled power,

A.

Other nations should have their rights.

B.

Uncontrolled power is an old Middle Age concept.

(for)

1.

The day of the lord's castle on the hill has passed.

2.

Today all nations are interdependent with one another.

Entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate
the League. (for)
A.

All the nations in the League would be equally sovereign.

B.

All would impose exactly the same limitations that we would
have.

53u. S.
3^Ibid .
55ibid.

Congressional

Record,

op.

c i t

., 4461.
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Conclusion
I.

I would rather the United States stayed out of the League than
to enter it with such reservations and conditions as emasculated
the agreement. (for)
A.

The European countries and Japan may be able to preserve the
peace of Europe.

B.

The Monroe Doctrine may preserve peace in the Western Hemi
sphere .

Analysis of the Organization
This section presents an analysis in terms of the craftsmanship
and the audience adjustment of the organization of Williams' address of
March 17, 1920.
Craftsmanship.

Organizational craftsmanship concerns thematic emergence,

method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in disposition.
1.

Thematic emergence.

Williams came closer to stating his

thesis in this address than in any of his previous addresses.

In his

fourth paragraph, he explained the three positions being taken by the
senators.
This whole question comes back to this: Will you or will you not
voluntarily limit your own sovereignty to the extent necessary to
bring about "peace on earth and good will among men?" There are
two sides, either one of which may be right, and nobody between
them can be right.
Williams then observed that Borah and the Irreconcilables, one of the
sides which could have been "right," favored no entangling alliances of
any description.

Outlining his own position, Williams noted that

The other side is the side which I take, which is that no country
can live for and by itself; that it must live interdependent and
not independent; and that in living in that way it must agree upon

~^Ibid., 4461.
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a modus vivendi with the remainder of the world whereby they can
all live in peace with one another .^
Of the third position in the debate, Williams commented:
Now, the men in between us two, that want to devitalize and
emasculate and poison the League of Nations so that it shall
not amount to anything except words, in my opinion, are clearly
wrong.
Considering the three major arguments of the speech, however, Williams did
not literally state his thesis.

The arguments that the League was already

in operation and was going to work; that the United States could not be
an independent and uncontrolled power; and that entering the League with
the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League seem to support a
thesis, the most succinct statement of which is:

"The United States

should enter the League without the Lodge reservations."

Since Williams

did not state his thesis in these words, the thematic emergence must, at
least to a partial extent, be considered implicative in nature,,
2.

Method of division and arrangement.

As in his previous

addresses, Williams divided his material according to the refutative re
quirements of his subject.

Each argument corresponded generally to argu

ments that had been raised against our entry into the League, although
the speech did not reply to arguments raised in any specific speech as
had Williams' address of August 12, 1919.
3.

Rhetorical order in disposition. Williams probably succeeded

in his opening remarks in enlisting the attention and interest of his
listeners and in rendering them well disposed toward himself.

58Ibid.

He raised
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the compelling question of nations’ getting along with one another and
then identified his position with that of Jesus Christ.
Fellow Senators, it has seemed to me since I was a boy as if the
world were composed of a lot of people, a lot of nations, a lot
of races, a lot of religions, and a lot of people everywhere who
ought to seek to get along with one another.
It has seemed to me
since I first conceived the idea of the purposes of Jesus Christ
that His purpose was to be a Prince of Peace and that the Christian
religion consisted chiefly in trying to live a peaceable life with
another individually and nationally.
It has seemed to me that
whether you were Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
Methodist, Baptist, or Mormon, you could all agree upon one thing,
and that was that the best thought and the highest thought of every
man might be well directed to the question of keeping the peace
and settling disputes, whether they were individual, industrial, or
international, by some fair, arbitral, common board.
Preparing the way for his ideas to come, Williams also argued, in his
introductory remarks, that "there is no such thing as an independent and
uncontrolled sovereignty amongst civilized countries."
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The body of the speech consisted of the statement of Williams’
three arguments:

that the League was already in operation and would

work; that the United States could not be an independent and uncontrolled
power; and that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would
emasculate the League.

Williams elaborated upon each of these arguments,

although not to the extent that he had in the past elaborated, often in
excessive detail.
Williams' concluding remarks were in the Aristotelian tradition.
He attempted to render his audience well-disposed toward himself, and
ill-disposed toward his opponent by realistically assuming that the Senate
would not ratify the covenant with the Hitchcock reservations and express
ing the hope that peace would prevail because of the operation of the

59Ibid.
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League in Europe and the operation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western
Hemisphere.

In order to render the listeners ill-disposed toward the

adoption of the Lodge reservations, Williams observed that they would
cause the League to fail, and, therefore they would also cause world
peace to fail.
A second Aristotelian characteristic of Williams' peroration was
that he made his own case seem more important and vital to the preserva
tion of peace by linking it with Jesus Christ and his world peace
philosophy.

He depreciated the adoption of the Lodge reservations by

identifying them as a cause for failure of Christ's world peace philos
ophy.
Third, the peroration was designed to excite emotions by appeal
ing to the listener's desires for self-preservation and legislative
success, and, finally, Williams attempted to recall the facts of his
case to his listeners.

He specifically discussed his own proposal as a

workable proposition for the preservation of world peace, and he dis
cussed the adoption of the Lodge reservations as a means for the destruction of world peace.
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Although making an impromptu speech, Williams

systematically attempted to capture the sympathy of his listeners for
himself, while alienating them from Lodge; he attempted to magnify his
own case, while depreciating Lodge's; he attempted to arouse the emotions
of his listeners; and he attempted to refresh their memories.
I would infinitely rather that the United States stayed out of
the league than to enter it with such reservations and conditions
as emasculated the agreement. I have a hope that Great Britain
and France and Italy and Holland and the Scandinavian powers and

61
DAThe characteristics of the Aristotelian peroration are cited
in Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, o p . cit., p. 240.

329
Switzerland and Japan may make it a working proposition for the
preservation of peace in Europe, we can make the Monroe Doctrine
here a working proposition in favor of the preservation of peace
in the Western Hemisphere. But if we go in with reservations
that render the original agreement invirile and emasculate, then
the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when
we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace philos
ophy. 62
The introduction, body, and conclusion of Williams' speech, then,
adhered to the Aristotelian tradition, although the speaker may have
made no conscious attempt at such adherence.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment
Williams' overt presentation of his thesis in his address of
March 17 was in keeping with the bluntness of his remarks to his colleagues.
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Since he stated each of his main arguments, and since the

listeners already knew his position, no justification'existed for the
implicative development of a thesis.

The thesis, as previously noted,

may be considered partially implicative in its development because
Williams did not make such an unequivocal statement as:

"The United

States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations."

His

interpretation of the three positions in the debate, however, clearly
leads the reader, and probably leads the listeners, to infer the above
statement of Williams' thesis.
The major divisions of the speech were consistent logically with
the thesis.

The lack of obvious transitional material, however, makes an

absolutely accurate determination of what Williams intended to be his

62u. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 4462.
*^As I previously indicated, Williams did not literally state his
thesis in the form with I take it to be. He gave a clear indication of
the nature of the thesis, however, in the fourth paragraph of the speech.

main arguments impossible.

The impossibility on the part of the reader

of determining main points was probably shared by the Senator's listeners.
As in Williams' previous addresses, all members of the Senate
were aware of his position and purpose in the debate.

His failure to

state his thesis unequivocally; his failure to preview his arguments;
his failure to indicate, obviously, by means of clear transitional wording
and his failure to summarize his arguments in his concluding remarks,
therefore, seems unjustifiable.

The writer concludes that, organization

ally, Williams was indifferent toward his listeners.

He showed no concern

for their facility in comprehension or retention of the arguments pre
sented in his speech of March 17, 1920.

Invention:

Argumentative Development

This section is concerned with the severity and strictness of the
argumentative development and the logical credibility of Williams' argu
ments to his listeners in his address of March 17, 1920.

Argumentative Development of the Thesis
In support of his thesis that the United States should enter the
League without the Lodge reservations, Williams contended, first, that
the League was already in operation and was going to work.

The relation

ship of this contention to the thesis becomes clear when both are restated
in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.
Major Premise:

If the League is in operation and is going
to work, the United States should enter the
League without the Lodge reservations.

Minor Premise:

The League is in operation and is going to work.

Conclusion:

The United States should enter the League with
out the Lodge reservations.
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In attempting to influence the defection of several Strict Reservationists,
Williams strengthened the minor premise of the argument by maintaining
that the League already was stronger than the concert of Europe ever had
been.

This was true, he said, because, in addition to the European

powers that had already entered the League, Japan and several of the
strongest South American countries had become members.
Since the senators were familiar with the countries which had
entered the League at that time, and, since Williams was correct in that
the numerical strength of the League did outweigh the previous concert
of European powers, this argument was probably logically credible to the
senators
Williams attempted, second, to strengthen the premise that the
League would work by pointing out that the members of the Senate were
powerless to prevent the League's operation.
You can not help it if you want to; you are powerless in men
and money and navy and army to prevent it if you want to. If
you think you can fight the world you are mistaken; you can
not. They have made up their minds that they will keep the
peace of the world against any lawless outcast nation; and if
you want to be a lawless outcast nation, be one if you choose,
but you can not win along that line.^5
Again, in view of the powers which had already become members of the
League, Williams' argument probably constituted logically credible proof
to his listeners that the League and its continuing operation was an
accomplished fact.
Williams' second major argument in support of his thesis was that
the United States cannot be an independent and uncontrolled power.

The

°^Fleming, The United States and the League, o)D. cit., p. 545.
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argument may be restated and clarified as a hypothetical syllogism.
Major Premise:

If the United States cannot be an independent
and uncontrolled power, it should enter the
League without the Lodge reservations.

Minor Premise:

The United States cannot be an independent and
uncontrolled power.

Conclusion:

It should enter the League without the Lodge
reservations.

In support of the minor premise, Williams contended, first, that
the other nations should have their rights.
I do not want to be, in the community in which I move, an uncon
trolled power; I want you to have your rights; I want the Senator
from Texas to have his; I am willing to give--and I am speaking
as a citizen of the United States--I want to give to all the people
on earth their rights. I do not want to be "uncontrolled" nor
"independent," and no nation on the surface of the earth can be
uncontrolled or independent .
This argument probably failed to impress the listeners as logically
credible because Williams failed to establish a definite causal relation
ship between the operation of the United States as an independent and
uncontrolled power and the infringement upon the rights of other nations.
He failed, in short, to answer the question;

Why cannot the United

States operate independently and, at the same time, avoid infringing upon
the rights of other nations?

Many of his listeners, particularly the

Strict Reservationists to whom he probably intended to direct his remarks,
may not have been willing to assume that the United States, operating as
an independent and uncontrolled power, would automatically infringe upon
the rights of other nations.
Second, in support of the premise that the United States cannot
be independent and uncontrolled, Williams argued that the concept of

66Ibid.
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uncontrolled power was an "old Middle Age concept."
There was a time when every community was independent, with the
lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they fought
the world for their side arms and for their food. That has passed
long ago, and the very word "independent" in connection with a
nation is a misnomer today. Great Britain is not independent;
France is not independent; you are not independent; we are all
interdependent with one another; and if we are not, then we are
uncivilized, and we sink to barbarism tomorrow, or else we declare
war upon the world and the world declares war upon us; and in that
sort of a war any particular nation must fall.°°
The weakness of this supporting argument lay in Williams' failure to
define the "interdependency" he claimed for all nations.

He failed to

recognize degrees of independence as opposed to interdependence.

This

supporting argument may be restated as a disjunctive syllogism to clarify
Williams' logic.
Major Premise;

Either nations are interdependent, or they
are uncivilized.

Minor Premise;

Our nation is not uncivilized.

Conclusion;

It is interdependent.

The weakness which probably occurred to Williams' listeners, especially
those already hostile toward his thesis, was that the two alternatives
of the major premise were not mutually exclusive.

Most listeners in 1920

would have concluded that, despite modern shipping, transoceanic communi
cation, and the airplane, the Western Hemisphere was still separated from
the continent of Europe by an ocean, and that, therefore, the United
States could, in fact, enjoy a greater degree of independence than could
the countries of Europe.
Williams' second major argument, then, that the United States

67Ibid.
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could not be independent and uncontrolled, probably failed to influence
the members of his "target group," because he failed to demonstrate
logically, first, that if the United States were independent, other
nations would suffer automatic infringement upon their rights.

His sec

ond failure was to demonstrate logically that the United States must make
a choice between the two absolute alternatives of interdependence or
barbarity.
Williams' third major argument in support of the thesis that the
United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations was
that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the
League itself.

The argument may be restated and clarified as a hypothe

tical syllogism.
Major Premise:

If entering the League with, the Lodge reserva
tions will emasculate the League, then the
United States should enter without them.

Minor Premise:

Entering the League with the Lodge reservations
will emasculate the League.

Conclusion:

The United States should enter the League
without the Lodge reservations.

Williams supported his minor premise by arguing that, since all
nations in the League would be equally sovereign, all nations would,
therefore, impose exactly the same limitations that we, by adopting the
Lodge reservations, would impose.
If they did let us in with the [Lodge] reservations, then, enter
ing a league with other nations every one of which would be equal
and sovereign and equally sovereign, they would have exactly the
same limitations that we would have, and the League of Nations would
be emasculate and invirile, as incapable of perpetuating itself as
an emasculated man might be, and the world in a few years would have
the object lesson of an unsuccessful League of Nations; and the
minute they saw an unsuccessful League of Nations, the average man
in America and Great Britain and France and Italy could not make the
distinction, and when you said to him, "This thing failed because it
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was defective," he could not understand that. He would just
simply say: "The experiment of a league of nations has failed.
It has gone down. It has been unable to do anything.
It was
invirile. It was emasculate. It accomplished nothing." Then
you shall have discouraged every seer and every prophet and
every poet that had dreamt about world peace, and you shall have
discouraged him for fifty years to come if not for a h u n d r e d .
Like his second major argument, Williams' third argument probably failed
to influence the members of his target group.

Williams begged the ques

tion by merely asserting that the Lodge reservations would weaken the
League.

He failed explicitly to explain how these reservations would

render the League powerless.

Why, the listener might wonder, would the

adoption of reservations similar to the Lodge reservations by the entire
membership of the League render it inoperable?

Williams failed to pro

vide an answer.
Williams seems to have been inaccurate in his evaluation of the
Lodge reservations.

Thomas A. Bailey observes that "most of the reserva

tions were irrelevant, inconsequential, or unnecessary.

Some of them

merely reaffirmed principles and policies, including the Monroe Doctrine
and control of immigration and tariffs, already guaranteed by the Treaty
of Versailles or by the Constitution of the United States."^®

Bailey

further notes that "Wilson repeatedly expressed a willingness to accept
mild reservations, and had in fact worked out a list with the Democratic
leaders that differed only slightly from that of Lodge."
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The essential

difference between the Lodge reservations and the Hitchcock reservations
was that the former had, in the second reservation, stipulated that a

^

Ibid., 4462.

7®T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, o p .
cit., p. 620.
^ Ibid,. p. 621.
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joint Congressional resolution would be required to carry out the pro
visions of Article X of the Covenant .^

Wilson had steadfastly urged

his followers to accept no compromise concerning Article X, the "heart
of the Covenant."

Lodge, of course, had been equally unwilling to com

promise .
In his unswerving devotion to the wishes of Wilson, Williams
failed to consider that "practically all Democratic senators desperately
wanted to accept the [Lodge] reservations, but a majority of them were
literally too afraid of Wilson to oppose h i m . " ^

Not only, then, did

Williams fail to explain why he believed the Lodge reservations would
"emasculate" the League, but he failed as well to realize that the reser
vations, particularly the second Lodge reservation concerning Article X
of the Covenant, were likely to be of ephemeral importance in practice."
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Summary of Argumentative Development
In terms of logical proof, then, Williams had made only his first
argument credible to his listeners.

He could, indeed, prove that the

League was already in operation and that it would continue to operate
despite the wishes of the United States Senate.

Concerning the more

72

'Article X was stated as follows: "The Members of the League
undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members
of the League.
In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat
or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Cited in Fleming, The United
States and the League« o p . cit., p. 538.
^ A r t h u r S. Link, American Epoch, o p . cit., p. 233.
^Fleming, 0 £. cit., p. 438. Both Fleming and Bailey express the
view that the Lodge reservations would not have seriously weakened the
League.
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delicate issues of whether the United States could be independent and
uncontrolled or whether the Lodge reservations would emasculate the
League, however, Williams was less than logically credible.

He there

fore failed effectively to utilize logical proof, one of his available
menas of persuasion.

Invention:

Emotional Proof

In his relatively brief address of March 17, 1920, Williams
attempted to arouse emotional responses within his listeners by appeal
ing to three of their motives:

social responsibility, patriotism, and

self-preservation.
In his introductory remarks, Williams appealed to the motive of
social responsibility with the observation that the questions of keeping
the peace and of one nation's getting along with another should be the
"highest thought of every man."

75

A second reference to the social

responsibility of the senators was Williams' declaration that the
"highest worship I could pay to God was to try to live in peace with
other people.n7^

He commented further that "it seems to me now that the

highest reason for which God created man was that he might cooperate with
other men in maintaining peace as a means toward progress and civiliza
Third, he urged his colleagues that "every civilized nation

t i o n . " ^

recognizes limitations upon its sovereignty.
75

If it fails to do so, it
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sinks into barbarism."7®

His final appeal to his listeners' motive of

social responsibility was his admonition that they must be willing "to
surrender a part of our individual liberty in order to secure peace.1,79
Williams appealed to the senators' motive of patriotism by sug
gesting that those most patriotic concerning the Monroe Doctrine had, by
defeating the League, given up the Doctrine, because South American coun
tries would enter the League.
If a half dozen South American powers enter into the League of
Nations, this great operating concern outside of which you
choose to remain and which you can not defeat on sea or on land,
which you can not fight on sea or on land--it is too powerful
for you--if those South American countries enter into it, and we
have a quarrel with one of them, it simply appeals to the League
of Nations.
Then we shall not face them but we shall face the
League of Nations, which means the civilized world. So while you
are quarreling here and talking about the Monroe Doctrine you
have surrendered it and given it up.®®
As a practical matter of self-preservation, Williams appealed to
his colleagues to appraise the League realistically and, essentially, to
realize that, since the United States could not succeed in fighting the
entire League, the best policy would be to join the League.
If you think you can fight the world you are mistaken; you can
not. They have made up their minds that they will keep the peace
of the world against any lawless outcast nation; and if you want
to be a lawless outcast nation, be one if you-choose, but you can
not win along that line.®*
A second instance of the Mississippian's appeal to his listeners' motive
of self-preservation was his ultimatim that the senators could accept
either of two alternatives:

7®Ibid.
79Ibid.

recognize the United States' interdependency
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upon other nations and join the League, or sink into barbarism and "fall."
You are not independent; we are all interdependent with one
another; and if we are not, then we are uncivilized, and we sink
to barbarism tomorrow, or else we declare war upon the world and
the world declares war upon us; and in that sort of a war any
particular nation must fall.
Finally, in his conclusion, Williams appealed to self-preservation by
vividly predicting that, should we enter the League with the Lodge reser
vations, we could prepare for the collapse of world peace.
But if we go in with reservations that render the original agree
ment invirile and emasculate, then the whole thing will fail;
and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ fails,
and with Him his world peace philosophy.83

Summary of Emotional Proof
As in his past addresses, Williams failed to make extensive use
of emotional proof as a means of persuasion.

In his address of March 17,

1920, he limited the types of motive appeals to those of social respon
sibility, patriotism, and self-preservation.

The appeals used, however,

were couched in the language of Williams' listeners and probably
accurately reflected the general overall objectives of all the members of
the Senate.

Invention:

Ethical Proof

In his address of March 17, 1920, as in his previous addresses,
Williams relied heavily upon ethical proof as a means of persuasion.

By

portraying himself as the spokesman in the Senate for world peace and by
depicting the opponents of the League as the enemies of world peace,

82Ibid., 4462.
83Ibid.
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Williams probably hoped to win the votes of enough Strict Reservation
ists to ratify the Covenant.

Character
In an effort to sustain his identification with world peace,
which he had in his past addresses attempted to establish, Williams r e 
flected that
It has seemed to me all the time, with all my individual defects
of every description, that the highest worship I could pay to God
was to try to live in peace with other people. I admit that I
have not been able to do it always with the hot, quick, Welsh
temper that led me now and then to strike when I ought not to have
struck, but it has seemed to me and it seems to me,now that the
highest reason for which God created man was that he might cooperate
with other men in maintaining peace as a means toward progress and
civilization.84
While associating himself with the ideals of humanity and peace, Williams
attempted to link his opponents with the opposite concept, the destruc
tion of peace and the perpetuation of war.

The Lodge Reservationists,

Williams maintained, were determined to "devitalize and emasculate and
poison the League of Nations so that it shall not amount to anything
except words."8-*

Further, the opponents of the League, he said, were

advocating a "Middle Age concept."88
Williams declared that the opponents of our entry into the League,
as well as those who would "emasculate" the League with the Lodge reser
vations, were advocates of the end of civilization; they were advocates

84Ibid., 4461
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of barbarism; and they were advocates of the "fall" of the United
States.

87

Moreover, he said the opponents of the League would cause the

United States, in an undesirable way, to "stand out" among nations.
. . . pretty nearly all the remainder of the world has gone into
this league; we "in the forefront files" of the army of time
alone stand out, and stand out how? By a certain 13 or 15
"irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders," who read the riot act to
the Senator froth Massachusetts and told him what he had to do with
this treaty, and the Senator from Massachusetts surrendered and
put all their requirements in, and then they concocted it all so
that they knew that I and about 26 other Senators on this side
could not vote for it in the way they had fixed it up. They have
thus arranged to beat the treaty and to beat the League of Nations
and to keep the greatest civilized country in the world out of
it.88
In addition to their other sins, the opponents of the League, Williams
contended, would cause the League itself to fail in the eyes of the
world.
. . . the minute they saw an unsuccessful League of Nations,
the average man in America and Great Britain and France and
Italy could not make the distinction, and when you said to him,
"This thing failed because it was defective," he could not
understand that. He would just simply say: "The experiment of
a league of nations has failed.
It has gone down. It has been
unable to do anything.
It was invirile. It was emasculate. It
accomplished nothing."8®
Not only would the League's opponents be responsible for its failure,
but, worse than that declared Williams, they would discourage "every
seer and every prophet and every poet that had dreamt about world
peace, and you shall have discouraged him for fifty years to come if not
for a hundred."®®

87Ibid., 4462.
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Finally, Williams attempted to discredit Lodge and the Reserva
tionists by warning that
. . . if we go in with reservations that render the original
agreement invirile and emasculate, then the whole thing will
fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ
fails, and with Him his world peace philosophy.9-^

Intelligence
In addition to attempting to discredit the integrity of his
opponents, Williams suggested to his listeners that the enemies of the
League and those who favored the Lodge reservations were not intelligent
in their judgments.
Any man who thinks that the United States can be an "independent
and uncontrolled power" is either a knave or an ass. No coun
try can be an independent, uncontrolled power on the surface of
this earth, not even we, the most powerful people in the world.92

Summary of Ethical Proof
Although his goal in speaking on March 17, 1920 vas probably that
of converting some of the votes of the Strict Reservationists if possible,
Williams gave indications of awareness of the hopelessness of his, and
Wilson's position.

He admitted that the Irreconcilables and the Bitter

Enders had forced Lodge into such a position that agreement among the four
factions was impossible.

Williams retained his vigor in this, his last

effort on behalf of the League, in his continuing effort to discredit the
integrity, the intelligence, and, indirectly, the good will of the enemies
of American entry into the League of Nations.

Primarily by casting a

shadow of doubt upon the integrity of his opponents Williams apparently

91Ibid.
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hoped, either to accomplish his purpose, or to forestall what he recog
nized to be the inevitable defeat of the Covenant in the Senate.
this means of persuasion upon which he relied heaviest.

It was

Although his use

of ethos reflected what should have been the goals of the elected repre
sentatives of the American people, a desire for world peace, as the
people themselves had repeatedly expressed it, it must be noted that his
efforts were overwhelmed by the other political factors operating against
the ratification of the Covenant.

Style

Clearness
As in his previous addresses to his colleagues, Williams' thorough
understanding and knowledge of the ideas involved in the second covenant
debate contributed to his ability to present the address clearly.

His

familiarity with the Covenant, for instance, permitted him to associate
it with the teachings of Jesus Christ, while he could associate the oppo
nents of the Covenant with the overthrow of Christ's philosophy of world
peace.
A second aspect of style which contributed to Williams' clearness
was his discerning word selection.

With the exception of his harshness

in labeling his opponents "either knaves or asses,"93 the Mississippian's
language was appropriate to the occasion and to his purpose, probably a
last-ditch effort toward ratification.

His choice of words enjoyed

currency in 1920 because the words are those in current usage today.
Moreover the words were reputable and intelligible to his listeners

93Ibid.. 4461.
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because of their general simplicity.

Williams' variety of word choice

may be demonstrated by contrasting his use of monosyllabic verbs e x 
pressing action, such as "strike," "sink," "live," "give," "take," "fail,"
"step," "fight," "face," "win," "fall," "fixed," and "beat," with his use
of such polysyllabic words as "devitalize," "emasculate," "misnomer,"
"concocted," "innocuous," "neutrality," "invirile," and "perpetuating."
Williams' choice of words was discerning, then, with respect to their
appropriateness, currency, reputability, intelligibility, and variety.
A factor wtlich failed to contribute to Williams' clarity was the
excessive complexity of his sentence structure.

In a representative

sampling of sentences from the address, Williams used a total of seven
compound-complex sentences, five complex sentences, four compound sen
tences, and only one simple sentence.^
The second aspect of style which contributed to clearness was
Williams' use of definitions to clarify ideas, his use of examples, and
his use of illustrations.

At the outset of his speech, the Senator

defined for his listeners, and identified his own cause with, the purpose
of the Christian religion.
It has seemed to me since I first conceived the idea of the
purposes of Jesus Christ that His purpose was to be a Prince of
Peace and that the Christian religion consisted chiefly in trying
to live a peaceable life with another individually and nationally.^5
A typical instance of Williams' use of examples to amplify his argument
was his enumeration of the powers that had already entered the League and
had made it a working concern.

^ T counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph of
the speech for my representative sampling.
95
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Not only France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan— the great powers —
have entered into the League of Nations and have made it a
working concern, which I hope they can make operate for the
peace of the world without our intervention and without our modi
fications and without our membership, if we do not choose to go
in, but the three Scandinavian countries have gone in; Switzer
land has gone in.96
Williams also used illustrations to support his arguments.

He argued,

for instance, that the idea of a nation's being "independent" and "uncon
trolled" was "an old Middle Age concept."97

ne illustrated this argument

with the observation that
There was a time when every community was independent, with the
lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they fought
the world for their side arms and for their food. That has
passed long ago, and the very word "independent" in connection
with a nation is a misnomer today.98
Organizationally, Williams may have left his listeners "in the
dark" to the same extent that the reader of the text in the Congressional
Record has difficulty in determining just what the Senator's major
arguments were.

If this writer's speculation is correct, that the main

arguments were that the League was in operation and would continue to
work; that the United States could not be independent and uncontrolled;
and that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate
the League; then the sequence of ideas was orderly, and the speech demon
strated organizational integrity in that the main arguments supported the
thesis.

The major criticism of Williams' organization is related

directly to his clearness in style.

He failed to employ any transitional

material whatsoever to bridge the gaps between the parts of his speech.

96Ibid.
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Consequently, the reader is forced to speculate as to the actual organi
zational intentions of the Senator.
An additional shortcoming which affected Williams' clearness was
the inadequacy of his argumentative development.

As indicated previously,

the writer believes that Williams failed effectively to utilize logical
proof, and, therefore, impaired the clearness of his style.
Finally, Williams failed at any point in the address to summarize
his arguments.

He did manage, as pointed out previously, to remind his

listeners of his general position in the debate in his concluding remarks.
The absence of summaries and transitional material in the speech, however,
vitiated the speaker's clearness to the extent that his knowledge of the
subject, his discerning word selection, and his superior use of defini
tions, examples, and illustrations were probably rendered ineffectual.

Impressiveness
Ineffective in his use of logical proof and limited in his use of
emotional proof in his address to the Senate of March 17, 1920, Williams
relied heavily upon ethical proof as a means of persuasion and as a
means of impressing his listeners.
The second aspect of style, then, which contributed to Williams'
impressiveness was his use of imagery.

He employed visual imagery, first,

in support of the idea that independence of nations and individuals was
"an old Middle Age concept."
There was a time when every community was independent, with the
lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they
fought the world for their side arms and for their food.99
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As a second instance of visual imagery, Williams expressed fear that
"blinded by our population, our wealth, and our power, the European might
let us in [the League] regardless of the Lodge r e s e r v a t i o n s . A s a
final instance of visual imagery, Williams warned that, should we enter
the League with the Lodge reservations, the League "would be emasculate
and invirile, as incapable of perpetuating itself as an emasculated man
might be."*®^
Williams utilized auditory imagery in his observation that the
Irreconcilables and Bitter Enders had "read the riot act to the Senator
from Massachusetts and told what he had to do with this treaty," after
which Lodge had surrendered to the pressure.1®^
In explaining that he had not always been able to live in peace
with everyone, Williams employed tactile imagery.

"I admit that I have

not been able to do it always with the hot, quick, Welsh temper that led
me now and then to strike when I ought not to have struck.

. . ,"1®3

Williams' final instance of- imagery was also tactile in nature.

He

asserted that the League of Nations "must have teeth in it, and it must
not be emasculated so that it is foredoomed beforehand to failure ."1®^
As previously noted, Williams' sentence structure was excessively
complex in his address of March 17, and failed to contribute either to
the clearness or the impressiveness of his style.

10®Ibid.
101Ibid.
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Nor did sentence length

or sentence form contribute to Williams' impressiveness.
sentence length was forty-seven words,
dominantly l o o s e . N e i t h e r

His average

and the sentence form was pre

sentence length, complexity, nor form,

therefore, contributed to Williams' impressiveness.
A third aspect of style which probably contributed to Williams'
impressiveness was his use of repetition as a device for emphasis.

In

explaining his general purpose in his introductory remarks, he noted
that "it has seemed to me since I was a boy as if the world were composed
of a lot of people, a lot of nations, a lot of races, a lot of religions,
and a lot of people everywhere who ought to seek to get along with one
another."^07

^ second instance of repetition was his explanation of

Borah's position in the debate.
One side is the side of the Senator from Idaho, who does not want
any entangling alliances of any description with anybody and says
that the United States is "sufficient to itself" and can live by
itself and must live by and for itself and does not ask for any
help from anywhere and will not give any help to anybody. 08
In contending that world order and peace among nations required a surren
der of some degree of sovereignty, Williams declared that
When these States entered into this Union, when the Provinces of
Holland entered into their union, when the Cantons of Switzerland
entered into-their union, they all understood that there must be
a surrender of some degree of State, or cantonal, or provincial
sovereign power in order that the purposes of the union might be
accomplished.

sampling included the first 100 words of every third
paragraph in the speech.
^■®8In sampling the sentences from every fifth paragraph in the
speech, I discovered five periodic, ten loose, and two balanced sentences.
lO^U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 4461.

108ibtd.
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Williams also used repetition in describing the entrants into the League.
Not only France, Great Britain, Italy, J a pan— the great powers —
have entered into the League of Nations and have made it a w o r k 
ing concern, which I hope they can make operate for the peace of
the world without our intervention and without our modifications
and without our membership, if we do not choose to go in, but
the three Scandinavian countries have gone in; Switzerland has
gone in; Brazil has gone in; Argentina has gone in; Chile has
gone in. . . ,110
The Mississippian used repetition further in a series of statements con
cerning the undesirability of independence and of being "uncontrolled."
I do not want to be, in the community in which I move, an uncon
trolled power; I want you to have your rights; I want the Senator
from Texas to have his; I am willing to g ive— and I am speaking
as a citizen of the United States--I want to give to all the people
on earth their rights.
I do not want to be "uncontrolled" nor
"independent," and no nation on the surface of the earth can be
uncontrolled or independent . ^
Williams spoke at some length against the concept of a nation's being
independent and uncontrolled.

He used repetition in listing those coun

tries which, in his view, were neither independent nor uncontrolled.
Great Britain is not independent; France is not independent;
you are not independent; we are all interdependent with one
another. . . . H *
In describing the reaction of the average man to an unsuccessful League
of Nations, Williams again used repetition.
He would just simply say:
"The experiment of a league of
nations has failed.
It has gone down.
It has been unable to
do anything.
It was invirile.
It was emasculate.
It accom
plished nothing.
Williams' concluding statements were highly repetitious in nature.

110Ibid.
^•■^Ibid.

112Ibid., 4462.
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I have a hope that Great Britain and France and Italy and
Holland and the Scandinavian powers and Switzerland and Japan
may make it a working proposition for the preservation of peace
in Europe; and if they make it a working proposition for the
preservation of peace in Europe, we can make the Monroe Doctrine
here a working proposition in favor of the preservation of peace
in the Western Hemisphere. But if we go in with reservations
that render the original agreement invirile and emasculate, then
the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when
we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace
philosophy.
Williams' eight instances of repetition as a device for emphasis, then,
may have contributed to the impressiveness of his style.
A final aspect of style which may have contributed to Williams 1
impressiveness was his use of the tropes of irony and hyperbole.

He

employed irony, first, in his description and evaluation of Borah's posi
tion in the debate.
. . . the Senator from Idaho . . . does not want any entangling
alliances of any description with anybody and says that the
United States is "sufficient to itself" and can live by itself
and must live by and for itself and does not ask for any help
from anywhere and will not give any help to anybody. That may
be right.
As a second instance of irony, Williams contended, with Senator Sheppard
of Texas, that the United States, by not entering the League, would
"stand out" among nations.
As the Senator from Texas has said, pretty nearly all the remain
der of the world has gone into this league; we "in the forefront
files" of the army of time along stand out, and stand out how?
By a certain 13 or 15 "irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders," who
read the riot act to the Senator from Massachusetts and told him
what he had to do with this treaty, and the Senator from Massachu
setts surrendered and put all their requirements in, and then they
concocted it all so that they knew that I and about 26 other Sena
tors on this side could not vote for it in the way they had fixed
it up.-*--*-”
114Ibid.
115lbid., 4461.
116Ibid., 4462.
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Williams, employed hyperbole, by making his description of events beyond
the strict line of truth, in expressing his hope that the League would
have "teeth" in i t , ^ 7 and in his observation that his opponents had
"read the riot act" to Senator Lodge.
Factors which contributed to Williams' stylistic impressiveness,
then, were his use of ethical proof, imagery, repetition, and tropes.
Aspects of style which probably failed to contribute to the speaker's
impressiveness were his ineffective use of logical proof and limited use
of emotional proof, and his excessively long, loose, and complex sentences.

Summary of Style
Although Williams did, in his address of March 17, 1920, recog
nize the virtue of brevity, his address was a stylistic failure.

His

most serious shortcoming was the lack of clarity caused by his failure
to employ transitional material and his unwillingness to summarize his
remarks at any point in the speech.

Because of his indifference to "oral"

organizational methods, neither the reader nor the listener could have
positively identified the speaker's main arguments.

In addition to the

shortcoming of a lack of clarity, the speaker's generally long, loose, and
excessively complex sentences probably rendered his speech unimpressive to
his listeners.

Effectiveness

Immediate surface response
There were no manifestations of response from the occupants of

117Ibid., 4461.
118Ibid., 4462.
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the galleries of the Senate when Williams spoke on March 17, 1920.
Immediate surface response came, however, from two of the Senator's own
colleagues.

First, Senator Sheppard of Texas interjected a comment as

Williams was speaking.

Williams was explaining that the states which

became the United States, the provinces that became Holland, and the
cantons that became Switzerland had all realized that they must indivi
dually give up some degree of sovereignty in order to become a union.
Sheppard then observed, "And the nations that have already entered into
the League of Nations have done the same thing." ^ 9

this Williams

replied, "I am glad the Senator from Texas has reminded me of that."

120

A second response to Williams came following his comment that
. . . pretty nearly all the remainder of the world has gone
into this league; we "in the forefront files" of the army of
time alone stand out, and stand out how? By a certain 13 or 15
"irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders" who read the riot act to
the Senator from Massachusetts and told him what he had to do
with this treaty, and the Senator from Massachusetts surrendered
and put all their requirements in, and then they concocted it
all so that they knew that I and about 26 other Senators on this
side could not vote for it in the way they had fixed it up. They
have thus arranged to beat the treaty and to beat the League of
Nations and to keep the greatest civilized country in the world
out of it.121
Senator Johnson of South Dakota asked Williams "if it is not also true
that none of the great powers of the world, aside, possibly, from
Switzerland, have attached any conditions or reservations to the origi
nal treaty as presented to them?"'*-22

■*~^ I b i d ., 4461.
120Ibid.
121Ibid., 4462.

Williams replied that China had
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wanted to attach reservations but had been told by the council that she
could either enter the league without reservations or stay out, and China
had chosen the latter course.

The Swiss reservation had been merely the

innocuous retention of Swiss neutrality, which, Williams pointed out, had
been recognized by all European powers years ago.

Williams went on to

say that the council, consisting of European countries primarily, would
not treat the United States as it had treated China.

Because of American

wealth and power, the council, Williams feared, would admit the United
States regardless of the attachment of the Lodge reservations.^23

Delayed Response
Williams was not directly mentioned in any of the editorial com
ments of major metropolitan newspapers concerning the league debates
following his speech of March 17, 1 9 2 0 . Most of these newspapers con
tinued their policies toward the League of Nations established during
earlier phases of the debate.

A significant exception to this was the

San Francisco Chronicle, formerly a league proponent, which editorialized
that
In fact the treaty would be found entirely unworkable with the
obligations of this country so utterly different from those of
other countries. It is best to forget the treaty, for to make
it the issue in a Presidential campaign might have very serious
international results. Drop it.*23
Indirectly the Chronicle criticized Williams for his obstinate support of

123Ibid.
^■2^See page 303 for the list of major metropolitan newspapers I
consulted.
125"jhe Rejected Treaty," (editorial), San Francisco Chronicle.
March 22, 1920, p. 18.
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the League Covenant in only its purest Wilsonian form.

"The only

noticeable cleavage following a [party] line that can be traced is the
evident disposition of Southern Senators to stick to the President right
or wrong.

And that may have been politics."

126

Although the newspapers failed to respond to Williams' speech
in the Senate on March 17, 1919, there was some recognition of his role
in the debates following his address before the Mississippi Legislature
on March 26, 1920, after the final defeat of the treaty.

All major m e t 

ropolitan daily newspapers carried reports of the content of the speech.
One of these, however, editorially urged Williams to stay in the Senate
to carry on the fight against the "hypocricy" and "two-by-four" states
men who had defeated the treaty.
Senator John Sharp Williams, addressing the Legislature of
Mississippi, says that he would rather be a dog and bay at the
moon than to spend one minute in the Senate after the expiration
of his term of office.
Senator Williams goes to that body representing the people of
Mississippi. At times he has done a service to the country by
tearing the mask of hypocricy from senatorial fakirs and two-byfour statesmen.
It is a good thing if a few men of intelligence and ability
are in the United States Senate even if a majority of that body
is of a low standard of intelligence and without any idea as to
the fitness of things. A few able men ought to remain in the
Senate to teach the other members manners, common sense, and to
keep them somewhere in the neighborhood of the principles under
lying the Constitution of the United States.
A few wise men are needed everywhere, in the Senate as well
as around homes of the feeble-minded and those suffering under
the handicap of invincible ignorance.
Readability
Williams' address of March 17 was probably less readable than

127i'stay in the Senate, John]1 (editorial), Memphis Commercial
Appeal, March 27, 1920, p. 6.

some of his past addresses had been, because his average sentence
length was forty-seven words.

Technical perfection
Rhetorically, Williams' address of March 17 was a failure.

Lack

of clarity in organization; failure logically to substantiate two of the
speech's three major contentions; limited use of emotional proof; lack
of variety in approach to ethical proof, in that the speaker again
attempted to discredit his opponents while portraying himself as the
Senate spokesman for world peace; and lack of clearness and impressive
ness of style because of Williams' refusal to summarize his arguments or
to indicate the main divisions of the speech by means of transitional
material and his long, complex, and loosely constructed sentences ham
pered the speaker's technical perfection.

Wisdom in judging trends of the future
Williams' general position, that the United States should become
a member of the League of Nations, of course, reflected the position of
Woodrow Wilson, whose ideas have since been embodied in the United
Nations Organization.

Williams' specific position in his address of

March 17, however, reflected his, and Wilson's uncompromising stand, that
no Covenant except the "Wils.on" Covenant would be acceptable.

This lack

of flexibility probably was detrimental to the general concept of world
peace.

Had Williams and other of Wilson's followers been willing to com

promise enough to allow the United States to become a member of the
League, perhaps the difficulties which Williams proclaimed would "emascu
late" the League could have been worked out among the members by mutual
consent.
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Long-range effects upon the social group
As in previous attempts to establish a causal relationship
between the speaking of John Sharp Williams on particular occasions in
the Senate and the course of subsequent events, the critic is forced to
recognize the absence of evidence which would warrant any conclusion at
all.
If Williams' purpose in the second covenant debate was to dis
credit Lodge to the extent that enough of his followers in the Senate
would rebel so that the treaty could be ratified, then the critic must
conclude that the speaker failed to accomplish his purpose.

No such

rebellion occurred, and the treaty was, of course, defeated in the
Senate.

Its defeat cannot be attributed to Williams' failure or success

in speaking.

Arthur Link's speculation concerning the causes for the

defeat of the treaty are worthy of consideration.
Certainly Lodge and his Republican friends must share a large
measure of the guilt for one of the most tragic episodes in
American history. Had they been less interested in the election
of 1920 and more concerned with their country's good, they would
have suppressed personal and partisan ambitions and met the
champions of the League half way.
In addition, the irreconcilables, who used every device to defeat ratification, must share
a large part of the guilt, for their unscrupulous propaganda
helped confuse the public as to the implications of American
membership in the League.
On the other hand, what shall we say of Wilson's conduct in
this, his greatest and most fateful battle? Because of his con
suming hatred of Lodge he, too, refused to compromise; he ignored
the advice of his best counselors and threw away the only possible
chance for ratification.
He, therefore, shared with Lodge and
other Republicans responsibility for breaking the heart of the
world. Moreover, those Democratic senators who voted against
ratification with reservations out of fear of the Wilsonian wrath
served neither the national interest nor the cause of international
peace.

^•2®Arthur S. Link, American Epoch, o p . cit., p. 233.

359
obligation is to evaluate the effort put forth by the speaker.

In short,

the critic must ask, "Faced with apparently insuperable odds against him,
did John Sharp Williams utilize effectively the available means of oral
persuasion?"
This critic replies that Williams made no effort in the final
stage of the debate to change the odds against him, which were not in
superable; and that he did not utilize effectively the available means
of oral persuasion.
In his observation that twenty-three Democrats had remained
"stubbornly loyal" to Wilson's wish to reject the Treaty with the Lodge
reservations, Bailey points out that
In view of the fact that the plain alternatives were a treaty
with reservations or no treaty at all, twenty-one realistic
Democrats forsook their leader and voted for approval.
If only
seven of the faithful twenty-three had shifted their votes,
the decision would have been reversed.
John Sharp Williams was among the seven who could have shifted their
votes.

Moreover, he probably was influential enough to have persuaded

six other senators to shift their votes with him, had he made the effort
to do so.

Then, had Wilson pigeonholed the Treaty, Williams at least

would have had the satisfaction of knowing that he had exerted his utmost
effort to realize his announced goals:

the purposes of Jesus Christ,

making the League of Nations a working concern, bringing about peace on
earth and good will among men, preventing the United States from being a
"lawless outcast nation," and avoiding "breaking the heart of the world."
In his address of September 26, 1919, Williams had argued that,
since many of the senators had expressed dissatisfaction with the

^Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, o p . cit.,
p. 622.
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Covenant as it was, it could be adopted and then modified as the United
States Constitution had been.

"Adopt it with its defects, since it is

heading in the right direction, and then proceed to amend it," the Mississippian had urged.

o

Faced with the obvious alternatives of adopting the

Covenant with the Lodge reservations or outright rejection of the Covenant,
however, Williams chose finally to advocate the latter course.

In view

of the generally "irrelevant, inconsequential," and "unnecessary" nature
O

of the Lodge reservations ,J the critic can conclude only that Williams'
fear of arousing the sickbed wrath of his Chief prompted him to ignore
his own plea:

"Adopt it with its defects, since it is heading in the

right direction, and then proceed to amend it."
Not only did Williams fail to modify his position adequately to
permit the accomplishment of his overall goal, but in pleading his cause
before his fellow senators, he failed to utilize the available means of
oral persuasion.

Williams' persuasive strength lay consistently in his

dependence upon ethical proof.

He depicted himself as an assistant to

the "Messiah" himself, whose aim was peace among the nations of the world,
a goal to which most senators at least paid lip service.

Williams'

reliance upon "proponent of peace" ethos, along with consistent castiga
tion of his opponents, however,should have been only one part of a
concerted persuasive effort utilizing effective techniques of organization,
logical proof, ethical proof, and style.^

2
U. S. Congressional Record, o p . cit., 5975.
O

JBailey, A Diplomatic History . . ., op. cit., p. 620.
^"Inadequate evidence precluded a criticism of delivery in this
study.
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Williams' organization was generally weak in that he refused to
concern himself with his listeners 1 ability to comprehend and retain his
arguments.

In his speech of December 3, 1919, he failed to identify the

arrangement of his material to the extent that an outline of the speech
must be considered speculation.

In addition to several logical incon

sistencies within the speech itself, Williams* remarks were so long and
involved that the speech must have been, to his listeners, organization
ally incomprehensible.
Although his address of June 9, 1919, contained a few organiza
tional devices designed to implement his listeners' comprehension, such
as stating topic sentences first in the development of new ideas and
indicating that he was about to criticize the activities of Senators
Reed and Borah by naming each of the senators as he began his criticisms
of them, Williams again fell short of clarity in terms of "oral," or
relatively obvious, speech organization.

The inclusion of clear transi

tional material would have aided both Williams' listeners and his
readers in determining, with some assurance of accuracy, the Mississippian's position in the debate.

Only in his address of August 12, 1919,

was Williams at all sensitive to his listeners in terms of organizational
clarity.

Presenting a series of arguments in opposition to those just

previously delivered by Lodge, Williams introduced each new counter
argument with the transitional statement, "Mr. President, the Senator
from Massachusetts says . . .," or a similar choice of words.
In his speech of March 17, 1920, Williams reverted to organiza
tional unintelligibility.

Absolute accuracy in determining the speaker's

thesis and main supporting arguments is impossible, simply because
Williams refused to exert any effort to make himself clear.

The mere
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inclusion of ordinal numbers, "first," "second," etc., to identify the
progression of arguments, would, with minimal inconvenience to the
speaker, have clarified for listeners

and readers alike the final policy

statement of the "unadulterated" League's chief Senate protagonist.
Since his position in the debate was well known by all his
listeners, Williams should have made his organization more obvious by
clearly stating his theses, by previewing his arguments, by introducing
each argument with appropriate transitional material, and by summarizing
his arguments in his concluding statements to refresh his listeners'
memories.
Successful in his address of December 3, 1918, in contending
that a league of nations could be practicable even if only the two
English-speaking countries supported it, Williams, nevertheless, failed
in subsequent addresses logically to substantiate arguments vital to
his cause.
In his speech of June 9, 1919, Williams' logical validity in his
contentions that his opponents had been guilty of partisanship, inaccura
cies, inconsistencies, and lack of imagination was outweighed by his
failure to substantiate logically his claims that opposition senators
were trying to usurp the treaty-making power from the President, that
Reed's charge of League domination by black supremacy was stupid, and
that Borah's position was that of an American junker.
On August 12, 1919, Williams failed to validate logically his
opposition to Lodge's argument that no nation could render service to
the world of its own free will.

Attempting to argue that Lodge had

neglected to consider the peace of the world, a matter which Lodge ob
viously had taken into consideration, Williams failed even to state the
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refutative argument correctly.

In short, Williams failed in all but one

instance to refute effectively the speech Lodge had previously presented
because he relied heavily upon shallow analogy and emotional and ethical
proof as a substitute for specific, tangible evidence.
Williams made only one of his three arguments logically credible
to his listeners in his address of March 17, 1920.

He substantiated

only his contention that the League was already in operation and that it
would continue to operate despite the wishes of the members of the United
States Senate, an unnecessary statement of an accomplished fact.

The

speaker failed, however, to contend with logical credibility that the
United States could not remain uncontrolled and independent and that the
Lodge reservations would emasculate the League.
The speaker's use of emotional proof was limited essentially to
appeals to the listeners' motives of self-preservation, patriotism, and
social responsibility.

In all four stages of the debate in the Senate,

Williams contended that the preservation of peace, and thus the preserva
tion of his listeners as well, depended upon the entry of the United
States into the League of Nations.

Additionally, in all four stages of

the debate, he maintained that the senators, out of love for their
country, should ratify the Treaty and insure entrance into the League.
Moreover, Williams argued consistently throughout his speeches to his
colleagues that ratification and subsequent membership in the League was
an obligation which the senators owed, not only to their fellow Americans,
but to the world as well.
This means of persuasion, however, was probably limited by the
nature of the audience.

The senators, as Williams had learned from

years of service in the Congress, were, as a group, probably not
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susceptible to an abundance of emotionalism on the part of those who
addressed them.
Williams' style was consistently verbose and rambling.
age sentence length was forty words.

His aver

The impromptu nature of the ad

dresses, along with Williams' propensity toward wordiness, probably were
the two factors most responsible for the speaker's lack of clearness
and impressiveness.
A final appraisal of the speaking of John Sharp Williams in the
League of Nations Debate in the Senate, 1918-1920, therefore, must be
twofold.

Williams failed effectively to exercise all the available means

of oral persuasion, and, at a time when independent statesmanship could
have insured the entry of the United States into the League of Nations,
John Sharp Williams either was incapable or unwilling to exercise inde
pendent statesmanship for fear of party reprimand.
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APPENDIX I

Speech of December 3. 1918
New York Times, December 4, 1918,
p. 2.

U. S. Congressional Record, 65th
Cong., 3d Sess., 1918, LVI1, Part 1,
28-31.

"The first [exploit] that they
made of themselves, what was it?"
asked he.
"They went over to the House the
other day to listen to the Presi
dent make an address with a sort of
[gentleman’s] understanding that
they were not to applaud him. They
did not know what he was going to
say, but there was a sort of a
gentleman's understanding that they
were not to applaud him."
"He had hurt their feelings by
saying that he thought the Democrats
ought to be elected to office."

"And the first [exhibition] they
made of themselves— what was it?
They went over to the House the
other day to listen to the President
make an address with a sort of
[gentlemen's] understanding that
they were not to applaud him--they
did not know what he was going to
say, but there was a sort of
gentlemen's understanding that they
were not to applaud him. He had
hurt their feelings by saying that
he thought the Democrats ought to
be elected to office."

"The hypocricy [of it I] Charging
Woodrow Wilson with a great crime
becausd" he wanted Democrats elected
to office. Even that objection was
not well founded, because when he
found men upon his own side who were
not true to the war and true to the
ideals of the war, his word went out
against them just as significantly as
it went out in favor of democracy
generally."

"The hypocrisy [of charging]
Woodrow Wilson with a great crime
because he wants Democrats elected
to office 1 Even that objection was
not well founded, because when he
found men upon his own side who were
not true to the war and true to the
ideals of the war his word went out
against them just as significantly
as it went out in favor of demo
cracy generally."

"Some of you think [over there]
that you beat the President. You
did not beat the President. The
people beat the Democratic Party at
the last election. Do you know why?
Because your party, taking it upon
the percentage basis, had been truer
to the war than we had— and when I
say we, I mean my party, We had men
in the other wing of this Capitol
[and we had men here] who were
sticking the President with a fine
Italian dagger every chance they
got.
I have come to the conclusion
that the American people put you in
office in these two houses because
they thought maybe you could be more
safely trusted to stand behind the

"Some of you [on the other side]
think that you beat the President.
You did not beat the President. The
people beat the Democratic Party
in the last election. Do you know
why? Because your party, taking it
upon the percentage basis, had been
truer to the war than we had— and
when I say 'we,' I mean my party.
We had men in the other wing of
this Capitol, [and we had men here
calling themselves Democrats, and
several of- them in high position of
committee vantage,] that were stick
ing the President every chance they
got with a fine Italian dagger. I
have come to the conclusion that the
American people put you in office
in these two Houses because they

374
President than a lot of our fellows
could be. That may be an error,
but that is my opinion, because I
have found a good many Mississippi
Democrats talking that way, even
Mississippi Democrats who never
voted any other ticket than the
Democratic ticket, and would not do
so to save their lives. But we
[have] got rid of [them, and] the
people ought to have known that we
[have gotten rid] of them [before
we went into this.]
I imagine the difficulty the
Senator from Illinois will have,
together with all of the wiser men
behind him who are going to spend
the next two weeks attacking Woodrow
Wilson, in persuading the old
Indiana Democrat in the Vice-Presi
dent's chair that he should qualify
as President of the United States
while Woodrow Wilson is [over]
having heart-to-heart talks with
Clemenceau and Lloyd George. You
might just as well try that on me
if I had happened to be Vice Presi
dent. You know that sort of
camouflage does not go."

thought maybe you could be more
safely trusted to stand behind the
President than a lot of our fellows
could be. That may be an error,
but that is my opinion, because I
have found a good many Mississippi
Democrats talking that way, even
Mississippi Democrats, who never
voted any other ticket than the Demo
cratic ticket and would not do so to
save their lives. But we [had] got
rid of [these traitors.] The people
ought to have known that [we would
get rid] of them.
[And now, Mr. President,] I
imagine the difficulty the Senator
from Illinois will have, together
with all of the wiser men behind him,
who are going to spend the next two
weeks attacking Woodrow Wilson, [if
they can manage to get the time--and
I suppose they will— I imagine the
difficulty they will have] in per
suading the old Indiana Democrat in
the Vice President's chair that he
should qualify as President of the
United States while Woodrow Wilson
is [in Europe] having heart-toheart talks with Clemenceau and
[David] Lloyd George. You know you
might just as well have tried that
on me, if I had happened to be Vice
President. You know that sort of
camouflage does not go."
["'Oh, well,' you tell me, 'but
maybe Italy will not agree; maybe
France will not agree; maybe Japan
will not agree; maybe Roumania has
private irons in the fire; maybe
Serbia has, so that you can not get
her to join in the agreement,'][I
tell you that] the two Englishspeaking races by themselves can do
it."
["I tell you that] if [nobody
else goes into the league of nations
except the English-speaking races,
the great confederacy of States here,
the great confederacy of Provinces
over there, Great Britain, Scotland,

Wales, Ireland— except the Sinn
Feiners, who amount to practically
nothing— the Canadians, the Austral
ians, the New Zealanders, the South
Africans, the most loyal of all
Britain's Provinces, because she
acted most magnanimously toward them,
they and we with our law, our language,
["If] the two English-speaking
and our courage and resources on land
nations go into it, we can by our
and at sea, are enough.]
sea power, by our control over raw
By our sea power, by our control
materials, by our control over
of raw material, by our control of
[natural] resources, [force the
the [economic] resources [of the
other nations of the world to do the world, such as iron and copper out in
league's bidding.] We can agree
your country, gold farther Northwest,
that any civilized nation that makes and cotton down South, without which
war upon another without first [sub nobody can exist, we alone, if the
mitting] the questions in controversy balance of the world will not come
to [an arbitration tribunal] shall
into it,] can agree that any civilized
be outside of the pale of civiliza
nation that makes war upon another
tion, [and that the freedom to
without first either [agreeing or
operate] upon the high seas [shall
offering to leave[ the question in
be denied to her, that access to
controvery to [fair and impartial
the raw materials and markets which
arbitrament] shall be outside of the
the two nations in the league shall
pale of civilization [and our enemy,
control shall be denied to her, and
and that their travel and traffic]
in that way we can keep] peace in
upon the high seas [shall be terminated
the world for 100 years if we only
We two--Republic and Empire--alone can
have the courage to do it.
bring about the] peace of the world
That is what Woodrow Wilson is
for a hundred years if we have the
going to Europe for.
courage to try.
That is what Wilson [has gone to
Europe to try to consumate— the dream
of poets, the vision of prophets, the
heart-wish of good men and good women
for a thousand years— peace, honor
able peace, permanent peace, just
peace; just even to our enemies, but
not over-merciful to them, because
in order to be just they must pay
retribution."]
Senator Williams warned the R e 
publicans that they would be "dig
ging their own [political] graves"
by making personal attacks upon the
President while he is abroad.

"You are digging your own graves
when you try to dig his."

"We want to have all of the in
fluence we can [while] over there to
bring about a permanent and just
peace as nearly as possible, [but]

"We want to have all of the in
fluence we can over there [with them]
to bring about a permanent and just
peace; as nearly as possible ["a
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what are you doing here?" he con
tinued. "Weakening your own [case]
every day, throwing [mud] and
accusing him virtually of [heresy]
of un-Americanism, weakening him in
the councils that, if you can help
it, America shall not predominate,
What do you want to do it for?"

parliament of man and a federation
of the world"; and] what are you
doing here? Weakening your own
[agent] every day, throwing [adjec
tives at his head,] accusing him
virtually of [idiocy,] of unAmericanism--weakening him in the
council, [so] that if you can help
it America shall not predominate,
[but somebody else will.] What do
you want to do it for?"

"All at once, nicely caught with
little complexities of [constitu
tional-oiled] arrangements, cosme
tics upon the [base] chiefly, you
try to make a scapegoat out of
Wilson. Well, you [can't] make a
scapegoat out of anybody [who] is
not a goat to start with."

"All at once, nicely caught with
the little complexities of [consti
tutional toilet] arrangements, cosmetice upon the [face,] chiefly, you
try to make a scapegoat out of Wilson.
Well, you [can not] make a scape
goat out of anybody [that] is not a
goat to start with,[and especially
not if he is wiser than the man who
attacks him is--and frequently he
is; not always; of course never when
a Senator attacks him."]

"I want to leave this thought:
How is all this going to hurt him?
How is it going to help you? How
is it going to help your posterity?
How is it going to help the American
Republic? How is it going to help
American influence in Europe? How
is it going to accomplish any good
end of any description for the pur
poses of civilization, or demo
cracy, or humanity?"

"I want to leave [you] this
thought: How is all this going to
hurt him? How is it going to help
you? How is it going to help your
posterity? How is it going to help
the American Republic? How is it
going to help American influence in
Europe? How is it going to accom
plish any good end of any descrip
tion for the purposes of civilization
or democracy or humanity?"

Speech of June 9. 1919
New York Times, June 10, 1919, p. 2

U.S. Congressional Record. 66th Cong.,
1st Sess.,1919, LVIII, Part 1, 674-78.

"Senator John Sharp Williams took
the floor and made a lengthy speech,
in which he criticised Senators
Lodge, Borah, and Reed vigorously. He
read from a Life of George Washington,
by Senator Lodge, and made analogies
between President Wilson and Presi
dent Washington.
In this history,
'"That there are in this as well as
Washington was quoted as speaking of in all other countries discontented
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'discontented [people,] who tried
to impede the Government,1 and
Senator Williams said the d e 
scription fitted Senators Lodge
and Borah perfectly."

[characters,] I well know; as also
that these characters are actuated
by very different views; some good,
from an opinion that the general
measures of the Government are im
pure; some bad, and, if I might be
allowed to use so harsh an expres
sion, diabolical— '
Think of that adjective coming from the
serene Father of his Country; diabolic!
It sounds like the Wilsonphobia of to
day -inasmuch as they are not only meant
to impede the measures of the Govern
ment generally, but more especially
as a great means toward the accom
plishment of it, to destroy the con
fidence which it is necessary for the
people to place, until they have
unequivical proof of demerit, in
their public servants.
Mr. President, if Gen. George Washington,
afterwards President, had had in imme
diate contemplation the Senator from
Massachusetts and the Senator from Idaho,
he could not better have expressed him
self when describing their conduct
toward and their words about the present
Chief Magistrate . . . .

"You are nagging and be
deviling the Administration and
taking advantage of every un
dotted *i '; you are trying to
arouse [discord among the people
toward the Chief Executive] in
Europe," said Senator Williams,
addressing Senator Borah and the
Republican side.

Alluding to the resolution
expressing sympathy with Irish
aspirations introduced by Sena
tor Borah and passed by the
Senate, Mr. Williams, who cast
the sole vote against the reso
lution, said:

"With waiting until they have 'un
equivocal proof of demerig, ' to quote
the language of George Washington, they
and their foolish followers have been nag
ging, have been bedeviling, have been on
the outside taking advantage of every
[little uncrossed "t" or] undotted "i,"
[or a "q" not followed by a "u," in order
to] arouse [distrust of our representa
tive] in Europe— [our representative,
whether we are Republicans or not. . . ."]
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"There are stories in the
newspapers about Korea having
national aspirations, but you
have not yet introduced any reso
lution against Japan, providing for
the independence of Korea, lately
conquered and very much oppressed.
Why? Because you know Great Britain
will be good-humored with you and
Japan will not be, and, [while]
there are a lot of Irish-American
votes, there are no Korean votes in
America. That is the honest God's
truth about you."

"You have not yet introduced any
resolution against Japan providing
for the independence of Korea, lately
conquered and very much oppressed.
Why? Because you know Great Britain
will be good humored with you and
Japan will not be, and [because]
there are a lot of Irish-American
votes [in America, and] there are
no Korean votes in America. That
is the honest God's truth about you."

Speech of August 12. 1919
New York Times, August 13, 1919,
p. 3.

U. S.Congressional Record,66th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1919, LVIII, Part 3,
3784-89.

"I hesitate very much to under
take to reply to the greatest possi
ble prepared presentation of the
selfishness of American policy [in
an extemporaneous answer that I must
make in a few minutes,"] he said.
"I would [need] to have more egotism
than [I ever had before if I said] I
could answer 'off the bat' the things
the Senator from Massachusetts has
been cogitating for three [months,]
more or less, with a view to
capturing the Senate and the
galleries today."
"It is not a new presentation of
the personality of the Senator from
Massachusetts. He has always
attempted to make a show of himself."

["Mr. President,]1 I hesitate very
much to undertake to reply [extem
poraneously and in a few minutes] to
the greatest possible prepared pre
sentation of the selfishness of
American policy [ever made even by
the Senator from Massachusetts.]
I
would [have] to have more egotism
than [even I have if I thought] I
could answer [fully] 'off the bat'
the things the Senator from Massa
chusetts has been cogitating and
laboriously studying to express for
three [weeks,] more or less, with a
view to capturing the Senate and the
galleries, [whose occupants have
come by announcement to hear him] to
day. It is not a new presentation
of personality of the Senator from
Massachusetts. He has always
attempted to make a show of himself."

Senator Williams went on to say
that he had intended saying that the
Senator from Massachusetts "has
always attempted to make a show of
himself as being non-partisan and
fair and impartial."

"As I was about to say, the
Senator from Massachusetts has always
attempted to make a show of himself
as being 'nonpartisan,' or 'non
sectional,' and fair and impartial."
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”1 have no respect for the man
who opposes any American [policy,]
[not because he is against it as an
American,] but because of [his]'
hatred of somebody in Europe."

I have some respect--not much—
for the German-American who opposes
American policies because of 'love
for the Fatherland, but I have no
respect [at all] for the man who
opposes [good] American [policies]
because of hatred of somebody in
Europe.
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